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Abstract  
The work’s goal is to contribute to the discussion on cartelisation in the party systems of East Central 
Europe. Its contribution to the research field is to be found in a thorough analysis of the budgets of political 
parties in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, to a smaller degree also of the budgets of political 
parties in Austria, Germany and Slovenia. In total thirty arguments found in the existing scholarly literature 
are discussed, with a focus on their relation to budgets and election strategies of political parties. These 
arguments are analysed with the help of basic tools of quantivative statistical analysis and the qualitative 
method of comparison of selected features of the analysed cases. The work’s analytical part is based on two 
new original datasets. The first one, where data on budgets of political parties are collected, uses publicly 
available sources found in both the off-line as well as the on-line world of today. The second one uses 
original data collected by the means of an electronic questionnaire send to representatives of political parties 
in the six researched countries. The work defines two new concepts that serve as the theoretical basis of the 
analysis: the rule drive and the strategy drive. The rule drive is the part of a party’s budget that is 
predominantly formed by legal regulations on political parties, their funding and activities. On the income 
side, the rule drive is mostly visible in the share of party budget comprised by state subsidies. On the 
expenditure side, the rule drive is most apparent in the legal limits of expenses parties may allocate to 
election campaigning. In addition, the rule drive encompasses also the various limits on donations 
permittable to be accepted by political parties, limits on parties‘ business activities, or the legal fees that 
parties are obliged to pay to enter certain types of elections. The strategy drive is the causal agent that is 
predominantly formed by parties‘ free decisions on how they wish to conduct their day-to-day activities 
and their election campaigning. On the income side, the strategy drive is represented by the amount of 
membership fees collected, donations accepted or loans taken out. On the expenditure side, the strategy 
drive is the formula by which political parties allocate their financial assets to the various activities each 
political party carries out: office operations, administrative work for their elected representatives and 
officials, education of party members and promotion towards the public in general, election campaigning. 
Both concepts are of interest for the analysis and all their segments are used to assess the various structural 
features of party budgets. Original data collected for the work show that  parties in their lifetime go through 
an evolution of their budgets, from one relying mostly on private donations and spending the majority of 
assets on elections to one relying on membership fees, state subsidies in the case of an electoral sucess, and 
spending a larger part of assets on activities not related to election campaigning. The specific shape of 
budget evolution depends largely on the size of their budget – parties with smaller budgets feature also a 
different budget structure than parties with budgets larger. This rule applies across the spectrum, from the 
largest parties in the dataset to the smallest one. The quantitative data on budget sizes are in the work 
translated into meaningful, categories based on budget sizes. , The categories are labeled weight classes, 
mimicking the weight classes found in the boxing world, from bantamweight parties, with annual budgets 
up to €10 thousand, to super heavyweight parties, with annual budgets over €10 million. All parties in the 
researched countries are thus be classified. Based on these categories, is it shown that the largest, super 
heavy parties in East Central Europe receive the bulk of all public funding. The model of subsidies 
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distribution differs in the researched countries and the numbers show that it is difficult to assess whether 
one system is more cartelised than the other on the basis of distributed state subsidies. Easier and less 
arguable is to assess the relative transparency of the models of party regulations and regulations of party 
funding in each of the researched country. Austria, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia and Poland are in the 
recent time undergoing a turn towards more transparency, with new laws already in place or currently 
being adopted. The Czech Republic is noticeably lagging behind. The last phenomenon discussed in the 
work is that certain features of budgets, including its size and structure, correlate with certain party 
strategies. Parties of certain budget size and structure have different campaigning strategies, different 
policies and different opinions than parties of different budget size and structure. The collected data shows 
links between several variables, such as parties with large subsidies share in their budgets see as legitimate 
larger subsidies share than parties without subsidies, or heavyweight and middleweight parties spend a 
significantly larger share of their election expenses on the Internet than super heavyweight parties. Finally is 
discussed the behaviour of a specific set of parties that are in the researched dataset mostly found in the 
heavyweight and middleweight class. These parties have different campaign strategies, keep their election 
campaign spending higher than the rest and their budgets do not go through the same evolutionary shift as 
do the budgets of other parties. They do not increase their fee-paying membership and do not sustain 
significant day-to-day activities not directly related to election campaigning. These parties are since 2007 at 
the latest most successful in challenging the ‘cartel’ established by larger parties in national parliaments. 
The set of these parties overlaps in a large part with the set of ‘populist’ parties as discussed in other, 
ideology and party programme-oriented literature. Or, if restated, the populist parties are in their majority 
distinguished not only by their programmatic profile, but also by the structure of their budgets and related 
party strategy features. Ultimately, the work provides a lot of empirical evidence for the discussion of the 
concept of ‘cartel’ in the region of East Central Europe. It supports with hard data some of the old folk 
theorems and creates a firm data and conceptual basis for further research of party funding in East Central 
Europe. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
As with probably every dissertation, this work started as a project of imprecise targets, unclear goals 
and vague notions. Only in the course of time, the research subject acquired distinct boundaries, its main 
line of inquiry was plotted with ink pen among other lines drawn with pencil and its exact research 
concepts were pinpointed and defined against those, that are close relatives but, at the end, fall outside the 
scope of the present work. 
The project started with a deceptively easy question: how money influences party politics in the 
post-communist countries of East-Central Europe? Coming from the former Czechoslovakia, I had a chance 
to observe closely the important role big money plays in the politics of a newly democratised country. Not 
only that the acquisition of money seemed to be for many Czechoslovak politicians an important goal in 
their political careers, money also appeared to be one of the factors decisive for the results of elections. Over 
time, political campaigning in Czechoslovakia and later in the Czech Republic was becoming more and 
more expensive: from relatively small financial contributions made by private donors to candidates in the 
1990 and 1992 elections, who relied mostly on volunteer work and face-to-face improvised contact 
campaigns, politics moved in the late 1990s to party-directed events with millions channeled from both the 
public as well the private sector into streams of large scale media advertising and celebrity-led grandiose 
stage shows. With that, the costs of political campaigns were also rising.  
Figure 1.1: Overall costs of election campaigns in the Czech Republic 1996-2012 (in CZK)1 
 
Czechoslovak politicians realised the need for funding of their election campaigns early after the fall 
of the communist regime and already in the spring of 1990, they passed a law allowing for the 
reimbursement of political parties that passed a 2 per cent threshold in the upcoming June elections to the 
Federal Assembly. Between 1995 and 2004, the sum that political parties were granted by the state as a 
subsidy for the working of the parties’ offices and the offices of their elected representatives was continually 
being increased by both rightist and leftist governments. In the case of political parties represented in the 
Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament, state subsidies regularly constituted more than 50 per cent of 
their total yearly incomes.  
                                                     
1 If not otherwise stated, all Figures and Tables are original. 
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Figure 1.2: Share of state subsidies in the budgets of Czech parliamentary parties 1996-2012 (in per cents) 
 
A similar development was taking place in Slovakia, the other successor state to the Czechoslovak 
federation. The Slovak system of party funding featured regulations parallel to those in the Czech system 
and Slovak parties too have derived large part of their income from the state. Moreover, as not an 
insignificant number of authors argue (see, e.g., Sičáková-Beblavá and Zemanovičová 2002; Belko 2005; 
Císař and Petr 2007; Biezen and Kopecký 2007; Cabada 2013; Havlík and Pinková 2013), common to both 
countries has also been the tendency to favour by the system of subsidies primarily large parties, especially 
those represented in the lower chambers of the two respective national parliaments.  
The models of political financing adopted in post-communist countries, in the former 
Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, were also one of the major reasons why the cartel thesis of Katz and Mair 
(1995) has since the mid-1990s enjoyed a wide-spread popularity among students of party systems in the 
post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. The works of Ágh (1996; 1998), Klíma (1998), Lewis (1998), 
Krašovec (2000; 2001), Biezen and Kopecký (2001), Szczerbiak (2001), Biezen (2003), Sikk (2003), Enyedi 
(2006), Kopecký (2006), Roper (2006), Grzymala-Busse (2007), Haughton and Krašovec (2011) or Hutcheson 
(2013) used the cartel thesis in their theoretical discussions and slowly built up the notion that the majority, 
if not all, of European post-communist party systems belong to a group of systems with features indiciating 
high levels of party cartelisation. Perhaps it is the flexibility or the not precisely defined scope of the concept 
of political cartel (for theoretical criticism, see, e.g., Koole 1996; Young 1998; Kitschelt 2000; Pierre, Svåsand 
and Widfeldt 2000; Bowler, Carter and Farrell 2003; Scarrow 2006), whatever the reason, the cartel thesis has 
begun close to dominate the mainstream research on the developments of party politics in the post-
communist region. Considering the large numbers of works on cartelisation of party systems in East-Central 
Europe, it might be even argued that cartel thesis has been the framework for understanding a wide range of 
political phenomena present in the region, from electoral volatility (Best 2007; Sikk 2005) through political 
elitism (Fink-Hafner 2006) to corruption and other illicit practices (Roper 2002; Biezen 2004; Grzymala-Busse 
2007). 
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However, not all studies confirmed that something as the emergence of political party cartels was 
happening in post-communist countries. While some works presented ambiguous data open to more 
interpretations (see, e.g., Sikk 2003; Haughton and Krašovec 2011; Havlík and Pinková 2013), other directly 
argued against relying on cartelisation as something to be taken for granted and disputed the thesis‘s 
excessive application in the region (see, e.g., Rybář (2006); Szczerbiak 2006). After all, if the concept itself 
was from the start subject to criticism when used in the West, its use in the politically very volatile, 
turbulently changing environment of the East was theoretically questionable. Katz and Mair’s thesis was 
primarily meant as a tool to understand the developments that were taking place in the party systems of 
Western Europe; the two scholars were writing about parties in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and 
other Western European democracies, touching also upon the then situation in the United States and 
Canada, but nowhere in their first elaborations of the cartel thesis (1992; 1995) were mentioned post-
communist political parties or post-communist party systems. Katz and Mair avoided the topic of possible 
expansion of the geographical anchoring of their notion beyond Western Europe also in their 2009 
restatement of the cartel thesis (Katz and Mair 2009) and in 2012, in a commentary published posthumously 
after Peter Mair’s sudden passing half a year before, they asserted that “[p]arties in new democracies [were] 
inevitably confronted with a different situation than those about which [Katz and Mair had been] originally 
writing.” (Katz and Mair 2012: 109). 
The present work wants to contribute to the discussion whether cartelisation has been happening in 
post-communist democracies, particularly to the issue whether financial structures in East-Central 
European  party systems reveal signs of party cartelisations. As becomes clearer in the next part that 
describes in detail the work’s selected objectives, the scope of this dissertation is limited and it does not 
address all or even most of the topics related to political finances that has been up to now researched or 
suggested for further research by other authors in the field (see, e.g., Pierre 2000; Nassmacher 2001; 2009; 
Fisher 2002; Casas-Zamora 2005; Scarrow 2007; Smilov and Toplak 2007; Koss 2010). Despite that, I believe 
that it presents a comprehensible as well as an adequately comprehensive argument about the major 
importance of money for the developments of post-communist party systems as well as for the research 
methodology used by students of political finances. At the same time, the argument does not, however, 
necessarily imply also the major importance of cartelisation for post-communist party systems of for the 
students of thereof and may, in fact, run counter some of the notions of the cartel thesis. 
In the following Chapter, I put forward the basic tenets of the two basic concepts I use throughout 
the work and also sketch the research field of funding of political parties in Europe. I do it in problem-
oriented fashion; instead of a classic literature review, where authors function as the centre-point for 
description of the previous work made in the field, I state in total 30 arguments, in which I focus on the 
commonalities of the referenced works and by which I sort through a large volume of selected works, 
sketch theoretical links between them and carry out a basic review of a large volume of literature that 
delimits the research field’s boundaries.  
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Chapter 2: Major Concepts and Arguments in Literature 
Part 2.1: The rule drive and the strategy drive 
As Figure 1.2 shows, the share of state subsidies in the budgets of Czech parliamentary parties has 
been volatile. Three major causes are behind the volatility: first, there is inflation and global and national 
economic factors. In part, changes in the finances of political parties are due to the state of the economy and 
even though the focus of the present work lies elsewhere, major economic phenomena need to be taken into 
account if the calculated financial profiles of selected party systems are to be at least roughly accurate. From 
the three ‘drives’, as the causes behind changes in party budgets may be termed, the economic one is here 
assumed to be most external to political parties. The parties, specifically those that are in government, 
certainly have something to do with the direction that the economy takes. They adopt some economic to 
satisfy the popular demand and maintain their support among the electorate; however, they choose other 
policies too to satisfy particularistic interests. Political parties in government have the power, and many 
authors show how the parties regularly use it (Truman 1981; Piattoni 2001; Grzymala-Busse 2003; 2004; 
2007; 2008; O’Dwyer 2006; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), to implement policies that play into the hands of 
special interests. The may do it in exchange for direct or indirect aid in the parties’ election campaign and 
these politics-business exchanges are in fact very common in both European and non-European 
democracies. The question is: are the exchanges so momentous that they transform macro-economic factors 
so radically as to show have an impact on party budgets? Undeniably, the politics-business exchanges have 
direct impact in the form of private donations and other material aid; they also shape the parties’ 
programmes and the issues chosen for election campaigns. However, their indirect, second-hand impact via 
the effect they have on the direction of the entire economy would be very hard to asses and is outside the 
scope of the present, time- and cost-limited dissertation project. Economic factors are in the present work 
treated as phenomena fully independent on the will of parties. 
Second, there is the legal regulatory framework comprised of laws affecting the working and 
financing of political parties in the Czech Republic. It includes the Law on the Association in Political 
Parties and Movements (424/1991 Coll.), Law on Election to the Parliament (247/1995 Coll.), Law on 
Elections to Regional Councils (130/2000 Coll.), Law on Election to the European Parliament (62/2003 Coll.), 
several amending laws (e.g., Laws 322/1996 Coll., 340/2000 Coll., 273/2005 Coll.) and ministerial decrees 
(e.g., Decree No. 273/2005). The regulatory framework in its effect changes the structure of parties’ budgets 
by stipulating how much money parties are paid by the state to cover their expenses incurred in connection 
with the election to the Chamber of Deputies (Section 85, Law 247/1995 Coll.) and the European Parliament 
(Section 65, Law 62/2003 Coll.), how much are paid as a permanent contribution for receiving at least 3 per 
cent of the vote in elections for the Chamber of Deputies and how much are paid for mandates held in the 
Chamber of Deputies, in the Senate, regional councils and the Prague municipal councils (Section 20, Law 
424/1991 Coll.). The largest bulk of state subsidies are paid out after each election to the Chamber of 
Deputies, which gives Figure 1.2 its visibly cyclical feature. The second cause behind the volatility in the 
structure of parties’ budgets may therefore be termed ‘the rule drive’: it is confirmed in the law and, if 
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considered together with election results, predictable. The meaning of the word ‘rule-driven’ in this one 
point excludes both the strategy concerns parties may and do have when facing election results as well as 
the strategy parliamentary parties adopt when enacting the rules in the first place. It is an ‘objective’ cause, 
not related to the will of parties but solely to the law. Such an understanding of the second cause 
emphasises the difference with the third one. 
The third cause is internal to the working of the party system itself: it reflects the parties’ own 
decisions on their budgets, their financial and other plans and goals and may be termed ‘the strategy drive’. 
It is a voluntary, purposeful cause behind changes in party budgets. A budgetary feature that leads many 
an author to reason that large parties in a given country are “approaching the cartel party model” (Krašovec 
and Haughton 2011: 207) is a dominant, usually above 50 per cent share of state subsidies in their annual 
income. Among others, Ingrid van Biezen (2000b) argues that numbers like this show the tendency of large 
parliamentary parties to collude on regulatory policies privileging these law-enacting parties, effectivelly 
closing the system to new challengers, who end up in a large material disadvantage from the very start of 
their campaign for the popular vote. Indeed, the adoption of certain laws by a privileged group of parties in 
power has a profound effect on parties‘ budgets and, in the next causal step, on their plans and strategies. 
Law-making, an ability possessed by only a relatively small number of parties in a given party system, is 
not, however, by far the only tool that parties may and do use in their strategies: parties‘ annual budgets 
reflect more than just the current state of the law, they also tell something about the parties‘ decisions on 
how they plan to court the voters, secure public offices and push through their programme and desired 
policies. Choosing a campaign strategy and mounting a campaign is indeed a complex party activity 
establishing two-directional links with the public, with the state as well as with the different structures 
inside the party itself, the link with the party’s treasury being not of the smallest importance.  
Another feature that Figure 1.2 shows is the recent decreasing trend in the share of state subsidies in 
Czech parliamentary party budgets. It is interesting to look at this trend through the prism of the two causes 
that are behind the perceived year-to-year volatility: first, there is the rule drive by which adopted laws 
should dictate the nature of long-term developments. In 2001, the model of state subsidisation of political 
parties in the Czech Republic was significantly reformed with the purpose, as simple model calculations tell 
(see, e.g., Havlík a Pinková 2013; Šimral 2013), to increase the material advantage of the two largest 
parliamentary parties. Until 2007, the reformed rules indeed kept the chests of Czech parliamentary parties 
filled mostly from the state. Since 2008, however, the share of state subsidies has been decreasing, a 
phenomenon which is not eplainable by the rule drive as there were none significant changes to the laws 
regulating the financing of political parties.  
The trend must therefore necessarily be attributed to the third cause, the strategy drive. As Figure 
1.1 shows, the aggregate costs of election campaigns in the Czech Republic has been increasing ever since 
the first free election and even the most subsidised, largest parliamentary parties are not able to complete all 
their campaign goals fuelled solely by the state. Presumably, it might be that an increased competition from 
other parties forces them to search for other, private sources of income. Moreover, there is no guarantee that 
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the party will be represented in the parliament also after the next election, so the search for more non-state 
sources might as well be a precautionary measure. Or there might have been a change in the public 
perception of subsidisation of political parties, brought about by the ongoing global economic recession, 
and weakening the link to state resources becomes an important issue put before the voters in the election 
campaign. Indeed, there are a lot of interconnected matters included both in the term ‘the rule drive’ and 
the term ‘the strategy drive’ and while the terms themselves are in short presented already in this Part, the 
matters that relate to them and constitute them are further discussed in Parts 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. 
Part 2.2: The rule drive 
Many laws change the structure of party budgets. Even though I focus in this part mostly on the two 
successor state of the former Czechoslovakia, what is written about them applies as well to the majority of 
European democracies and a large share of non-European ones. In most countries, party budgets are 
affected by regulations dealing with the accounting of non-state institutions. These regulations may have 
the form of a statute or an act issued by a legal authority other than the parliament, such as a ministerial 
decree that stipulates the details of the law passed by the parliament. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
for instance, political parties are obliged to provide reports of their accounts written according to the 
respective Czech and Slovak Laws on Accounting (563/1991 Coll., as amended, and 431/2002 Coll., as 
amended). Other regulations that affect party budgets are, for instance, auditing rules that stipulate how 
often and to what extent the books of political parties are supervised and periodically controlled. Both in the 
Czech Republic and in Slovakia, there are many parties where the costs of audit count among the highest 
expenses in their budgets; on the one hand, this problem concerns only the smallest from political parties, 
on the other hand, it does to a certain extent limit party competition. 
Limiting party competition is indeed one of the apparent aspects of virtually every legal rule that 
somehow regulates the life of political parties. Some libertarian scholars and political parties even argue 
that the adoption of any legal regulation of political parties inherently constitutes an attack on personal 
liberty and freedom of expression. This is an issue more suited for a philosophical debate about the 
democratic principles on which Western political institutions are built but it cannot be denied that a 
moderate version of this libertarian notion may be found in the background of the cartel thesis: regulations, 
as one resource of the state, limit political competition (Katz and Mair 2009). However, some regulations do 
so more than others. For instance, Czech political parties are strictly required to submit their complete 
annual financial report by 1 April of every following year or face dissolution. In reality, political parties that 
do not submit complete financial reports by this date are usually suspended until they remedy the situation 
and they are often shown leniency about non-essential clerical mistakes. However, when the ignorance of 
the law is long-lasting, suspended parties are dissolved, like it happened to the once parliamentary 
Coalition for Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Decision of the Czech Supreme 
Administrative Court Pst 4/2013-29). In comparison, Slovak political parties are required to submit their 
annual financial reports by 30 April of every following year. The punishment they face in case of non-
compliance is a fine of €3.319,- (Law 85/2005 Coll., on Political Parties), a relatively small sum that makes the 
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Slovak approach arguably far more liberal than the Czech one. On the other hand, Slovak political parties 
submit their reports in both hard-copy and electronic version and the latter are put up on the website of the 
Slovak National Council. The Czech reports are even in the year 2014 kept only in hard copies in the 
Parliamentary Library, which makes their research excessively time-consuming and makes the control of 
Czech political finances by the public rather difficult. 
For research into political finances and political parties, including research on the cartel thesis, two 
aspects of the rule drive are particularly important: first, with a good knowledge of the existing legal 
framework, some features of parties’ budgets ought to be to a certain degree predictable. Based on financial 
and electoral laws, one ought to be able to predict what parties will be paid state subsidies and their 
amounts, learning in the process a lot about the budget structure of large, especially parliamentary, parties. 
On the other hand, laws on auditing stipulate the costs that a party will pay for its compliance with 
reporting rules, which is particularly important for the budget structure of small parties.  
At this point, the first argument, based in the previous scholarly work and related to the rule drive 
may be stated: the more party funding is regulated by law, the larger proportion of money found in the entire party 
system is predictable. On the assumed predictability as well as on an argument put forward by advocates of 
strict reporting rules for political parties draws the second argument: the more party funding is regulated by 
law, the less corruption is in party politics (O’Leary 1962; Paltiel 1976: 109; Panebianco 1988: 58; Casas-Zamora 
2002: 293). And third, if not the level of corruption is objectively decreased, at least stricter regulations increase 
the (subjective) public trust in party politics (Fay 1982; Johns 2001; Biezen 2008). 
The second aspect of the rule drive is already been hinted at in the previous paragraph: rules affect 
parties in different ways, depending on the parties’ characteristics. One may expect parties to be impacted 
differently by rules depending on a large set of variables: the parties’ electoral strength, their membership, 
sponsors, material possessions or activities. This is an issue found at the very centre of the cartel thesis: Katz 
and Mair essentially argue that these differences in impact are at least known to but more probably counted 
upon by the law-making parties in power. These parties ‘tweak’ the laws so as to aggravate the financial 
standings of others and to help themselves to financial resources coming from the state budget. In other 
words, not only electoral laws work as a deterrent to party cartel challengers, which is a topic of many an 
analysis (see, e.g., Quintal 1970; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart and Aitkin 1994; Remington and 
Smith 1996; Cox 1997; Farrell 1997; Birch 2003; Colomer 2004; Renwick, Hanretty and Hine 2005); it is a 
larger set of legal rules that might together form a more or less penetrable ‘firewall’ against parties from the 
outside of the cartel.  
The issue whether parties in power indeed purposefully change rules so as to gain advantage over 
their rivals is dealt with within the concept of the strategy drive. When the characteristics of different parties 
are touched upon within the scope of the rule drive, they are taken as objective facts and the question of 
parties’ will is left out for discussion in another, strategy-related part of the present work. From the 
methodological point of view, the rule drive is mostly a correlational analysis of researched variables and if 
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causal mechanisms are at looked for, it is done so without the interference of the motivations of voluntary 
agents, be it political parties, politicians or any other possible actors. In other words, the rule drive concept 
comprises includes the various mutual correlations linked to party finances in previous literature (for a 
comprehensive review, see, .e.g., Nassmacher 2009: Chapter IX) that have their basis in some form of a legal 
instrument, i.e., law or other statutes.  
In a large share of the literature, it is the state subsidies that usually constitute one side of these 
correlation formulae as the question of whether and to what extent public funding ought to be available to 
political parties is regularly debated in both new and old European democracies. The precise amount and 
eligibility of public funding for political parties is fixed by law and therefore not subject to changes made by 
parties in their strategy. Based on the existing scholarship, several arguments about state subsidies and their 
impact on parties and party systems may be further elaborated: first, that a higher threshold of access to public 
funding closes party competition and petrifies the party system (Niedermayer 1992: 145; Neill Report 1998; Pierre, 
Svåsand and Widfeldt 2000; Casas-Zamora 2002; Hooghe, Maddens and Noppe 2006; Niedermayer et al 
2006) Second, following an argument of the cartel thesis, it is stated that wider availability of public funding 
discourages parties from establishing  grass-root links to the society via large party membership (Pinto-Duschinsky 
1981: 138; Katz and Mair 1995; Neill Report 1998: 30; Casas-Zamora 2002: 66; 2005). Third, linked to this is a 
point emphasised by opponents of state subsidies who fear that high amounts of public funding delegitimise the 
democratic process in the eyes of the public and contribute to the public distrust of politics (Jones 1988; Arnim 2001: 
106). Fourth, state subsidies strengthen the position of the subsidies’ direct beneficiaries inside the party and change 
the party internal power structure (Deutsch 1966; Pinto-Duschinsky 1991; Biezen 2000a). However, advocates 
of state subsidisation for political parties put forward also some more complex arguments, with multiple 
variables involved. First, state subsidies ought to strengthen the unity of political parties and reduce the threat of 
party disintegration (Reed 2002; Birnir 2010; Zbieranek 2010; Luther 2011). Second, the availability of public 
funding decreases the level of corruption in party politics (Grzymala-Busse 2003; Mietzner 2007). Third, while the 
petrification of a party system is something preferably to be avoided, public funding ought to prolong the 
average lifetime of parties and by that help to stabilise the system. Stable party systems positively correlate 
with high-levels of democratic development (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). 
And fourth, public funding may help to get involved in party politics groups who are in traditional societies 
materially disadvantaged, such as women, workers or non- ethnic and religious minorities (Walecki et al 2009). 
All these variables are here conceptualised as objective, i.e., not subject to the decision-making of 
parties. Moreover, state subsidies are not by far the only variable that is in literature included in correlation 
formulae. The literature is interested in private donations as a significant share of large corporate donations 
in parties’ budgets commonly indicates propensity of the receiving political parties to favour liberal, right-
wing economic policies that privilege employers over employees (Römmele 1995: 1995: 172; Miller 2005: 99). 
Economically socialist and communist parties, on the other hand, receive much of their revenues from small 
donors and regular membership fees (Fromont 1992: 157; Bardi and Morlino 1994: 248; Sickinger 1999: 306; 
Cordes 2001: 102). The relationship between different ideological party profiles and sources of revenue, 
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however, belongs rather to the discussion on the strategy drive, where it is further dealt with. Then again, 
the umbrella of the rule drive certainly includes the issue of legally imposed limits on private donations, 
their sources, disclosure rules or potential caps. Interestingly enough, large or non-transparent donations 
from private sources are often thought to carry the negative charge as state subsidies: they increase the 
public distrust in politics (Walecki 2001: 399). It may therefore be argued that limits on large and corporate 
donations increase the public trust in party politics. Or, it may even be that these limits on large and corporate 
donations decrease corruption in party politics. Finally, stricter reporting and disclosure rules on private donations 
ought to increase the public trust in party politics.  
Not only revenues but also expenditures have lately been targeted by law-makers in European 
countries and elsewhere and these too therefore belong under the rule drive. In 2012, 21 out of 44 European 
countries researched by IDEA were regulating to some extent the spending of political parties during their 
election campaigning (IDEA 2012). While the first spending limits were introduced in US elections already 
in the 1911 amendment to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, they have much shorter history in Europe, 
which does not yet allow presenting any firm conclusions about their real world impact. Still, despite the 
sketchy existing knowledge about their effects on the political and social system, there are several 
arguments that need to be tested in further empirical studies: first, limits on campaign expenditures ought to 
curb the total amount of money that is channeled into party politics (Blasi 1994; Ortiz 1997: 105; Ware 1998: 240). 
Second, on the other hand, limiting expenditures may lead to an increase in the level of corruption in the party 
system, as parties look for new, illicit ways through which individuals and groups can bring their influence 
to bear on campaigns and politicians (Pinto-Duschinsky 1981: 249; Alexander 2001: 198). To that 
phenomenon is linked the third argument that campaign spending increases between-election spending of political 
parties, as the parties try to disguise the first as the latter (Cross 2004: 170). Fourth, paradoxically, capping 
expenditures in election campaigning ought to increase the public trust in party politics (Coleman 2003; Gross and 
Goidel 2003: 101). Fifth, spending limits benefit in elections governing parties, as they have more space in the media 
ex-officio and because they misuse government channels for partisan purposes (Pinto-Duschinsky 2004; Pastine and 
Pastine 2012). And sixth, since caps on campaign expenditures restrict the amount of information spread 
among the voters both about the candidates as well as the election itself, spending limits lower voter turnout 
(Palda 1985: 535; Matsusaka 1995; Baek 2009). 
Part 2.3: The strategy drive 
Both in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia, aggregate revenues and expenditures of political parties 
have been gradually rising since the first free elections (Figures 1.1 and 1.3). As is noted in Parts 2.1 and 2.2, 
a share of the rise may be put down to first, economic trends and second, changes in legal regulations, 
specifically to increasing state subsidies. A larger share of the rise, however, was due to other factors: first, 
the number of political parties that belong to the Czech party system has been growing (Figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1: Number of parties in the Czech party register 
 
If measured in the number of legally active political parties, the level of Czech participation has 
indeed increased since the 1990s. Still, there are two caveats that need to be added to this observation: first, 
parties are not by far equal in the quantity and quality of their activities, which affects not only the various 
issues related to participation of the people in the political process but also the financial profile of the party 
system. Some wealthy parties with a substantial and active membership and a relatively large following of 
core voters may for instance cease to exist for the reason of a merger with another party. After that, these 
parties replaced in year-to-year statistics by the new merged party plus a group of split-off parties led by 
opponents to the original merger; all these parties will then be of different electoral and financial values. 
Party replacement is an important issue when dealing with time-series financial in volatile party systems 
and is dealt with further in the present work. 
The second caveat concerns parties that do not submit their annual financial reports. This may be 
considered a feature of the rule drive, as it concerns a question of the law, but it is included in the concept of 
the strategy drive simply for the reason that it is a phenomenon for now researchable only from the point of 
party strategy. One-off parties that first, register before an election, second, fail to attract the amount of vote 
its leaders consider to be important and third, subsequently cease to exist, do not submit any financial data 
to anyone. Therefore, from the point of view of statistics on party funding, they do not exist. This is a 
considerable problem for both interested scholars as well as for democratic accountability of the whole 
party system but, until remedied by legal regulations, the problem is unsolvable. Once there is a rule that 
legaly obliges every party that has run in an election to submit at the end of the year a report on its work 
and its financing, research will be made a lot easier and these ‘mischievous parties’ may be explored also 
under the concept of the rule drive 
The second factor behind the continual rise of revenues and expenditures in the Czech and Slovak 
party systems is the core of the strategy drive concept itself: voluntary decisions of principal agents in party 
systems. The people that have entered election contests may have been able and willing to put gradually, 
over the course of the last two decades, larger and larger financial stakes in the game; or they have not, that 
is one of the questions that the present work wants to answer. It may be even argued that voluntary decisions 
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about the goals, strategies and tools of election campaigning have a large impact on first, the structure of financial 
assets accumulated in party systems and second, on the total amount of these assets. The wealth and budget 
structure of political parties are not merely the objects of outside forces created by the economy and law but 
they are to a large extent shaped by the will of the party activists, both card-carrying members as well as 
collaborators. 
The cartel thesis itself contains one intriguing notion that parties in positions of law-makers, which 
in most cases are parties in parliament, collude and create laws that give them advantages, including 
financial advantage, over challenger parties (Katz and Mair 1995: 17-21). In other words, as opposed to 
previous models of party organizations, the new model of the cartel party widens the scope of resources 
used in party strategies from solely private to both private and public resources. Even though Katz and 
Mair never implicitly state so, the emergence of the new model, if the existence of the model is assumed, 
ought to be understood as a result of gradual qualitative transformation and long-term development rather 
than an instant, surprising result. Political parties in Europe were originally creatures of spontaneity and 
later of custom and were not regulated by law until after the Second World War. Roots of the cartel party 
phenomenon may be noted already in the late 1940s, when Germany, Italy and Austria adopted laws 
specifically aimed at political parties. Over the years, parties become legally regulated in more and more 
European countries; first, the laws usually described the purpose of political parties, the rules of their 
formation and entry into elections. Lately, the rules would become more detailed and target other areas of 
party activity, including their financial operations (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2). 
Table 2.1: Party Regulations Passed in 28 current EU Member States), 1945-2013 
 
Total 
Countries 
Countries Cases Articles 
 
1940-49 3 3 3 28 
1950-59 4 1 1 1 
1960-69 7 5 5 56 
1970-79 11 6 7 78 
1980-89 12 6 7 48 
1990-99 24 16 36 359 
2000-09 26 19 26 578 
2010-13 27 13 14 359 
   
99 1507 
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Figure 2.2: Average number of articles in a law regulating political parties in 28 EU Member States 
 
 Source: Simral (2013) 
The transformation of parties into cartel parties may therefore be at least in part expressed in 
quantitative indicators: in aggregates of party membership (Mair and Biezen 2001), sums of public funding 
(Szczerbiak 2001; Biezen 2008), and the number of laws regulating political parties. It ought to be 
emphasised that these laws are also drafted and adopted by political parties. 
The adoption of certain laws by a coalition of parties in parliament may be an effective tool that 
parties use in their strategies but certainly is not the most common. First, only a relatively small group of 
parties possesses this tool. For instance, in the Czech Republic, political parties in the Chamber of Deputies 
make up for only 5 to 10 per cent of all parties registered. Some 90 to 95 per cent of political parties have to 
get by in their activities without the power to change any of the rules of the game in the process and they 
have to devise their plans accordingly. 
Second, even the parties that temporarily possess the law-making power will want to use it with 
caution. For political parties in a democracy, the most important currency is votes. Even though this 
statement may be conditioned when considering other variables, such as the type of election, the positions 
to be won or the electoral formula, parties would always prefer to get more votes in an election than less. 
That is a Downsian (1957) assumption but, at the same time, it does not oppose Kaare Strøm’s (1990a; 1990b; 
Müller and Strøm 1999) distinction between vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking parties. Parties 
abandon the median voter position because the policies or the offices they seek require that, not because 
their goal is to attract less votes. The decrease in electoral support is a necessary cost, not the objective. 
Parties calculate that the sacrifice in terms of votes will be in the big picture outweighed by a policy or office 
pay-off. 
Legislators passing regulations on political parties must calculate the effect their activity has on their 
voters. The activity may enrage the voters, who will punish the legislators in the next elections; and, if the 
regulations were aimed to benefit parties in the legislating coalition, once they drop out of the coalition, the 
parties may find themselves in a disadvantageous position. As has already been noted in Part 2.1, this 
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situations is also a focal point of the cartel thesis: Katz and Mair (1995; 2009) argue that parties hedge 
against their potential future losses. They set up a funding model that is beneficial to all parties in 
parliament, both those in government as well as those in opposition. Sometimes, they even widen the 
‘safety net’ of material advantages to parties with electoral support close to the parliamentary threshold. 
That way, if they experience a temporary lapse in their electoral strength, they will be still able to draw on 
public funding and sustain financially at least a part of their normal activities. The question whether there 
actually objectively exists such a safety net of public funding is tackled under the ‘rule drive’ concept. The 
motives behind and methods towards a construction of this net, on the other hand, are part of the strategy 
drive. 
In short, to modify funding regulations is a strategy available only to a selected few who need to use 
it cautiously. The vast majority of party strategies that shape the structure of assets accumulated in a party 
system and their total amount are not concerned with changing the law. They are concerned with acquiring 
the maximum of resources available under the current law and employing these resources effectivelly so as 
to reach the maximum of their goals. As Part 2.1. states, the strategy drive is a voluntary, purposeful cause 
behind changes in party budgets. In other words, the causal mechanism here discussed is ‘strategy’, a 
complex phenomenon that has been elaborated in many ways by many authors in political science and 
elsewhere. It is an essentially contested concept (Gallie 1956) and there has never been a major consensus 
among social scientists what the term ‘strategy’ denotes; indeed, latest works on the concept consider its 
vagueness one of its hallmarks and intrinsic advantages (de Wit and Meyer 1994; Eden and Ackermann 
1998; Freedman 2013). 
In political science, strategy has been used to describe phenomena occurring in e.g., policy-making 
(Mitroff and Emshoff 1979), political marketing (Baines and Worcester 2006; Lees-Marshment 2009), studies 
of elites (Raschke and Tils 2007; 2010), political philosophy (Fosdick 1942), political media studies (Aalberg, 
Strömbäck and Vreese 2011) or international relations (Signorino 2002). Scholars of party politics has the 
term ‘strategy’ applied to various issues that can be, in a crude simplification, divided into groups: first, 
there is the strategy of voters who choose in an election between political parties not only according to their 
policy preferences but also according to their beliefs about the probable result of the election. Strategic (or 
tactical or sophisticated) voting occurs when “[s]ome voter whose favourite candidate has a poor chance of 
winning, notices that she has a preference between the top two candidates; she then rationally decides to 
vote for the most preferred of these top two competitors rather than for her overall favourite, because the 
latter vote has a much smaller chance of actually affecting the outcome than the former” (Cox 1997: 71). It 
has been the focus of many studies (e.g., Farquharson 1969; Enelow and Hinich 1990; Nurmi 1998; Grofman, 
Blais and Bowler 2009) since Duverger’s (1951) seminal volume and the strategic behaviour of the electorate 
will most certainly remain a focal point of political research for the future. 
The other group of studies using the concept of strategy in party politics is concerned with the 
strategy of parties themselves. The group may again be sub-divided into those that treat parties as unitary 
actors (e.g., Sitter 2002; Meguid 2005) and those that focus on party leaders, elites, or lower levels the party 
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hierarchy (e.g., Tsebelis 1990; Chhibber and Torcal 1997). While the first then pursue exclusively the subject 
of inter-party interactions, the latter broaden their research also on intra-party relations (e.g, Kitschelt 1988; 
Katz 2001). The present work primarily treats political parties as unitary actors and handles the concept of 
strategy accordingly; only from time to time, in order to better explain and clarify some issues, it overlaps 
into the field of leadership strategy. 
Strategy, in the ancient Greek meaning of ‘strategos’, is a general set of manoeuvres carried out to 
overcome an enemy (Eden and Ackermann 1998: 3). It is concerned with maintaining a balance between 
ends, ways, and means; with identifying objectives; and with the resources and methods available for 
meeting such objectives (Lykke 1989: 3). This general notion may serve as the basis for the definition of 
strategy used in the present work: strategy is a planned set of actions with selected resources and technology that 
agents of party systems use in order to achieve their intended goals. These actions may be classified according to 
the intended recipient of the action into four major groups: action aimed at a) partisan agents, b) non-
partisan political agents, c) special agents of note outside the politics (the bureaucracy, the media, and the 
business) and d) the electorate. The resources and technology are selected depending on the intended agent 
of the action; the same applies if the action is aimed at more than one of the agent groups. Strategic actions 
have a bidirectional relationship with party budgets. They affect them and are affected by them. To clarify, 
it is possible to sketch a hypothetical situation based on, as the present work shows later, a real-life 
experience: a party looks to enlarge its electoral strength in the younger, educated, liberal demographic 
group. It channels a share of its funds into stronger virtual presence on the Internet, particularly on social 
networks and in selected webzines. These expenditures may then be recovered not only in votes but also in 
money; the targeted demographics may react positively to a request included in the promotion for small 
donations to a magazine published by the party.  
The magazine donations were an example of direct, immediate reaction to a party’s strategic action. 
However, this action may further resonate and lead to originally unintended and undesired results. For 
instance, the move targeting younger and liberal demographic group may disappoint an older, conservative 
group from the original core of party voters. If these voters feel betrayed, they will not only vote for another 
party in the next election, they may also withdraw their financial support. A change in the selection of 
marketing tools may often have a deep impact on the tone of the programme message send out by a party, 
even without an actual policy change. A Christian Democratic party, to give the hypothetical scenario a 
flare of realism, that wants to feel hip and sexy for younger voters may end up losing a large share of their 
older electorate and with that a significant part of their revenues coming from small and medium donors.  
In short, the structure and amount of assets found in the party system ought to be dependent of 
many things and the existing literature provides several hints as to what might be expected to affect party 
budgets. In the literature, it is argued that the structure and amount of assets in party budgets varies according to 
ideological party families. There are expected causes behind this relationship: the campaigning style (see, .e.g, 
O’Neill 1997; Gibson and Römmele 2001; Gibson, Ward and Lusoli 2002) and the characteristics of voters of 
each particular party family (e.g., Oppenhuis 1995; Swank and Eisinga 1999; Karreth, Polk and Allen 2013). 
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The first cause is related to the expenses paid for the different campaigning tools used for different voter 
demographic groups. The second cause is related to revenues and its varying amounts and forms when 
provided by different voter demographic groups. In essence, this arguments restates the old folk theorem 
that conservatives are connected to big business while social democrats to workers. 
The third argument discussed in this Part states that the structure and amount of assets in a party’s 
budget varies according to the party’s pre-election coalition position. Here, the present work moves into from the 
shallow end of the pool paved by previous research into deeper, unexplored water. There are studies 
suggesting that pre-election coalitions may be formed not only with the vision of gaining more votes and, 
potentially, seats and offices in an election (Ferrara and Herron 2004; Golder 2006; Blais and Loewen 2009; 
Resnick 2011. One of the goals of pre-election coalitions may also be to reach the threshold guaranteeing 
public subsidies; moreover, pooling resources for a coalitional election campaign may save parties’ 
considerable effort and money on the side of expenses. If the pre-election coalition as well as post-election 
bargaining proves cost-efficient, the cooperation may evolve into a full-fledged merger, in which even more 
valuable resources will be saved (Bélanger and Godbout 2010; Bandyopadhyay, Chatterjee and Sjöström 
2011). 
Fourth, the structure and amount of expenditures in a party’s budget varies according to the party’s past 
electoral performance. While there would be hardly anyone arguing that party incomes are affected by past 
electoral performance, the question whether expenditures too are affected by the same variable deserves 
further thought. It makes sense that the total amount of expenses ought to rise and fall as the incomes rise 
and fall. Parties are not as such profit-making institutions (if all cynicism is being left out) and regularly pay 
out even more money than they make. However, is the structure of expenditures affected too by how a 
party fared in previous elections? It might: in the above sketched scenario of Christian Democrats trying to 
attract a younger electorate, it is conceivable that the shift to new marketing methods was occasioned by a 
previous plunge in preferences.  
Fifth, not only the past matters in human decision-making but also the future. It therefore ought to 
not come as a surprise, if the structure and amount of expenditures in a party’s budget varies according to the 
party’s expectations about their future electoral performance. Informations from pre-election polls are devoured 
by parties and they modify their strategies based on this information (Farrell and Wortmann 1987; Herrnson 
1989; Sparrow and Turner 2001); if they see a chance for success in the upcoming election, they may pour 
some more capital into their campaigning efforts. They are also in a better negotiating position when asking 
potential donors for more resources. Last but not least, they feel more confident and are more creditworthy 
when applying for bank loans. 
Sixth, the structure and amount of assets in party budgets varies according to electoral formula and type of 
elections. This is a compound argument that probes two important issues: differences in electoral formulas 
used over Europe and second-order elections. Electoral formulae around the world are one of the most 
researched topics in political science (see, .e.g., Rae 1967; Bogdanor and Butler 1983; Lijphart and Aitkin 
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1995; Norris 2004; Golder, Matt 2005; Diamond and Plattner 2006; Gallagher and Mitchell 2007; Baldini and 
Pappalardo 2009; Farrell and Shugart 2012). They have been shown to have influence on the number of 
parties surviving in a party system (Duverger 1951; Riker 1976; Taagepera and Shugart 1993; Ordeshook 
and Shvetsova 1994; Benoit 2001), on inter-party strategies (Duverger 1951; Cox 1997; Golder, Sona 
Nadenichek 2005), on voter turnout (Blais and Carty 1990), on the chance to create a majority government 
(Blais 1987), on the level of personalisation of the relationship between a voter and a candidate (Carey and 
Shugart 1995), on the representation of minorities (Rule and Zimmerman 1994), on the level of corruption 
(Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003) and a great many other things. The present work discusses election 
formulas in relation with other legal instruments in Chapter 5. 
Gemerally speaking, studies show that parties indeed campaign differently under different 
formulas, even if the formulas are used in a single country (Roberts 1988); they also approach differently 
campaigns for seats in different representative organs: European, national, state, regional or local (Eijk 1996; 
Heath, McLean, Taylor and Curtice 1999; Jeffery and Hough 2003; Manow 2004). The complex logic of the 
so-called ‘second-order’ elections often prove too challenging for party leaders and campaign-makers and 
parties that fare reasonably well on the national level crash and burn in European or sub-national elections. 
Conversely, underdogs frequently thrive in these elections. The causal mechanism behind this interesting 
phenomenon is quite definitely made up of multiple variables and it is reasonable to expect some of its 
effects to show in party budgets.  
The seventh argument ventures that the structure and amount of assets in party budgets varies according 
to the length of its election campaigns. Indirectly, it is a question on capital intensity of election campaigns. 
Parties commonly spend more when there are elections ahead and a quick look at annual data of, for 
instance, Czech political parties prove it (Havlík a Pinková 2013). However, annual data compile 
expenditures spent on one or more elections that may occur in a single year and cannot answer the question 
which election campaigns are capital-intensive and which extensive. As far as I am aware, this area of study 
is virtually untouched in European literature and few studies have been carried out even in the more 
information-rich American environment (Hogan 1999). A new dataset compiled during research on the 
present work may answer, however, in the future help to explore the question in European context. 
Eight, the structure and amount of assets in party budgets varies according to the composition of the 
campaign planning team. Again, this is an argument discussable only if new data are brought in as the 
existing public datasets do not offer any hints as to the composition of campaign teams in political parties in 
Europe. The usual research strategy how to uncover the details of teams delivering election campaigns 
across Europe and elsewhere is the pursuit of qualitative case studies; scholars have indeed already made 
many inroads into this particular field (e.g., Sayers 1998; Lees-Marshment 2001; Lilleker and Negrine 2002; 
Carty, Eagles and Sayers 2003; Denver, Hands, Fisher, MacAllister 2003). The present work wants to enrich 
this study field by providing fresh insights from the newly compiled dataset. 
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The new dataset covers also the ninth argument of the strategy drive part: the structure of incomes in a 
party’s budget varies according to the party’s policy position on the existing regulations on political parties. This is 
the third argument based on data collected exclusively for the present work and it is another indirect 
question on cartelisation in a party system; specifically, it is a question after motivation of prospective cartel 
members. Restated, it is a question whether the parties that reached the minimal threshold needed to be 
subsidised by the state and therefore may have a good motivation to join a cartel, think differently about the 
regulations than parties that are not subsidised. Moreover, the argument ought to empirically backed up by 
a correlation between big business-backed conservative parties of the right and anti-regulation policy stance 
on the one hand, and small donors-backed socialist parties and pro-regulation stance on the other. Last but 
not least, it may also show whether parties publicly proclaiming their negative attitude towards large 
private donors, a common manifesto piece of some new challenger parties (e.g., Mudde 2007; Bornschier 
2010) actually do not depend on such donors for their income.  
The fourth argument related to the new dataset the tenth in this Part in total states that the structure 
of incomes in party budgets varies according to the voluntary efforts for transparency. It tackles a question similar 
to the previous one: do political parties have something to hide in their financial operations? Is there a 
correlation between a specific distribution of donors and reluctance to disclosure? Another old folk theorem 
says that political parties indeed habitually hide big business donations. The public fears that large 
corporations might pay into politicians’ pockets as well as to parties’ war chests significant sums for which 
they would seek influence in the state administration. Some scholarly literature argues that such concerns 
are substantiated and even though actual evidence about illicit practices is scarce (e.g., Scarrow 2004; 
Briffault 2011), limiting the space for potential corruption ought to assumingly be always preferred. 
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Chapter 3: Minor Concepts and Research Objectives 
Part 3.1: Concepts from Previous Literature 
Thirty arguments about party funding, its regulations and election campaigns found in the existing 
literature is a formidable number, especially when real-world indicators related to the concepts may be 
numerous and their selection as well as the selection of a certain data pool may significantly, even crucially 
influence the ultimate research conclusions. However, it is not the goal of the present work to discuss all of 
them thoroughly on the following pages, even if most of them are at least touched upon. They serve mostly 
as an issue-based literature review, where previous works are clustered around the central questions, or 
arguments they put forward. That being said, it is indeed possible to research at least to a certain extent 
most of the involved concepts in the present text, if these concepts are properly inspected and potential 
relationships between them are with caution considered. There is no need to further conceptualise the 
majority of the terms used in the arguments, since that has been done several times over in the previous 
literature dealing with these terms and on that previous knowledge draws the present chapter.  
The two crucial new concepts of this text, of the rule drive and the strategy drive, respectively, have 
already been elaborated and may be here merely summarily defined: the first denotes movements in party 
budgets that are obligatory due to the letter of the law. The latter denotes movements in party budgets 
caused by parties’ own volition. The first reflects the current legal structure of a party system; the latter 
reflects the financial impact of actions of party agents. In the present work, I argue that these two distinct 
types of movements in parties’ budgets may provide a significant amount of information about the 
development of European party systems. Specifically, this work focuses on the information that is provided 
about the possible existence and functioning of party cartels in Central European countries. 
Since they are based on two distinct movements, the two sets of arguments are distinct too: 
arguments related to the rule drive assume relationships between variables that are largely independent of 
party strategies and concern the party system aggregate. Arguments based on the strategy drive, on the 
other hand, discuss mostly relationships between the different configurations of party budgets and policies 
or campaign designs of political parties. Still, these set definitions are qualified to a certain extent as the 
exact terms included in the arguments often refer to concepts that have been dealt in the existing scholarly 
literature with ‘fuzziness’ as to their operational definitions. Thus, while to conceptualise the terms anew 
would be purposeless, there is still the need to ascertain their exact real-world indicators. 
The first term to operationalise is party regulations. The use of the plural ‘regulations’ reflects the 
notion already elaborated in Part 2.2: party regulations are not a single piece of law but a set of several legal 
instruments that, assumingly, ought to work synergistically to make the rules of party competition fair for 
everyone. It is necessary to survey the various forms party regulations may have in the real world and think 
about the real differences between these forms. It is crucial to ascertain a) differences between party 
regulations strict and a liberal, which are here considered to be the opposite sides of one spectrum, and b) 
how may be measured the overall extent of regulations on political parties in a given legal system. There is 
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currently in existence no widely used ranking system according to which party regulations in different 
countries might be lined up from most strict and least liberal to most liberal and least strict. Nor there is a 
database that directly measures the extent. The only international organisation specifically designated to 
examine party regulations in European countries is the Group of States Against Corruption, or GRECO for 
short, a subsidiary organisation of the Council of Europe. This anti-corruption body monitors the 
transparency of party funding in signatory countries (all Council of Europe Member States plus Belarus and 
the United States) since January 2007 and its Evaluation Reports provide great insights into the working of 
party systems in Europe. GRECO’s methodology does not allow for a direct quantification of differences 
between evaluated units but the Reports might serve as a basis at least for an ordinal scale showing relative 
differences without the measure of degree of difference. Other sources, complementary to GRECO Reports, 
are the Political Finance Database of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA) and the Party Law in Modern Europe Database that is being compiled by a research team at the 
Leiden University. Ordinal ranking is therefore, generally speaking, the method used in the present text to 
assess both the relative degree of strictness of party regulations in individual countries as well as the extent 
of regulations. 
The second term is corruption in party politics. Unlike party regulations, corruption has been a central 
concept in various disciplines of social sciences and there are already several ranking systems and 
measurement available for application in the present work. One of the most popular is the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), published annually by Transparency International, which has over the years 
developed into a standard measure of corruption across the world. Despite regular criticism (see, e.g., 
Sampford 2006; Andersson and Heywood 2008; Eigen 2010; Ko and Samajdar 2010), the CPI has served at 
least as a proxy variable also for scholars working on party politics (e.g., Veugelers and Magnan 2005; Lewis 
2006; Ekman 2009; Krause and Méndez 2009; Charron 2011) and the present work follows the suit. 
However, it uses secondary proxies, too. After all, the CPI is not the only system used in literature to 
measure corruption. These are other popular rankings, such as the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS), a wide-range cross-country survey implemented jointly by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank (see, e.g., Kenny 2009), the World Banks’s 
own Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) (e.g., Sandholtz and Gray 2003; Ledeneva 2009), 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1995; Fisman and Gatti 2002), 
compiled on a monthly basis by the private political-business forecaster PRS Group, the World Economic 
Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey and annual Global Competitiveness Report (e.g., de Walle 2006; Knack 
2007), or the Incidence of Bribes, a part of the UN’s International Crime Victim Survey (e.g., Holmes 2009).  
With the exception of the Incidence of Bribes, these rankings focus on company entities and not on 
individuals. They may be particularly useful for the argument which states that more regulation of party 
funding leads to lower corruption levels in party politics. That argument clashes with the findings of Paul 
G. Wilhelm (2002) who asserts that lower corruption levels as measured by the CPI are actually associated 
with lesser “overabundance of regulation”. Such a perceived clash underscores the issue that ‘corruption in 
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party politics’ may in its content to some extent differ from corruption in other areas, such as in business or 
state administration. Since there is however no available ranking system to measure corruption in party 
politics directly applicable for the present work, in Chapters 5 and 7, the CPI index is used 
Third, there is the term public trust. Public trust is another concept that has been enjoying a long life 
and a high level of attention in political science literature. From the Gallup World Poll to the International 
Social Survey, there are dozens of public opinion surveys that measure public trust in various institutions 
and branches of government across the world. In Europe, when not building original datasets (see, .e.g, 
Wyman et al 1995), scholars find data on the level of public trust in political parties in several widely used 
sources: the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (e.g., Grönlund and Setälä 2011; Anderson and Just 
2012), Eurobarometer (e.g., Dalton and Weldon 2006), European Social Survey (ESS) (e.g., Jones et al 2008; 
Hooghe 2011; Marien 2011), Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (e.g., Slomczynski 
and Shabad 2011), or the University of Strathclyde’s New Europe/Baltics/Russia Barometer (e.g., Rose 1995; 
Clark 2001; Sil and Chen 2004). Again, there certainly exists a disagreement over methodologies used in 
these surveys and about the conceptualisation of public trust itself (e.g., Citrin 1974; Braithwaite and Levi 
1998; Newton 2001; Stolle and Hooghe 2003; Keele 2007; Hooghe 2011). At the same time, there is no reason 
why the same technique as is used for corruption scores may not be used for public trust as well. Data from 
several sources are therefore in the present work put together and used in Chapter 7. 
The fourth term to operationalise, party system closure, is rather less common in social sciences 
literature as it is used exclusively by scholars of political parties. It was introduced into the mainstream 
research by Peter Mair (1997; 2002) but the concept heavily draws also on earlier works about Western 
European party system, particularly on the research of Otto Kirchheimer’s (1965). Despite the narrow field 
of its use, party system closure has already been the object of several operationalisations. Most authors 
follow Mair and focus on the patterns of alternation of political parties in government, or more generally 
agree that it is a concept closely related to that of party system stability. However, while most authors 
consider party system closure to be a dichotomous variable, or a composite variable made up of 
dichotomous components (e.g., Toole 2000; Linz and Montero 2001; Müller and Fallend 2004; O’Dwyer 
2006), some recent studies follow the example of Pedersen’s Index of electoral volatility (1979) or Lewis’s 
Index of Party Stabilization (2006) and treat party system closure, or one of it components as a continuous 
variable (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2014). The present work follows the latter example and conceptualises 
party system closure as a continuous composite variable. The three components of party closure are the 
same as were used by Mair (1997) and Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2014). . The data from the latter are in the 
present work used in Chapter 7. 
Fifth, there is party membership. Again, the declining numbers of party membership in Western 
European countries have been at the centre of the cartel thesis from the very beginning (Katz and Mair 1995; 
2009; see also, Dalton 1984; Dalton and Wattenberg  2002; Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012): a major 
indicator of presence of the cartel party model is a low party membership. Since this is a concept with a 
clear operational definition, the only issue to tackle is collecting necessary data. Even today, there exists no 
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up-to-date Europe-wide database of membership figures of political parties and therefore, for the countries 
research in the present work, the data are collected from previous works found in the scholarly literature 
listed in Chapter 7. 
The sixth term, party internal power structure, is more complicated. The concept of ‘power structure’ 
inside political parties refers to the way in which power is distributed among internal party actors. 
Duverger (1951) distinguishes between centralised and decentralised structure: in the first, all decisions and 
taken at the top, either autocratically or democratically, and then implemented locally. In the latter, local 
representatives of a party, usually members of parliament, have a wide autonomy in decision-making on 
issues of varying importance. Other authors use the difference between centralised and decentralised 
structure to delineate also relationships among different, extra-parliamentary branches of a party (see, e.g., 
Laver and Shepsle 1990; Strøm 1990a; Heidar and Koole 2000). Helboe Perdersen (2010) operationalises 
internal party structure under the term power distribution as a composite of four fields of power drawn 
from party by-laws: candidate selection, sanctioning of MPs, policy decision-making and informing the 
party on voting in parliament prior to the vote (2010: 744-5). The selection of these variables essentially 
corresponds with the model of three faces of a party organisation (Katz and Mair 1993; Katz and Mair 2002; 
Detterbeck 2005), even though one more variable ought to be added in view of the topic researched by the 
present work: the organisation and supervision of election campaigns. If the argument states that state 
subsidies strengthen the position of the subsidies’ direct beneficiaries inside the party and change the party internal 
power structure, the more either the party headquarters, party members of the parliament, or party regional 
branches are subsidised by the state, the more influence over the selected five power fields one face ought to 
execise to the detriment of the remaining two faces. The present work tackles this issue only tentatively in 
Chapter 7 and uses concept operationalisation found in the existing research. 
Seventh, there is party unity and party disintegration. Even though these two terms are used in a single 
argument, in the scholarly literature, they commonly refer to two different phenomena. While the first term, 
party unity, is mostly used to describe high levels of party parliamentary discipline or cohesion (e.g., 
Ozbudun 1970; Weyland 1996; Mainwaring 1999; Olson 2003; Carey 2007), the latter, party disintegration, is 
widely understood to be the last stage of party factionalism (e.g., Truman 1984; Scherlis 2008; Boucek 2009). 
In the present work, I follow this conceptual distinction; at the same time, however, I argue that both terms 
may be discussed togetether if understood as sharing a common causal mechanism. Scholars note that party 
unity, i.e., parliamentary cohesion, may be brought about via two distinct paths (Hazan 2003: 3-4): first, by 
shared preferences of individual actors, and second, as a result of positive or negative incentives that make 
MPs vote together; in other words, they are disciplined by whipping. If policy preferences diverge and 
party whips are not efficient enough in disciplining their members, party factionalism will occur. And if it 
prevails, it will ultimately lead a party break up and disintegration of the party ranks in the parliament and 
possibly in the central office and on the ground as well. These two phenomena may, albeit simplifiedly, be 
tackled as two stages of a single causal chain and discussed in common, even if two datasets for each of 
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those two are used. The data need to be again looked for in country-specific sources, which are listed in 
Chapter 7. 
The eighth term in need of operationalisation is average lifetime of parties. That term may have many a 
specific meaning: how long a party exists, how much time has it spent in the parliament, how long does it 
function under one name, or under several. When it may be said that a party is completely new and when is 
it only a continuation of a previous political formation? Party replacement, i.e., the emergence of new 
parties, has been a major cause of instability particularly in new democracies of the post-communist Europe 
(see, e.g., Birch 2003); however, this phenomenon is particularly difficult to analyse, since there is so many 
personnel and programmatic legacies moving from old to new parties (e.g., Bartolini and Mair 1990: 311-2). 
In volatile party systems, leaders and whole groups and factions often continue in politics by switching 
party affiliations. New parties are therefore often not truly new formations but rather re-incarnations of old 
ones. Casal Bértoa and Spirova (2013) suggest that the survival of political parties in Eastern European post-
communist countries is largely contingent on securing a sufficient share of state subsidies. That picture 
might however significantly change if the question of what constitutes a party survival is answered in 
different ways. The present work looks at parties’ lifetime through the framework of its new collected data, 
which are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.  
The ninth term, groups who are in traditional societies materially disadvantaged, is related to 
characteristics of the electorate and, indirectly, to party families. Social scientists have established that a 
certain demographic profile of an individual is strongly correlated with impaired possibilities of vertical 
social mobility: the factors mostly aggravating one’s position being the female gender, a non-white race and, 
frequently, the status of a relative new-comer into the country (see, e.g., Moncrief 1991; Raijman and 
Semyonov 1997; De Jong 2001). Both political and economic possibilities of representatives of these 
traditionally underprivileged groups are unfairly limited due institutionalised or non-institutionalised 
prejudice (e.g., Lawrence 1978; Krysan 2000; Sniderman et al 2000) and from the start of democratization in 
the early 1990s, scholars and practitioners have feared that underprivileged groups would face a 
particularly tough opposition in post-communist political systems (e.g., Stein 2000; Matland and 
Montgomery 2003; Galligan, Clavero and Calloni 2007; Stan and Turcescu 2007). Arguably, state subsidies 
might be expected to help the underprivileged in politics by providing them with needed material 
resources. They will no create a level playing field but they give the challenger a head-start. To track 
disadvantaged groups, analysis in the present work ought to look at both the party level as well as at the 
voters themselves: first, some groups may form exclusive gender- or ethnicity-based parties (e.g., Ishiyana 
2003; Vermeersch 2003), while other may simply rally under multi-issue parties. Therefore, both a 
qualitative textual analysis of programme manifestoes of relevant political parties as well as a simple 
quantitative analysis parties is carried out in Chapter 7 to determine, whether public subsidies in individual 
polities helped to boost the presence of underprivileged groups in politics.  
Following up on the previous paragraph, the tenth term to discuss in short is party families. Some 
kind of relationship between a particular party family on the one hand, and a particular structure of 
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financial assets on the other is expected. The particular type depends on what common typology party 
families is used; or an entirely new typology might be also introduced. Given the focus of the present work, 
this is not however the case here. Traditional typologies of party families (e.g., Rokkan 1970; Janda 1980; 
Seiler 1980; von Beyme 1982) are primarily based on Western Europe party types and do not travel 
particularly well to the post-communist Europe, where different historical trajectories and mechanisms lead 
to the crystallisation of social cleavages and, subsequently, party systems in the 1990s (e.g., Kitschelt 1995; 
Whitefield 2002). Some scholars therefore attempted to build new typologies (e.g., von Beyme 1994; 
Mesežnikov 1995; Waller 1996) with mixed results: first, most of these typologies still draw heavily on 
Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) work and are methodologically limited by this old model. Second, societies and 
politics in post-communist countries have been developing more rapidly than in Western European post-
war democracies. Indeed, several authors (e.g., Berglund and Delenbrant 1991; Lane and Ersson 1996; Mair 
and Mudde 1998) early predicted that Eastern and Western European political parties would resemble each 
other sooner or later and, as the present work shows too,  recent developments prove them right. The 
argument whether original Rokkanian typologies of party families are of value for research into post-
communist politics may not be decided here and two typologies are therefore applied, when discussing the 
data in Chapters 5 to 7: first, representing the old, Klingemman, Hofferbert and Budge’s (2000) 15-class 
typology and second, as the new non-Rokkanian model based on general notions of winners and losers of 
democratic transitions, Kitschelt’s (1995) 2-axis division between secular libertarians, economic populists, 
market liberals and religious traditionalists. 
Eleventh, there is the misuse of public media for partisan purposes. The argument from previous 
literature states that spending limits in election campaigns benefit government parties as they, first, are 
more in the public view from the virtue of their office, and second, they may even misuse state-owned 
media for their partisan propaganda. This is a complex causal construction that poses three related 
questions: first, are government parties more in the public view? Second, do they misuse state-owned media 
for partisan purposes? And third, do spending limits effectively restrict media presence of political parties 
in election campaigns? The present work discusses these questions in Chapters 5 to 7, but does not offer 
firm conclusions, since data brought into the analysis are largely anecdotic and comparable in relative terms 
only for small-N sets. There exists no ready dataset with information on the presence of individual political 
parties in national media in Europe; and it is probably still a few years away until computerisation and Big 
Data trends catch up in this field. Scholars engaging in research on media and political parties still more 
often than not use qualitative methods and case studies (e.g., Gunther and Mughan 2000; Gross 2002). 
Moreover, the evidence that parties in the post-communist Europe indeed largely misuse public media is 
unclear or ambiguous. Parties have to some extent control over the media but they are rather just a link in a 
long chain of inter-connected segments of business, politics and civil society (e.g., Gross 2003; Bajomi-Lázár 
2013). As a proxy indicator for the misuse of public media might serve Reporters Without Borders’ Press 
Freedom Index or Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Index; these two ratings do not measure 
specifically the intrusion of political parties into the media world but rather the intrusion of the government 
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and, indirectly, governing parties. The hypothesised relationship is therefore that spending limits 
strengthen the position of governing parties in elections the more the less freedom there is in the media. 
Twelfth, there is pre-election coalition position. Parties assumingly structure their budgets so as to most 
effectively use the position they find themselves vis-à-vis their coalition parties. Common examples are 
parties co-financing candidates in some districts or dividing media space. Coalitions are regularly formed to 
cross the thresholds needed for parties to enter representative organs or thresholds of state subsidies. A 
simple analysis of parties’ pre-election coalition agreements before every election is carried out in Chapter 7 
and the information juxtaposed with data on assets structure. 
Thirteenth, assets structure is also analysed with relation to past electoral performances. Readily 
available datasets of election results only for every European country but the two issues that need to be 
tackled here, in accord with previously discussed terms, are party replacement and pre-election coalitions. 
Individual party-tracing data are already gathered and edited for the operationalisation of the eighth term, 
average lifetime of political parties, and they may be applied for this term too. Birch’s (2003) methodological 
guidelines deal with both party re-formations as well as election coalitions. Election results of individual 
political parties in coalitions in European countries are in most of the cases calculable from available 
datasets, which are listed in Chapter 7. 
The fourteenth term to operationalise is expectations about future electoral performance. The obvious 
indicator is pre-election polls. Even though some political parties poll their preferences privately and do not 
make these data accessible to everyone, most parties rely on polls distributed to the public. In Chapter 7, the 
present work uses time-series data from several polling companies to model what individual political 
parties might have expected before elections. 
The fifteenth and last term to operationalise in this Part is type of elections. That refers to the 
representative organ the election in question is scheduled for and in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the present work 
distinguishes between European, national, regional and local elections. 
Part 3.2: New concepts 
In the previous Part, fifteenth terms found in the arguments of the existing literature have been in 
more detail described and their indicators discussed. These terms may be considered secondary as they 
mostly draw upon previous research or are directly lifted from existing scholarly literature. In the present 
Part, five more terms are considered. These terms are of the primary consideration for this thesis; they all lie 
inside the narrowest set of concepts related to party funding and election campaign finances. 
First, there is the structure of assets accumulated in party budgets. The budgets of political parties are 
commonly, in the majority of European countries, submitted to professional independent auditors and they 
need to conform to national laws on accounting and subordinate legislation. For instance, Czech political 
parties submit for auditing their annual balance, statement of revenues and costs, lists of private and 
corporate donors and copies of deeds of donations over 50.000,- CZK. For the control by the Supervisory 
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Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, they also submit the final auditor’s report and attach a ‘Summary 
of Total Incomes and Expenditures’, in a form prescribed by the Ministry of Finance (Section 17, Law 
424/1991 Coll.; Law 322/1996 Coll.; Decree 273/2005 Coll., as amended by Decree 40/2010 Coll.) (Figure 4.1) 
Figure 3.1: An Example of a) balance sheets of a Czech political party and b) the ‘Summary of Total 
Incomes and Expenditures’ form prescribed by the Czech Ministry of Finance 
  
The Czech example shows that structure of assets in party budgets may be conceptualised in 
different terms, depending on the issue at hand. The standard accounting items do not provide much 
information to a researcher interested in the issue what are the sources and uses of finances flowing through 
treasuries of political parties. In this case, more relevant and useful, even though unaudited and therefore 
less reliable, is the Summary form. The information that the present work looks for in party budget reports 
ought to be instrumental in formulating some answers to the thirty arguments discussed in the present and 
that would be not be achieved by a description of the budget assets structure in the language of accounting. 
Structure of assets in budgets of political parties is therefore on the following pages understood as the 
primary quantitative and secondary qualitative description of shares of sources of revenue and uses of 
expenditure, respectively, which are of interested to the present work due to their close relation to the 
research question asked and arguments stated. 
The data collected for this research project are edited so as to show the following characteristics of 
budget assets: in incomes, the share of state subsidies, the share of large and small donors, the share of 
corporate donors, the share of loans and credits, other specific features; in expenditures, the share of 
operational costs, the share of campaigning costs, the costs of specific campaigning tools, other specific 
features. All financial data are converted into Euro (€), apart from cases where conversion would not be 
suitable for issues of methodology or clarity. As has already been noted in Part 2.1, the present analysis 
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controls for economic factors, typically for inflation, and when the data are edited for that purpose, it is 
highlighted in the text. 
The second important term is a voluntary decision about the goals, strategies and tools of election 
campaigns. This is quite self-explanatory. Political parties and their representatives are assumed to make 
plans how the parties are to proceed with their work. These plans undoubtedly include budgeting and other 
financial planning. They include operational costs. Moreover, parties plan what will be the focal issues in 
their next election campaign and their target group in the electorate. They choose which tools they will use 
for campaigning. They make projections about their future electoral strength and about the amount of 
donations they might expect from their sponsors. They calculate how many seats in what representative 
organs they will have. Last but not least, they take into account possible pre- and post-election coalition 
formulas that will impact their financial and other assets. All these decisions, about day-to-day work 
operation in party offices, about work in representative organs as well as about election campaigns are 
covered by the term voluntary decisions. 
The third term is length of election campaigns. This length is represented in days, weeks or months that 
a party spends officially mounting a campaign before an election. It includes exclusively the time parties 
spent campaigning for a specific election in the streets, in the media and in the virtual space; it does not 
include the planning period and standard ‘permanent’ day-to-day campaigning of a party that is not 
focused on a specific election. 
Fourth, there is the composition of the campaign planning team. Election campaigns of political parties 
are usually planned and directed by teams comprised of people with specific responsibilities: there is the 
head campaign manager, who oversees all activities and is ultimately responsible for the result, head of 
finances or treasurer, head of marketing, volunteer coordinator, communications officer, etc. The present 
work focuses, first, on how many people are directly involved in the planning and directing of campaigns in 
individual political parties, second, on the specific job types inside the team, and third, on how large a share 
constitute hired non-partisan campaigning professionals. In the set of people composing a campaign 
planning team, this work distinguishes between unpaid volunteers, party officials with wider 
responsibilities than campaign planning and specialised campaign managers. Finally, lower-level party 
officials, if they are working on campaigns and party candidates may also belong to the set. 
The fifth term and last term is party’s policy position on the existing regulations on political parties. This 
term is in the present text operationalised as a composite variable made up of two dichotomous variables: 
first, regulations on political parties may be according to a party position either liberal, or strict. Second, 
parties may either want to change these regulations, or not. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
Part 4.1: Research approaches in the existing literature 
The previous discussion of basic concepts and primary and secondary terms included in scholarly 
arguments shows outlines of the current state of research in the field of party funding. The field is not as 
large as, for instance, the study of electoral systems. In this respect, it corresponds to the real-world 
situation: while formal rules of voting have been around at least since the classical period of Ancient Greece 
and spread around the world during the pre-Second World War democracy’s ‘First Wave’ (Huntington 
1991), party funding regulations are a relatively new phenomena in existence as of now for no more than 
seven decades. On the other hand, while voting systems have in the recent period changed relatively only 
little in the majority of world democracies (Carter and Farrell 2010), political finances has been targeted in 
reform policies by many European as well as non-European governments.  
The rapid Europe-wide increase in the number of regulations of political parties and their funding, 
that is described above in Part 2.3, Table 2.1, has been accompanied by a similarly rapid development in the 
research into the respective scholarly field. On the level of individual cases, social scientists were writing 
about the funding of political parties already in the inter-war period (e.g., Pollock 1926; Overacker 1932) but 
the phenomenon was on the whole so unexplored that even the great sociologist Max Weber complained 
that, despite its real-world importance, the research field suffers from lack of scholarly attention (Weber 
1925: 169). After the Second World War, the situation began to improve in the 1960s with the works of 
Heard (1960), Heidenheimer (1963) and, most importantly, Paltiel (1966; 1967). Originally focusing on his 
home country Canada (Paltiel 1970; 1974; 1975; 1976), Khayyam Z. Paltiel soon began to expand his research 
beyond the borders of his nation and wrote small-N comparative works (1979; 1980; 1981), on which other 
students of political finances could build (e.g., Levush 1997; Nassmacher 2001). These early case studies and 
comparative works opened the research agenda of the field and highlighted lasting general trends: first, 
costs of campaigning in democratic elections were steadily rising (e.g., Pollock 1926; Overacker 1932; Heard 
1960) but, second, their amounts depended to a large extent on the electoral system and the system of 
government enacted (Penniman 1984). Third, the lack of laws regulating political finances opened the floor 
to shady politics and back-yard deals of politicians with special interests (e.g., Heidenheimer 1963; 
Alexander 1989; Little and Posada-Carbó 1996; Williams 2000; Scarrow 2007). 
The research in the field further expanded with the democracy’s ‘Third Wave’ (Huntington 1991). 
Post-communist countries serve in many ways as laboratories for political institutions (Lewis 2000: xi) and 
laws regulating political parties were enacted in all post-communist EU Member States. These laws 
however did not preclude the spread of corruption in politics in the region: regularly, the newly passed 
regulations were from the start written in a way to facilitate the predation of political parties on state 
resources (e.g., O’Dwyer 2006; Grzymala-Busse 2007). Other trends that had previously been observed in 
older democracies were also detected in the post-communist region: rising costs of election campaigns are 
already described in Chapter 1 of the present work, anecdotic evidence that contours of political systems 
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affect the working of party regulations and funding models may be traced in first multi-case studies or 
comparative works on post-communist party politics (e.g., Smilov and Toplak 2007; Roper and Ikstens 
2008). 
While the post-communist Europe to a large extent follows the Western Europe in terms of real-
world political finance trends, there is one trend in terms of the respective scholarly field in which the East 
surpasses the West: it is the evident lack of reliable data. This unfortunate hallmark of the field, already 
markedly affecting the possibilities of research in old democracies (Nassmacher 2009: 20), is even more 
appreciable in countries with brief democratic experience, such as in the recently democratised post-
communist countries. Given the “shady” nature of the subject and the tendency of major political players in 
the post-communist region to habitually side-step the boundaries of democratic competition, data on public 
and even more on private funding are difficult to collect. This has quite logically profound consequences on 
the quality of democracy in Central and Eastern countries: even if elections in these countries are free and 
fair, without public control over financial channels that fund election campaigns, political competition as a 
whole ultimately lacks fairness and the voter’s choice is not quite free. 
The issue of corruption is one of three issues largely dominating the scholarly discourse on party 
funding. The other one, the impact of regulations on the competition of political parties, is already discussed 
in Chapter 1 but an important point needs to be added here to that discussion. As Nassmacher (2009: 27) 
also notes, there is only a handful of truly comparative works on political finances. The great variance of 
legal regulations in European countries makes inter-national comparisons very difficult. “Comparative” 
volumes in the field of political financing are very often just a collection of case-studies or small-N studies 
focusing on regional country groups (e.g., Heidenheimer 1970; Alexander 1989; Smilov and Toplak 2007). 
Instead, comparisons have been made mostly from the point of view of party systems – Katz and Mair 
(1992; 1996; 2009) are a case in point. The various forms party funding may take up in different countries are 
usually considered one of many indicators of a previously hypothesised phenomenon related to changing 
party systems or models of party organisations. Or, from the point of view of general social scientific 
methodology, it is usually thought of as an independent, explanatory variable. Movements in party funding 
help to explain electoral losses and gains (e.g., Cordes and Nassmacher 2001), the loosening of party 
discipline (Carty 2004), the closing of a party system to challengers (Casas-Zamora 2005), or the de-
/centralisation of parties (Koole 1996). Far less prevalent in the field of party studies has until recently been 
the research agenda that putts party funding on the first position in a hypothesised chain of causality and 
making it a dependent variable (see., e.g. Scarrow 2004; 2010; Clift and Fisher 2004; Hopkin 2004; Weekers, 
Maddens and Noppe 2009); and that despite the example set by another sub-discipline of political science 
that discusses finances in politics: political marketing. 
Political marketing focuses on the third issue that dominates the scholarly discussion on party 
funding, which is the issue of campaigning. Students of this field (e.g., Herrnson 1980; Maarek 1993; 
Newman 1999; O’Shaughnessy and Henneberg 2002; Lilleker and Lees-Marshment 2005; Baines and 
Worcester 2006; Davies and Newman 2006; Lees-Marshment 2009) write about finances as one of the 
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resources a successful political campaign necessarily requires. Through a well-executed campaign, money is 
converted into votes; in such a one-directional model, finances are mostly thought of as the independent 
variable and one of the first components of the causal chain. That does not however apply to the entire 
duration of political campaigns and more complex models include sub-processes, in which money gain are, 
quite contrarily, the primary goal. Typically, candidates strive to attract material contributions from large 
and small donors via contact events and grass-roots campaigning. Comprehensive strategies that are 
discussed by scholars and executed by political marketers and campaign professionals see finances as both 
an independent as well as a dependent variable, as both means and ends. 
The present work follows the example of this two-directional approach towards party funding and 
in different parts looks at it as either a dependent or an independent variable. The assumption behind such 
an approach is that a comprehensive inquiry into the state of political parties and party systems in the post-
communist Europe and an inquiry into the issue of cartelisation require it. Treating party funding as a 
dependent variable becomes necessary when the strategy drive concept is considered: as is already noted 
above in Part 2.3 and as many authors argue too (e.g., O’Dwyer 2006; Grzymala-Busse 2007), parties in 
parliament sometimes are, or at least appear to be, colluding on passing regulations favourable to them. 
Furthermore, the present work does not assess merely the legal aspect of political finances but also the real 
world situation. The precise forms of budgets of political parties are the results of work of individual agents, 
who plan election campaigns and day-to-day party operations and with these goals in mind structure funds 
accordingly. Money may not therefore be treated simply as a resource enabling movements and changes in 
parties and party systems, it is necessary also to see it as the planned goal of a deliberate effort. 
Part 4.2: Research design 
Tackling party funding as both a dependent and an independent variable requires a complex 
research design, which allows following a causal chain in both directions. The design and the research 
project as a whole is nevertheless already limited by its overarching goal to contribute to the discussion 
whether cartelisation has been happening in post-communist democracies, and whether the financial 
structures of political parties in East Central European may reveal something new about the region’s party 
systems. Narrowing down the subject of inquiry is a necessary step in every reseach undertaking but it 
needs to be done in a way which does not significantly impedes methodological possibilities of that 
undertaking. In this case, the stated goal demands that the research design is centred around the concept of 
political cartel, around post-communist democracies in East Central Europe and around financial structures 
found in the party systems of this region. 
Katz and Mair’s cartel thesis is discussed already in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 and there it is already also 
stated that the notion itself is still developing and has so far lacked precise, short definition. The two 
original authors themselves come closest to it, when they talk about the cartel party as a “type that is 
postulated to emerge in democratic polities that are characterized by the interpenetration of party and state 
and by a tendency towards inter-party collusion.” (Katz and Mair 2009: 755) Based on this statement, it is 
clear that a research design that plans to operate with the notion of cartel needs to include interpretations of 
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party types and of party strategies. Parties, their interactions and their strategies are three units in the set of 
focal points of the present work. 
In terms of geography, the research design is limited to post-communist democracies in East Central 
Europe. East Central Europe is conventionally understood by scholars as the region between German-
speaking countries on the West and Russia on the East (e.g., Halecki 1950; 1952; Palmer 1970; Szücs 1985; 
Magocsi 1993; Kłoczowski 2005). In its geographically largest interpretation, for instance the one used by the 
East Central European Center of the Columbia University in New York (Columbia University 2014), East 
Central Europe includes the Baltics, Central Europe as well as the Balkans and comprises today 21 countries 
(Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Ukraine). The smallest model (e.g., Winiecki 1994), on the other hand, usually equals East Central Europe to 
Member States of the Visegrad Group, i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. There are many 
reasons behind grouping these countries into a conceptual region: some are purely geographical, follow the 
rivers Danube, Dnieper and Prut and the mountain ranges Alps and Carpathians (e.g., Götz 1904); others 
are linguistic and delimit the region as a group of Western and Southern Slavic and Finno-Ugric languages 
(e.g., Cornis-Pope and Neubauer 2004); yet others follow common cultural and historical legacies (e.g., 
Lhéritier 1928; Kossmann 1950; Turnock 2001). The last is used also as the basis of the present work: the 
selection of cases researched on the following pages is based primarily on the common Habsburg Empire 
legacy of five countries in the region: Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
At its downfall, the Habsburg Empire encompassed a large area from the Dalmatian coast of the 
Adriatic Sea to Galicia behind the Western Carpathian Mountains. Discounting short war-time changes, the 
core of the Empire, the Austrian and Czech territories and Upper Hungary, or Slovakia, remained stable 
from 1526 to 1918. During the 17th and the 18th century, the Empire’s outer regions, Hungary and Dalmatia 
with Galicia, respectively, were incorporated. A Habsburg politico-cultural historical legacy is therefore 
today most noticeable in four of the countries selected for  inquiry in the present work, i.e., Austria, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, plus in Hungary. This quintet of presently sovereign countries were 
subsumed into the Empire at the latest after the Vienna Congress in 1815 and their first era of national mass 
politics was anchored in the centralised administrative system of the Habsburg Empire. Poland, on the 
other hand, was incorporated into the Habsburg domain only partially in 1772, when the Polish-Ukrainian 
region of Galicia fell under Austrian administration. The three centres of the region, the Ukrainian cities of 
Przemyśl and Lviv as well as the Polish Kraków remained in the Empire until its dissolution in 1918. 
A selection based on such the common historical legacy follows authors who emphasise the 
importance of long-term political influences on present politics. Schöpflin (1990), Cotta (1994), Márkus 
(1994; 1996), Rivera (1996), Tworzecki (1996; 2002), Ishiyama (1997), Mair (1997), Kitschelt (1999), Lewis 
(2000), Lindström (2001), Sitter (2001), Kostelecký (2002), Zieliński (2002), Roper and Fesnic (2003), 
Dimitrova-Grajzl (2007), or Meyer-Sahling (2009) provide abstract model constructs as well as empirical 
evidence that the present politics of the core countries of the former Habsburg Empire share striking 
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similarities that might have to a large degree originated in the era of their common absolutist state. The first 
clashes of modern mass politics took place between Austrian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Slovakian, 
Slovenian and other politicians in the common representative organ, the Imperial Council or Reichsrat. This 
period lasted for almost half a century and during these first five decades, striking similarities between 
political systems and party systems on respective national levels were established. Sovereign national states 
that emerged from the Habsburg Empire after the First World War, carried further these features of 
similarity (see, e.g. Simral 2012). Before the majority of post-Habsburg successor states turned authoritarian, 
their constitutional and party-system make-ups bore close resemblance to the pre-1914 Imperial politics. 
When democracy in East Central again resurfaced after some six decades of fascist, pro-nazi and communist 
dictatorships, the common Habsburg cultural, historical and political legacy resurfaced as well. 
The selection of Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia is based on this long-term 
legacy argument. While the focus of the present work is on post-communist countries, the inclusion of 
Austria in the set enriches the present work with the possibility to compare post-communist experience 
with a control case that has enjoyed democracy since after the Second World War. Most students of post-
communism focus exclusively on post-comunist countries and do not transgress boundaries that existed 
between the socialist Eastern world and the ‘free’ Western world before 1990; the same applies to students 
of Western European politics and party systems. Only slowly these two groups merge and endeavour to 
juxtapose countries from the former Eastern bloc with those of the former West. The present work wants to 
add to this trend by having a mixed set of cases. 
Whereas Austria is included in the set, Hungary is not. It is a significant omission made primarily 
due to practical issues: I do not speak Hungarian and may not have therefore such an insight into the 
country’s politics as in the case of the four included countries. Moreover, Hungary might prove to be too 
much a different unit for a comparison with the rest of the set as its unique mixed electoral system has most 
probably a stronger institutional effect on the shape of the national party system than in the four selected 
countries (e.g., Moser and Scheiner 2004; Bennoit 2006). In the recent years, Hungary has also experienced a 
series of controversial political turn-abounds that surpassed even the already high standard level of 
incredibility that may be seen in the day-to-day politics of the post-communist East Central Europe. The 
plan of this work is to follow as much as possible the classic Most Similar Systems Design (e.g., Skocpol 
1984: 379; Sartori 1991: 250; Bartolini 1993: 134) and Mills’ Method of Difference (Mill 1843: 455); a 
fundamentally different electoral formula as well as a tendency to reverse the progress towards a high-
quality type of democracy  might defeat this plan. 
In the text, I also make allusions to other European countries, when I believe it enhances the 
information about the researched countries. The seminal comparative volumes of Karl-Heinz Nassmacher 
and Khayyam Paltiel has shown that even comparisons across large spatial and temporal distances may 
help to understand specificities in widely different individual cases. In the final part of the present work, 
which deals with campaign strategies of political parties, I make the prominent addition of data gathered in 
Germany. As described in Part 5.5, I decided to include these data based on their apparent similarity to the 
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Austrian case and relative dissimilarity to other researched countries. The long common history of Austria 
and Germany has always been reflected in commonalities of their political institutions, including the basic 
mechanisms and structures of their party systems. The post-war period was in both countries characterised 
by the rivalry between the Christian Democratic and the Social Democratic Party and the tendency to a 
Blondelian two-and-a-half party system; based on the common features of the constitutional and the 
political systems, empirical evidence from one country ought to therefore boost the explanatory power of 
evidence in the other. 
The above references to the Habsburg period on the one hand, and the most recent political 
developments on the other, usher into the text the issue of time dimension. On the following pages, I aim to 
present an up-to-date picture of the situation in party systems of East Central Europe and focus primarily 
on the recent years. The basic descriptive analysis of all five cases covers their present ongoing periods of 
democratic rule. For the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, this means the post-1989 era; for 
Austria, the entire post-Second World War period. Understandably, only the most important changes in 
constitutional and party regulations, that have had some bearing on the current shapes of respective party 
systems, are mentioned in the descriptive analysis. Description of quantitative data on finances in the party 
systems is limited by data availability in individual countries; this data is discussed more extensively in the 
next Part. As regards party strategies, the analysis focuses on the most recent developments that took place 
in the last three election terms. 
The three segments of the research itself are therefore, first, the development of laws and 
regulations, second, financial history, and third, developments in party strategies. A specific methodology is 
selected for each on segment in this triad. First, descriptive qualitative analysis is mostly used for 
highlighting important changes in the legal framework of individual countries that shaped the working and 
funding of respective party systems. A basic historical narrative that focuses on politics and changes in 
party systems introduces the reader into the environment and reminds the interested scholar about all 
important junctures that political parties, politicians and people in the researched countries experienced. 
Already a basic narrative may tell who the parties behind the legal and other changes were and such 
information may serve as an anchor for a later analysis of political strategies. Second, quantitative data on 
political finance gathered in party archives and from national regulatory bodies are analysed. In this 
research segment, several hypotheses are statistically tested. Financial histories of political parties lay in the 
very centre of the present work, which also purports to build a comprehensive dataset serving as a reliable 
source for future research projects. Third, quantitative data are juxtaposed with data on political strategies 
obtained from political parties and their representatives. This data were gathered by means of a targeted 
email survey and during personal interviews. It is an original dataset, presented in full for the first time in 
this dissertation, and when combined with data on finances, it has the potential to enrich the field of 
political party studies with important findings about strategies currently shaping political systems in post-
communist countries and elsewhere. 
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Part 4.3: Data 
The next chapter, Chapter 5, relies on a qualitative analysis of primary sources related to the 
development of legal regulations in European countries, primarily in Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The two main sources of information on party regulations in Europe used in 
the Chapter are the International IDEA website (www.idea.int) and the Party Law in Modern in Modern 
Europe research project conducted by a group of scholars headquartered at the Leiden University 
(www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl); these two data collections were already used in my previous work (Simral 
2014) and amended by further data mining of primary sources on the governmental or legal websites of 
individual European countries. The current status of the party law in each country was also assessed with 
the help of the GRECO Third Evaluation Round Evaluation and Complinance Reports (www.coe.int).  
Primary data for Austria are taken from the website of the Austrian Parliament 
(www.parlament.gv.at) and the Austrian Court of Audit (Rechnungshof; www.rechnungshof.gv.at). For the 
Czech Republic, the Collection of Laws (all laws passed since in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic 
since 1950) may be found at the official database of the Ministry of Interior at http://aplikace.mvcr.cz/sbirka-
zakonu/. Data on German laws were collected at the official website of the Federal Ministry of Justice, 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/index.html. Polish legal developments may be followed at 
http://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/. Official data for Slovakia are found at 
http://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky/Zakony/Zbierka-zakonov.aspx. Finally, Slovenian legal data were taken 
from the Official Gazette (www.uradni-list.si). 
Chapter 6 is based primarily on information gathered from official financial reports of political 
parties in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Data for Czech parties were gathered from hard copy 
reports archived and accessible on request in the Parliamentary Library at the Chamber of Deputies of the 
Czech Parliament in Prague. Hard copy scans of reports of Polish political parties may be found online at 
the National Electoral Committee website (Państowa Komisja Wyborcza, pkw.gov.pl), similarly to the 
reports of Slovak parties, of which hard copy scans are accessible online at the website of the National 
Council of the Slovak Republic (Národná rada Slovenskej republiky, www.nrsr.sk). The scope of the data on 
Slovak parties also limits the scope of the entire dataset – financial reports older than 2003 are not publicly 
accessible on the website of the Slovak National Council. Even though some scholars were able to construe 
their own datasets for earlier perdios (see, e.g., Mesežnikov 1995), I rely in the present work only on 
officially sanctioned data and to manually gather older data would require further substantial fieldwork not 
manageable under the time restraints of the present research project. In total, the dataset constructed for 
Chapter 6 covers all parties that submitted their annual financial reports between the years 2003 and 2013 in 
the Czech Republic (207 parties), Poland (155 parties) and Slovakia (153 parties). The total adds up to 2343 
individual observations (i.e., 2343 included financial reports).   
Secondarily, Part 6.5, discussing to a limited extent the cases of Austria, Germany and Slovenia, uses 
data covered from their respective national sources, i.e., Wiener Zeitung, the official gazette of the Austrian 
government, the website of the German Bundestag, and the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public 
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Legal Records and Related Services. For reasons related to practical obstacles in data gathering described in 
Chapter 5, this small datasets of three countries covers seven largest Austrian political parties between 2006 
and 2012, six largest German parties between 2007 and 2012 and twenty Slovenian political parties in 2012 
and 2013. 
Chapter 7 uses original data collected specifically for the present work. The data are the product of 
an email questionnaire sent to 470 political parties from Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia in December 2013. The questions included in the questionnaire asked about the 
surveyed parties’ opinion on the current state of party regulation in their respective countries (4 questions), 
party policy towards potential reform of party regulations (4 questions), and parties’ conduct of election 
campaigns (6 questions). The questionnaire was followed by two email reminders in February and April 
2014 with the goal to increase as much as possible the response rate. In the end, the questionnaire was fully 
or partially completed by 117 parties.  
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Chapter 5: Rules 
Part 5.1: General developments of party regulations in Europe 
As is already noted in Chapter 2, European countries have been since the Second World War 
increasingly limiting the space of party competition through legal instruments. While the inter-war period 
may be characterised as a time, when partisan politics was regulated almost exclusively through informal 
means and customs, formal rules for the behaviour of political parties were being adopted only after 1945. It 
was perhaps the first experience with failures of democracies in some of the most developed countries of 
Europe, such as Germany, Austria and Italy of the 1930s, that lead the post-war leaders to include 
regulations of political parties in the basic legal frameworks of the new political systems. In 1947, an article 
on the activities of parties appeared in the new Italian constitution. In 1949, the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany included Article 21 focusing in detail on how parties are created, how they account for 
their assets and activities and how can be outlawed (see, .e.g, Schefold 2002: 134; Müller and Siberer 2006: 
438). 
While formal regulation of political parties was scarce in the pre-1945 world, the importance of 
regulation of political campaigns was understood already in the 19th century. The United Kingdom’s 
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act of 1883 laid down specific rules and limits on how much can be 
spent on political campaigns and by whom (Glen 1884; see also Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). However, despite 
these first efforts to curb corruption in the democratic process and the emphasis put on political finances by 
some prominent scholars (Weber 1925; Pollock 1926; Overacker 1932), also the area of party funding 
remained largely unregulated until the second half of the 20th century. It might be the issue’s political 
nature, when a certain balance between the right for private business of party members on the one hand, 
and the need for public control on the other, must be achieved, that delayed the introduction of financial 
regulations of political parties in Europe until quite recently. Only in the last 25 years, European politicians 
have begun to discuss the need for more rules on party finances and money in political campaigns in 
general.   
As I show elsewhere (Simral 2014), the three factors that has been so far in the history of EU Member 
States most conducive to passing a new law regulating political parties are first, a regime change, second, a 
visitation by a GRECO evaluation team, and third, a stable cabinet lasting at least six months. Party 
regulations, more or less detailed, are in the post-1945 world one of those laws almost automatically 
adopted when a dictatorship falls and a country is (re-)democratised. That happened in the 1940s in Austria, 
Germany and Italy, in the 1980s in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and in the 1990s in former communist 
countries. The adoption of party regulations serves more than one purpose: while there is always in the 
regulations included some mechanism that ought to in the future help in preventing another potential 
democratic breakdown, such as a legal process for outlawing an extremist political party, there are also 
mechanisms that ought to help in establishing and maintaining a stable party system, such as the 
introduction of public funding of political parties. A table borrowed from Magnus Ohman (2011) (Table 5.1) 
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shows that the second half of the 20th century was not only a time when parties around the world were 
increasingly more and more formally regulated, but also a time when parties were increasingly more 
funded from public sources. This correlation is to a certain degree self-explanatory: without an appropriate 
legal basis, parties in developed democracies would not, hopefully, resort to channel state money into their 
own treasuries. Looking at the relationship from the opposite direction, however, there is no clear-cut 
explanation why once political parties are formally regulated by the state, they should at the same time be 
given by the state any financial resources. The concurrent adoption of regulations and public funding seem 
to indicate that the sufferance of the first was at least partially motivated by the need for the latter.  
Table 5.1: Year of introduction of direct state funding of political parties in selected countries in Western 
Europe, North America and the Commonwealth (adapted from Ohman 2011) 
Germany (West) Sweden   USA   Australia, Greece 
1959 
 
1965 
 
1971 
 
1984   
Norway 
 
Finland 
 
Ireland 
 
France   
1960 
 
1967 
 
1973 
 
1988   
Austria 
 
Denmark Canada, Italy South Africa 
1963 
 
1969 
 
1974 
 
1993   
Netherlands Belgium 
 
Spain, Portugal United Kingdom 
1964   1970   1977   2000   
 
This explanation of the willingness of parties to be regulated leads back to Katz and Mair’s cartel 
thesis: the adoption of legal regulative frameworks was on the part of parties nothing but an economically 
rational act based on self-interest. The calculated cost of this act, i.e., to be in the future constrained in the 
party competition by a set of formal rules, was lower than the prospective benefit of having a stable and 
reliable source of income from the state budget. While, as Katz and Mair also point out, there were 
undoubtedly other pay-offs connected with the new rules, and while it would be fatally wrong to assume 
that correlation implies causation, money were most probably a great motivator for the parties to act as they 
did. 
This statement is supported by evidence, if one considers the form of rules passed in the first waves 
of regulations. The lack of detail in early laws on political parties, already shown in Figure 2.2, did not help 
transparency in party competition and did not allow for substantial public control of political finances. This 
unfortunate situation, that lead to a regular occurrence of scandals connected with party funding in 
Western, and later also in Eastern Europe (see, .e.g, Smilov and Toplak 2007; Kopecký 2008; Koss 2010), was 
to be improved by establishing a system of international organisations supervising financial operations in 
party systems in Europe. The second factor most conducive to passing a new party regulation in European 
history, already mentioned above, are visits by GRECO evaluation teams. Substituting in its impact the 
earlier phenomenon of a democratic regime change, GRECO, or the Group of States Against Corruption, a 
48 
 
subsidiary organisation of the Council of Europe, serves in the 21st century as an influential agent of change 
(not only) in the legal background of party systems in Europe. GRECO, which was founded in 1999 to curb 
corruption at national levels in its member states, has since 2008 extended its activities to also report on 
transparency of funding of political parties in individual countries. Despite having no direct powers over 
the adoption of new party regulations in the states that are party to the GRECO Agreement, evaluation 
reports issued by the organisation appear to have an impact on the behaviour of parties in Europe. Even 
though its effect ought not to be overestimated, international pressure has lead in many countries at least to 
the opening of a discussion over the future of party funding and to the recognition of the need for further 
reforms both in the new as well as old established democracies (GRECO Twelfth General Activity Report 
2011: 6). The importance of international organisations in the process of adopting new party regulations 
presents a significant change, when compared to the situation of the mid- and late 20th century. In the 1960s 
Germany or Sweden, in the 1970s United Kingdom, or in the 1980s France, legislating agents faced direct 
challenges mounted exclusively by domestic actors, like  the courts, independent committees or new, non-
traditional parties. 
Domestic actors, nevertheless, still play the key role in the process of adopting new legislation, 
including legislation about political parties. While then GRECO and other international supervisory 
organisations may indeed move politicians in the direction of reforming regulations of party funding, the 
actual impact on transparency and public control over political finances varies from state to state: for 
instance, while the latest regulations passed in the United Kingdom comply with six of the eight GRECO 
recommendations for improving transparency of party funding, and in the Netherlands, they comply with 
15 out of 19 recommendations, in Belgium and in the Czech Republic, the regulations comply as of 2014 
with only one out of 15 and 19 recommendations respectively issued by GRECO for the two countries (see 
GRECO Third Evaluation Round Compliance Reports on Belgium (2011, 2012, 2014), Czech Republic (2013, 
2014), Netherlands (2010, 2013, 2013) and the United Kingdom (2010, 2013). Political parties, both in 
Western Europe as well as in the post-communist Eastern Europe, seem to gladly accept the benefits of 
party funding from public resources, but are reluctant to disclose much information about how they use this 
funding. 
As is already noted above, particularly in Part 4.2, the low level of disclosure of data on party 
funding in many European countries complicates research into the field. The following parts describe in 
detail the developments of regulations of political parties and party funding in the three researched 
countries, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia; one part is dedicated to a brief description of party 
regulations in Austria, Germany and Slovenia. The last part of this chapter summarises the information on 
the six individual cases and places it into a larger picture that includes other European countries. 
Part 5.2: Regulations of political parties in the Czech Republic 
The origins of today’s Czech and Slovak party systems are found in the former common 
Czechoslovak state that existed for the major part of the 20th century: in the interwar period between 1918 
and 1939, and post-Second World War, between 1945 and 1993. A deep and exhaustive explanation of the 
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current forms of the respective Czech and Slovak party systems would require a journey into the systems’ 
origins in the First Czechoslovak Republic, and even deeper, into the times of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. For the purposes of the present work, it suffices to note that a comprehensive framework of legal 
regulations for political parties did not develop in Czechoslovakia before the year 1990. Political parties in 
the interwar Czechoslovakia were only indirectly regulated by general rules on associations from the 
Habsburg era and by election laws. Since there was no threshold required for political parties to enter the 
parliament, the Czechoslovak party system became numerous and fragmentized. The first law directly 
aimed at political parties was adopted in 1933, which focused mostly on the moments of legal creation and 
dissolution of political parties with the aim to prevent rising radical right-wing tendencies among the 
Sudeten German electorate. In the critical year 1938, the Czechoslovak government issued a series of decrees 
that curtailed the spectrum of political parties in the system and resulted in a short-lived two-and-a-half 
party system. 
The trend to regulate the number as well as the ideological basis of political parties in 
Czechoslovakia continued also after the forced break from democracy caused by the German occupation 
between 1939 and 1945. The semi-democratic system of 1945 – 1948 was founded on presidential decrees 
that curbed multi-party competition: the strongest party of the interwar era, the Agrarian Party, was banned 
from re-entering the political space and the remaining, predominantly socialist, parties were forced to 
cooperate in the so-called National Front, which effectively precluded any effective opposition to the 
government and allowed the Communist Party a gradual take-over of the state. Between 1948 and 1989, the 
Communists turned the country into a full-fledged member of the Soviet bloc and allowed only the puppet 
presence of three pro-Communist satellite parties.  
In 1990, after five decades of suppression, the Czechoslovak party system needed to be re-started 
with the help of the state that was to compensate for the general lack of fee-paying party membership. The 
party funding model established in the 1990s Czechoslovakia was thus one based on large state subsidies. 
At the same time, it continued the trend to partially limit the extreme pluralism of the inter-war era: while 
the election threshold in all elections was put at 5 per cent, state subsidies were given to parties that 
received at 2 per cent of the total vote in the 1990 election to the Federal Assembly. In 1991, the current Law 
on the Association in Political Parties and Movements was adopted, which established a) a permanent 
contribution to parties which received at least 3 per cent of the vote in elections for the Chamber of 
Deputies, b) a mandate contribution to parties with at least one candidate elected to the Chamber of 
Deputies, with further amendments introducing contribution also for mandates in the Senate (amendment 
117/1994 Coll.), regional councils and the Prague municipal council (amendment 340/2000 Coll.) (Section 20, 
Law 424/1991 Coll, on the Association in Political Parties and Movements). The two other laws crucial for 
the system of subsidies for Czech political parties, the Law on Election to the Parliament and the Law on 
Election to the European Parliament, were adopted in 1995 and 2000, respectively; the complete the system 
with contributions towards expenses incurred in connection with elections to the Chamber of Deputies, for 
parties which received at least 1.5 per cent of the total vote (Section 85, Law 247/1995 Coll.), and in 
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connection with elections to the European Parliament, for parties over a 1 per cent threshold (Section 65, 
Law 62/2003 Coll.). 
Even though subsidies were thus in three steps introduced also for parties successful in elections to the 
Senate, regional councils, the Prague municipal council and the European Parliament, elections to the 
Chamber of Deputies has always remained crucial not only for parties’ relationship to the national 
government, but also for the level of financial aid received from the state. The current legislation and its 
previous development shows a tendency to give preferential treatment to larger parties that are at the 
forefront of the competition for parliamentary seats. 
In its original version, the 1995 Law on Election to the Parliament increased the previous 2 per cent 
threshold (left over from the 1990 law) required to become eligible for the contribution towards election 
expenses to 3 per cent and increased the original sum from 15 CZK per vote to 100,000 CZK per 0.1 per cent 
of all votes up to a maximum of 5 million CZK. That amendment was, however, at the initiative of President 
Havel ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and the current law was adopted instead. The 
same ruling and fate awaited a part of Law 340/2000 Coll., amending the 1991 Law on Political Parties, 
which increased the original mandate contribution for a member of parliament from 500,000 to 1 million 
CZK. Instead, a new legislation, adopted in 2001, set the sum to 900,000 CZK; after the start of the economic 
crisis in 2011, it was lowered by 5 per cent to 855,000 CZK. 
To add to the evidence, the prominent role that the Czech political system (or, at least a significant 
part of its political representation) assigns to the Chamber of Deputies is manifested in three other facts: 
first, contributions received after a success in elections to the Chamber of Deputies are ten times the amount 
received after a success in elections to the European Parliament. To the Chamber of Deputies, the permanent 
contribution stands at 200,000 CZK for every 0.1 per cent over the 3 per cent threshold up to 5 per cent of the 
vote. Plus, there is the contribution towards expenses incurred in connection with elections to the Chamber 
of Deputies is 100 CZK per vote to parties which received at least 1.5 per cent of the total of all valid votes. 
In rough numbers, 5 per cent of the total vote equals approx. 8 million CZK. As for elections to the 
European Parliament, the only contribution is towards expenses and equals 30 CZK per vote to parties over 
a 1 per cent threshold, which adds up to some 800,000 CZK for 5 per cent of the total vote. 
Second, in the original wording of Section 20 of the Law on Political Parties that granted 
contributions to parties represented in a regional council or the Prague municipal council only if the parties 
also held seats in the Chamber of Deputies. That wording has always been disregarded in the practice of the 
Ministry of Finance, which pays contribution also to parties not represented in the Chamber of Deputies; 
however, it shows the tendency to strengthen the position of several parties, which are successful in the 
national election, at the expense of others, including those parties that are successful mostly at the regional 
level. In the case of the contribution for regional mandates, the Ministry of Finance clearly took the initiative 
and at its own risk awarded subsidies to parties not covered by Law 340/2000 Coll. Strictly speaking, it 
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acted outside of the provisions of the law until the amendment 556/2004 Coll. was passed four years later, 
which corrected the existing discrepancy between legal theory and reality. 
Third, the Chamber of Deputies functions as the central supervisory body over the activities and 
finances of all political parties. Specifically, it is the Chamber’s Supervisory Committee, a fully political 
body made up exclusively of Deputies of the Chamber (i.e., MPs), who is the first to inspect Annual 
Financial Reports submitted to the Chamber by political parties and who decides on the Reports’ 
completeness. The review process in the Supervisory Committee is quite relaxed: parties’ books are 
inspected and checked for financial irregularities by independent private auditors chosen by the parties 
themselves. The review focuses mostly on monitoring whether the required amount of standardized forms 
was received, since the Committee does not have the capacities or the legal powers to make a thorough 
investigation of parties’ possessions and activities. The supervisory work carried out by the Chamber is thus 
more a matter of protocol than a real scrutiny of capital flows. It is mostly concerned with parties who are 
too careless to even properly submit their Annual Financial Report on time. If the Supervisory Committee 
finds that a party did not submit a complete report, it officially proposes to the government to lodge a claim 
against the party at the Supreme Administrative Court, who may suspend and subsequently dissolve the 
offending party. 
The centrality of the Chamber of Deputies in the Czech system of regulation of political parties and 
party funding is the system’s first hallmark; the second then, as the paragraph above already hints at, is its 
liberal nature that does not allow for a sufficient public control. The only control mechanism has been since 
1991 the review process by the Supervisory Committee described in the paragraph above. In 1994, a new 
regulation was passed, Law 117/1994 Coll., by which political parties were compulsorily to be audited by 
the Supreme Audit Office of the Czech Republic. That article of the law was, however, ruled 
unconstitutional by Finding 296/1995 Coll. of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, who wished 
to ensure privacy for internal dealings of political parties, including the privacy of their financial structures. 
By Law 322/1996 Coll., Annual Financial Reports of political parties were at least made accessible to public 
and archived in hard copies at the Office of the Chamber of Deputies, or in reality, in the Parliamentary 
Library. 
The Constitutional Court’s desire to protect the privacy of political parties is characteristic of the 
liberal approach towards regulation of political parties. Parties continue to be in the Czech Republic 
considered by law above all private enterprises and guarded against penetration by the state; this legal 
notion might be still a reflection of the previous time of a totalitarian party-state and the Court’s effort to 
avoid the return of such a state. On the other, the defence of parties’ privacy has lead in the Czech case to a 
low level of transparency of the party system, including its funding. The liberal model of control has led to 
several negative phenomena that do not benefit democratic political competition: first, there are frequent 
instances of political advertisements with no direct financial link to political parties or their representatives. 
Some parties use private unsanctioned political campaigning that is not regulated by law. These campaigns 
are carried out outside of the official budgets of political parties and are detectable only by private media 
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companies, who monitor the entire advertising market. State agencies have no powers or means to control 
them. By extension, finances used for these ‘grey’ campaigns are not written down in any books, apart from 
the books of individual PR and media agencies; for a researcher or the lay public, such campaign funds are 
virtually undiscoverable. 
Second, closely related to the previous problem are the undisclosed discounts obtained on products 
and tools used for political campaigns. There is evidence of large discounts for political parties and their 
candidates by some Czech media companies; in effect, such discounts function as an indirect material 
support for parties and skew significantly the financial data on costs of political campaigns. In some cases, 
the discounts on large-scale campaigning in the press or audiovisual media amount to 80 or 90 per cent 
from the usual market price (see, .e.g., Mediář 27 November 2012). 
Third, the real identities of party donors are often carefully hidden. The use of dummies and slush 
funds and their uncovering by journalists led in December 1997 to a government crisis and the subsequent 
fall of Prime Minister Klaus (see, e.g., Rutland 1998: 83-4). Large donations, originating from one donor, are 
also divided into several smaller ones, using a network of party colleagues, personal friends or family 
relations. Since the law also allows for company donors, many private businessmen choose to financially 
support parties through one of their companies. 
To sum up, the Czech legal regulation of the national party system is characterised by two major 
features: first, the anchoring of the system in the lower house of the Czech parliament, i.e., the Chamber of 
Deputies, which has a central role in terms of public subsidisation and supervision of parties. Second, the 
activities and, in particular, financial dealings of the party system are largely from outsiders. The life of 
parties is relatively weakly regulated and the low level of oversight allows party actors and their supporters 
to evade legally prescribed channels when mounting political campaigns and carrying out day-to-day party 
operations. Even though there has been development in the legal framework to a more transparent 
environment and today’s situation is markedly different from that in the 1990s, local as well as international 
watchdogs agree (see, .e.g., TI Czech Republic, Oživení, Růžový panter) that there is still a real need for 
reforms if the Czech Republic is to strive for a truly fair and legitimate party competition. 
Part 5.3: Regulations of political parties in Poland 
The political history of Poland immediately after the 1989 regime change is among the Central 
European countries one of the most turbulent ones. Poland experienced between 1989 and summer 2014 
eight parliamentary, five presidential, six local and two European elections, which is in total a lower 
number than, for instance the number of elections that took place during the same period in the Czech 
Republic (where Senate and regional elections are conducted separately from parliamentary and local 
elections, respectively). However, the early 1990s in Poland were characterised by a large fragmentation of 
the party system that lasted until the parliamentary election of 1997 (Figure 5.1) 
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Figure 5.1: Effective Number of Parties in Poland 1991 – 2011 
 
In 1990, first democratic law on political parties was adopted that regulated basic operations, 
establishment and dissolution of political parties (Act 54/1990). This law was the keystone of the first post-
revolution legal framework for party competition in Poland and lasted until 1997, when it was substituted 
by an entirely new law. Unlike in the neighbouring Czechoslovakia, Poland at first chose not to publicly 
subsidise its political parties and election campaigns for the 1991 parliamentary elections therefore were 
funded completely from private sources. Law 54/1990 even explicitly prohibited direct state subsidies to 
political parties, which was, as Walecki argues, a reflection of the public outrage over the previous use of 
state funds for the benefit of the Polish United Workers Party and an effort to weaken materially specifically 
the Worker’s Party former satellites and new social-democratic successors (Walecki 2005: 89, 134). 
However, Polish politicians soon realised the need for some sort of guaranteed income if the party 
system was to stabilise and develop. The new Electoral Law adopted for the 1993 parliamentary election 
(Act 45/1993) introduced contribution for votes to parties and coalitions (in Polish legal language, ‘election 
committees’) that secured seats in the Sejm and Senate, the two chambers of the Polish parliament. The 
entire contribution was set to of 20 per cent of the total sum allocated from the state budget to cover the 
costs of the election and amounted to a one-off payment of 14,500 Polish złoty (PLN) for each seat in one of 
the chambers.  
The system of state subsidies further progressed in 1997, when both a new Constitution of Poland as 
well as a new Law on Political Parties (Act 98/1997) was adopted. The new Constitution itself established 
the requirement of transparency of political parties (Art. 13) and the requirement that “the financing of 
political parties shall be open to public inspection” (Art. 11, Section (2)). The provisions were introduced in 
direct reaction to previous disclosure and reporting infringements made by many political parties and 
coalitions in the 1991 and 1993 elections.  Even though all parties (more precisely, ‘election committees’) 
were already in 1993 obliged to submit reports on the expenditure incurred during their election campaigns, 
more than 50 committees did not do so and the Prosecutors’ Office started against them proceedings for 
breach of the Electoral Law. These proceedings were later discontinued, but the situation showed the weak 
spot of the pre-1997 Polish regulations on political parties, i.e., ineffective sanctions and enforcement. 
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Between 1997 and 2001, the legal framework was overhauled in order to make party funding 
regulations more relevant and useful in efforts to make party competition in Poland fair and transparent. 
The conditions of disclosure were made detailed and quiet stringent, requiring two different financial 
reports to be submitted by each party every year, plus separate reports on each election campaign. The legal 
reform soon resulted in better reporting discipline of Polish parties: after the 1998 local elections, over 20,000 
election committees did not submit their financial reports. After the 2002 local elections, only 2,800 did not 
(Treneska 2007: 133). Sanctions for breach of the new law range from fines up to 100,000 PLN, through 
withdrawal of public funding, to criminal proceedings for individuals who significantly violate the integrity 
of the elections.  
Sanctions involving the withdrawal of state subsidies became serious, when the 1997 – 2001 reform 
also revamped the system of public party funding. In 1997, the one-off contribution for seats was newly 
accompanied by a second contribution paid only to political parties, not electoral coalition. This new dotacje 
celowa, as opposed to the older dotacje podmiotowa, was based on votes received, not seats won, and awarded 
to all parties (not coalitions and non-partisan candidate lists) that crossed a 3 per cent threshold of the total 
vote received by parties. As in 1993, the total sum allocated from the state budget to both contributions 
together amount to 20 per cent of the cost of the election; 60 per cent of it went to dotacje celowa, paid out in 
four yearly instalments, 40 per cent to the single payment of dotacje podmietowa.  
In 2001, the system was again modified with the adoption of a new Parliamentary Election Law (Act 
46/2001 and 154/2001). The total amount of contribution to each election committee (both parties and 
coalitions) was set at the actual annual expenditure each particular committee incurred. Dotacje podmiotowa 
paid to each election committee was now the amount of election expenditure incurred by all committees 
that won at least one seat in the parliament divided by 560 and then multiplied by the number of seats won 
by the particular committee. Unlike in 1993 and 1997, the contribution was paid out in two yearly 
instalments and amounted to 111,000 PLN per a seat. For dotacje celowe were now eligible electoral coalitions 
that received at least 6 per cent of the total vote and all parties crossing the 3 per cent threshold, this time 
calculated from all election committees running, not only from the pool of parties. Non-partisan committees 
were again eligible only for dotacje podmiotowe. Dotacje celowa was not like in the past calculated from the 
cost of the election, but was firmly set at 10 PLN per vote for parties that finished between 3 and 5 per cent 
of the total vote, 8 PLN for those between 5 and 10, 7 PLN for 10 to 20 per cent, 4 PLN for 20 to 30 per cent, 
and 1.5 PLN for the parties that received more than 30 per cent of the total vote. Quite interestingly, two 
months after the election, the government in an agreement with the opposition lowered these rates by 
substituting each contribution rate by the succeeding one (i.e., the contribution decreased from 10 PLN to 8 
PLN, etc) and the 1.5 PLN rate to 0.5 PLN. Even with this partial cut in dotacje celowa, the total sum of direct 
state subsidies to political parties in Poland increased from approximately eight million PLN in 1993, 
through 14 million PLN in 1993, to 257 million in 2001 (Szczerbiak 2006: 305-6). In 2011, these rates were 
changed to 5.77 PLN up to 5 per cent, 4.61 PLN up to 10 per cent, 4.04 PLN up to 20 per cent, 2.31 PLN up to 
30 per cent and 0.87 PLN over 30 per cent of the total vote. 
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Since 1991, Polish party regulations also include limits on campaign expenses. At first, the limit was 
set at 60 times the average monthly salary per a list of candidates in one electoral district for elections to the 
Sejm; after the 2000/2001 reform, spending limits were set firmly at 12 million PLN for one election 
committe  in presidential elections (in practice an unrealistically low sum, see Walecki 2005: 131), and 1 PLN 
per a registered voter for one election committee in parliamentary elections. Moreover, expenses on all paid 
advertising and press publications were limited to 80 per cent of all campaign expenditure incurred. In 
2011, a new, detialed formula for spending caps was introduced (Act 112/2011, Art 199), still in force today: 
the limit is calculated as the total number of registered voters times 0.82 PLN times the number of Sejm 
deputies elected in all the districts the particular commitee runs its candidates, and this entire sum is 
divided by 460, the number of all deputies elected to the Sejm. For the Senate, the same formula applies, 
only the monetary allocation is set at 0.18 PLN and the whole sum is divided by 100, the number of 
Senators. For elections to the European Parliament the total limit is set at 0.60 PLN per a registered voter in 
one of the 13 electoral districts. The same sum of 0.60 PLN is used for mayoral elections up to 500,000 
inhabitants at the given municipality; for population over 500,000, the same is halved to 0.30 PLN. In local 
and regional elections, the spending limit varies between 1,000 PLN (gmina) to 6,000 PLN (sejmik 
województwa) per a local or regional  councilor, depending on the type of municipality and the size of 
population. 
During the 1990s, the Polish system of party funding developed from one based exclusively on 
private sources (where state subsidies were even specifically banned) to one that relies from a major part on 
financial contributions from the state. The change that the Polish regulations on political parties underwent 
led to a very important shift: similarly to the Czech Republic, where the Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSČM), the successor to the pre-1989 Communists, quickly learned to use their still considerable 
real estate for business activities, also Polish successor parties (Social Democracy of Poland SdRP, Polish 
Peasants’ Party PSL, Democratic Party SD) enjoyed at the start a considerable advantage in terms of material 
assets. However, post-Solidarność parties became gradually very skillful in attracting private donations and 
together with an important legal rule that prevented parties in Poland from renting out their real estate for 
business activities (Act 98/1997, Art 24), a playing field even for all in terms of material support was reached 
at the latest at the turn of the millennia (see, e.g., Casal Bértoa and Walecki 2012: 19-20). 
Like the Czech case described above and the Slovak case described below, also the Polish system has 
been from the start and still very much is oriented towards the Parliament. Even though Presidents of 
Poland posses relatively strong executive as well as symbolic power, and parties play an important role in 
the selection of candidates, presidential elections are not subsidised by the state.Unlike in the Czech case, 
the funding system is based on both parliamentary houses, the Sejm and the Senate. The elections to both 
houses take place simultaneously and the funding system considers seats in both of them equal. Moreover, 
oversight of party finances is carred out by the National Electoral Committee (PKW), an independent body, 
which is not a part of the legislature. This weakens the position of political parties in the party regulation 
process, if compared to other Central European cases, but it is the favoured solution from the point of view 
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of transparency and good governance. Together with the detailed restrictions put on private sources of 
funding, rules about their use and limits on expenditure, simple descriptive analysis indicates that Poland 
has so far developed a more fairer and transparent system of party finances than in the Czech, or, as shown 
in paragraphs below, the Slovak case.  A real gift from the point of academic analysis is also the website of 
the PKW, where all Annual Financial Reports of political parties are accessible from 2001 onwards.  
The Polish party system has undoubtedly been affected by its legal regulations. Political parties in 
Poland are not required to pay any registration fee, but the 1997 law on political parties imposes some strict 
rules related to the establishment and activities of parties. While in 1990, only 15 signatures were required 
for the registration of a new party, after 1997, it was 1,000 signatures. The number of registered parties 
immediately decreased from over three hundred to eighty (Kubiak and Wiatr 2000: 183-187; Casal Bértoa 
and Walecki 2012: 17). As Figure 5.1 shows, the early highly fragmentised party system turned during the 
1990s into a relatively compact one, based effectivelly on three or four major parties. The correlated 
development of the form of the party system and party regulations supports Biezen and Rashkova’s (2011: 
7, 16) finding that increasing regulation has a negative effect on the number of parties in the system. 
However, the major parties in Poland were not always the same as they are today and the late 1990s were 
also characterised by movements at the top level of the party system, when the previously united Solidarity 
Electoral Action (AWS) became divided into two new major contenders, the Civic Platform (PO) and the 
Law and Justice (PiS). New party regulations were therefore most certainly only of the causes of the party 
system change, accompanied by an inner programmatic and ideological tension inside the electorate and the 
party system itself. It would be nevertheless wrong to overlook the 3, respectively 5, per cent thresholds 
required for participation in the state subsidies scheme, which gives significant advantage to well-
established large parties. In this respect, public funding in Poland follows the suit of other countries in both 
post-communist as well as Western European countries, including the Czech Republic, described in the 
Party above, and Slovakia, described in the following Part. 
Part 5.4: Regulations of political parties in Slovakia 
Since the Czech Republic and Slovakia left their common state only in 1993, naturally, the 
development of their respective national party systems as well as their models of regulations of political 
parties followed similar lines. That being said, the Slovak political system differed for a large part of the 
1990s from the Czech one by the dominant position of Prime Minister Mečiar’s People’s Party – Movement 
for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), which in 1992 and 1994 secured, respectively, 37.3 and 35 per cent of the 
total vote in parliamentary elections. Mečiar and HZDS represented the conservative, anti-federation and 
anti-liberalisation part of the electorate and, as their critics argue, achieved the dominant position by riding 
the wave of post-communist populist politics and turning various branches of the state into party fiefdoms 
(see, e.g., Gould and Szomolányi 2000; Deegan-Krause 2012). 
The situation began to change only in 1998, when Dzurinda’s centre-right coalition formed the new 
government. The law on political parties from 1991 was reformed in order to increase the transparency of 
party funding and to improve the system of oversight (404/2000 Coll.): anonymous donations were banned, 
57 
 
political parties were now obliged to be audited by an independent auditor and their Annual Financial 
Reports were made accessible for the public. A completely new law on political parties was adopted in 2005 
(85/2005 Coll.) that merged rules previously included in two separate laws, Law 424/1991 Coll., on Political 
Parties and Law 234/1994 Coll., on Limits of Campaign Expenses. To complete the regulatory framework, 
Law 333/2004 Coll., on Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic was also adopted that 
regulates certain specific areas of election campaigns and state subventions towards election expenses. 
These two laws form today the basic legal structure for the financing of the Slovak party system. 
The Slovak system of funding originated in Czechoslovakia and bears close resemblance to the 
Czech system. First subventions were to Slovak political parties awarded by the same law that covered also 
Czech political parties: in 1990, ‘contribution towards election expenses’, in fact, contribution for votes, at 
the amount of 10 Czechoslovak Crowns was given to parties that received at 2 per cent of the total vote in 
the 1990 election to the Federal Assembly. In 1992, the amount was 15 Czechoslovak Crowns and in 1994, in 
the already independent Slovakia, the contribution was increased to 60 Slovak Crowns (SKK) and the 
eligibility threshold to 3 per cent of the vote. Law 190/1992 Coll. originally disallowed the contribution for 
votes to parties that reached the 3 per cent threshold in two successive elections, but did not reach the 
parliamentary threshold of 5 per cent in neither of them; this rule was in 2001 the cause of a minor scandal 
of the right-wing Slovak Democratic and Christian Union party (SDKÚ) and was abandoned in the next 
amedment of the law. A 3 per cent threshold was set also for the permanent contribution at the amount of 
one quarter of the party’s contribution towards election expenses. The third and last type of state 
subvention, the contribution for mandates in the National Council, was introduced only in 2000 and 
originally set at 500,000 SKK per year for one seat (404/2000 Coll.). 
After the adoption of the 2004 – 2005 reform of legal regulation of political parties, state subventions 
became linked to the average wage in Slovakia. Contribution for votes was set at 1 per cent of monthly 
nominal average wage in the year preceding the election (Law 333/2004 Coll.); the total amount of 
permanent contribution equals the one of contribution for votes, but is divided into 48 (more or less 
monthly) payments. Contribution for a seat in the National Council was at 30-times the amount of monthly 
nominal average wage for first 20 seats per one party, for more seats, at 20-times the amount of average 
wage (85/2005 Coll.). 
The 2005 reform took away one until then constant feature of party regulations by which Slovakia 
differed from the Czech Republic: caps on campaign expenditures. In 1994, 234/1994 Coll. introduced limits 
of campaign expenses for elections to the National Council, set at 12 million SKK. However, this law was 
only rarely enforced and became effectually invalidated by the passing of the 2005 Party Law. Expenses 
spent in presidential campaigns, regulated by Law 46/1999 Coll. and its amendments (515/2003 Coll., 
167/2008 Coll., 445/2008 Coll., 204/2011 Coll.) and currently limited to €132,775 per a candidate, have been 
monitored more closely, but still not free of minor scandals (see, e.g., TI Slovakia 11 September 2009). 
Spending caps for political campaigns will be introduced into Slovak regulations again on 1 July 2015 (Law 
181/2014 Coll., on Election Campaigns, amending Law 85/2005 Coll., on Political Parties) and set detailed 
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limits for elections to the National Council and the European Parliament (€3 million per party), presidential 
elections (€500,000 per candidate), mayoral elections in Bratislava (€250,000 per candidate) and in other 
communities (from €2,000 to €100,000, depending on the size of the community), and regional elections 
(€5000,000 per party). The law also stipulates the permissible length of campaigns (180 days before the 
election date) and fines for its breach, ranging up to €300,000 for the most serious offenses. 
The changes in the system of financing of political parties in Slovakia between the years 2000 and 
2005 had two immediate results: first, the total subsidy to political parties from the state increased 
significantly. In 2001, the increase was primarily caused by the addition of the contribution for seats in the 
National Council. In 2004, the change of the contribution for votes from the previous fixed sum of 60 SKK to 
the flexible rate based on average salary led to an immediate increase from 60 SKK in 2003 to 144 SKK in 
2004 (Rybář 2011: 4). Second, the reform of the regulatory framework led also to a much desired increase in 
the transparency of the system. The introduction of financial sanctions for non-compliance with the rules 
resulted in a much more disciplined approach towards submission of Annual Financial Reports, which 
indirectly helped academic research and, specifically, the analysis of parties’ incomes and expenditures. 
Newly were required also lists of all party donors with their full personal or company details, which ended 
the previous tradition of anonymous donations.  
Another new requirement affects specifically election campaign expenses: parties are required to 
submit separate reports that cover their campaigning expenditures from the day of the announcement of the 
election until 30 days before the election. Reports are publicly accessible on the website of the Ministry of 
Finance. No later than 20 days after the election, parties send to the Ministry also their final reports covering 
total costs of their campaigns. If any of these reports are not complete and the offending party did not 
remedy the situation upon request of the Ministry of Finance, it may be sanctioned by suspension of the 
permanent contribution and the contribution for parliamentary mandates, and by a financial fine at the 
amount of 100,000 SKK (€3,319). 
While the development towards more transparency was profound, the 2005 regulation suffers from 
several important deficiencies that invite criticism from independent commentators (see, .e.g., Rybář 2011; 
Mesežnikov 2014). First, the oversight centre of the financing system was still left, similarly to the Czech 
Republic, in the National Council. The MPs of the oversight committee focus on the completeness of 
submitted reports and do not investigate further the veracity of financial sources listed in the reports. Fully 
transparent is thus only the part of parties’ income that comes from the state; private sources are still 
susceptible to unlawful practices. The approach of the MPs controlling Annual Financial Reports has been 
reportedly very lax and allowed to pass were also reports listing illegal donations or donations coming 
clearly from dummy persons (Rybář 2011: 8). Second, large parts of election campaigns are uncontrolled by 
the audited central party and expenditures for advertisement come directly from individual candidates. In 
2010, a new scandal of black financing of election campaigns arose, which involved both the ruling party 
Direction – Social Democracy (Smer–sociálna demokracia) and Prime Minister Fico (see., e.g., SME 19 May 
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2010; Čas 20 May 2010) as well as the major right-wing challenger SDKÚ and its leader Dzurinda (SME 27 
January 2010; Čas 27 January 2010; 3 February 2010).  
The scandal showed tangible evidence of the deep-rooted tradition of ‘parallel’ financing of election 
campaigns and political parties and partially in response to these scandals, the 2014 Law on Election 
Campaigns was adopted. Apart from re-introducing caps on election spending, it also ushers in a new ‘State 
Committee for Elections and Oversight of Party Financing’. This body will be comprised of 14 members, 10 
of them nominated by parliamentary parties and 4 by institutions outside of the legislature, and will 
monitor budgets and campaign activities of parties and candidates in election in Slovakia. Only practice will 
show, whether the Committee will be really effective, but already the proposed establishment is an 
important step forward in making political competition in Slovakia clear of illicit practices. The two 
problems related to the level of transparency of the Slovak regulation of financing that have so far closely 
resembled the Czech case, i.e., oversight left to politicians in parliament and the existence of unofficial 
campaigns, are gradually being removed and the latest changes show promise for the near future. 
Moreover, from the point of academic analysis and public control, having all Annual Financial Reports 
accessible from one website makes an important difference too. 
The impact of funding on the shape of the party system is quite similar to the Czech one: the 3 per 
cent vote threshold, which is even higher than in the Czech Republic, set for contributions for votes and the 
permanent contribution, strengthens the material standing of large and medium-sized parties. The 
contribution for mandates even more advantages parties represented in the National Council. Unlike in the 
Czech case, subsidies are provided exclusively only with connection to national elections and parties that 
are successful in the European, regional or local elections do not receive any financial help from the state. 
The system of party funding is centralised towards medium and large parties that succeed, or are close to a 
success, in election to the National Council. The post-2000 trend towards a lower Effective Number of 
Parties in Slovakia, both at the electoral level as well as at the parliamentary level (Figure 5.2), correlates 
with the 2000 – 2005 reform in party regulations that increased the material advantage of large parties. 
However, whether the Slovak party system is due to the reform more resistant to a de-centralising shift that 
recently happened in the Czech Republic (Figure 5.3) would be difficult to tell. 
Figure 5.2: Effective Number of Parties in Slovakia 1990 – 2012 
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Figure 5.3: Effective Number of Parties in the Czech Republic 1990 – 2013
 
Part 5.5: Regulations of political parties in Austria, Germany and Slovenia 
The development of party regulations of Austria, Germany and Slovenia is in comparison to the 
previous three cases described more briefly in this Part. For obvious reasons, Austria and Germany have 
longer tradition of regulating political parties than post-communist countries do. The juxtaposition of these 
longer cases with the shorter experience of former socialist countries shows how the recent push by 
international organisations for greater transparency sped up the previously prolonged process of party 
regulations reform in Western European countries. 
From the turbulent years after the Second World War, when constant political pressure from the 
Soviet Union threatened to turn the entire Central Europe into a new Soviet territory, Austria emerged as 
fully democratic state with fair multiparty political competition. The Communist Party played a relatively 
minor role in the system and was practically marginalised in the 1960s. The two traditional pillars of the 
party system, the Social-Democratic and the People’s (Christian Democratic) party, endured the regime 
changes of 1918, 1938 and 1945 and form the basis of Austrian politics until today. Austria’s Constitution 
mentioned political parties since its adoption in 1920 (Art. 35) and in the post-war era, the number of articles 
defining the role of political parties and regulating their existence and activities grow to sixteen in total.  
The crucial law of the regulation of political parties is the Party Law of 1975 (BGBl. I Nr. 404/1975), 
which covers various details of party life, including party financing. The law was several times amended, 
most changes affecting particularly provisions on campaign financing, state subsidies and transparency of 
parties’ financial operations. The last amendment came in 2012 (BGBl. I Nr. 56/2012 and BGBl. I Nr. 57/2012) 
and modified again the regime of state subsidies as well as reporting rules. Contribution towards expenses 
is now awarded to parties that crossed a 1 per cent threshold in the federal elections to the National Council 
at the amount of €2.50 per vote. An additional annual contribution of €218,000 belongs to parties that won at 
least five seats in the National Council. For parties in the National Council, contribution towards expenses is 
calculated from a total sum of subsidies allocated to parties in parliament (number of eligible voters in 
Austria multiplied by €5.60) minus the cost of annual contribution. Those parties that also secured at least 
one seat in elections to the European Parliament are awarded contribution for votes received, which is 
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calculated as their share of votes received from the total allocated subsidy of €2 multiplied by the number of 
eligible voters. At the state and local level, political parties represented in a local, state or national 
representative body may also (at the discretion of the respective governments) receive additional annual 
funding proportionate to their vote share and allocated from a total sum based on the number of eligible 
voters in a given area, multiplied by an amount ranging from €5.60 to €11. Austrian party groups (or clubs) 
in the National Council (Nationalrat), Federal Council (Bundesrat) and the European Parliament are also 
eligible to additional payments towards their expenses (BGBl. 156/1985 as amended by BGBl. I 139/2008), 
but that is a feature common to most European countries and not usually included in party funding 
schemes as such. 
Apart from disclosure rules and parties’ requirements vis-à-vis the main oversight body, the Court 
of Auditors, political parties in Austria are also subject to limits on foreign donations and cash donations 
(€2,500), anonymous donations and donations on the behalf of third parties (€1,000) and to limits on election 
expenses which amount to €7,000,000 for any representative body (including the European Parliament). 
These rules and limits are still relatively new and untested and thus it is difficult to assess whether they will 
be help to overcome the old problems of non-transparent funding and party financing scandals that have 
plagued Austrian politics in the past. As of August 2014, GRECO has yet to publish its Compliance Report 
on Austria after the recent changes. Since there are still, however, ways how to donate to parties 
anonymously and the parties’ Annual Financial Reports are still not easily publicly accessible (neither in 
hard copy nor in digital one), GRECO’s evaluation will not be most probably very favourable towards the 
recent incomplete changes. 
Germany’s post-war development was not so different from Austria. The country was divided into 
West and East Germany in 1949, but the Western, democratic part, adopted a party system similar to the 
Austrian. The two major pillars, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD), were accompanied by a third party, the Free Democrats (FDP), and constituted thus together 
what Jean Blondel labeled the ‘two-and-a-half party system’ (1968). This form of party system lasted until 
the 1980s, when the Greens (Grüne) matched in electoral strength the FDP, followed in the 1990s also by the 
successor to East Germany’s Socialist Unity Party (SED), the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), today 
known as The Left (Die Linke). Nevertheless, the government of the country remained in the hands of one of 
the two major parties, who alternated in heading coalition cabinets.  
Parallelly to Austria, Germany also very early adopted regulations on political parties. Article 21 of 
the Constitution of 1949 (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) says that political parties 
“participate in the formation of the political will of the people” and that “[t]hey must publicly account for 
their assets and for the sources and use of their funds”. The Constitution leaves details of party regulation to 
federal laws, from which the most important one is the Party Law of 1967 (BGBl. I 773/1967). This law, 
substantially amended in 1994 (BGBl. I 149/1994) and lastly in 2011 (BGBl. 1748/2011), covers many aspects 
of party life, from its creation, through its campaign activities and funding, to its dissolution. The 1967 law 
was the first law that provided for regular state subsidies of political parties in Germany, even though these 
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were previously already unofficially subsidised via contributions towards educational work, introduced in 
1959 (Titel 620 in Bundeshaushaltsplan 1959/60, “Förderung der staatsbürgerlichen Bildungsarbeit der 
Parteien”) (see, e.g. Der Spiegel 36/1959). 
The threshold for access to state subsidies is in Germany set at 0.5 per cent of the total vote to the 
Federal Diet (Bundestag) or the European Parliament and at 1 per cent of the total vote to the State Diet 
(Landtag). The amount of state subsidies for parties is limited by three rules: first, there is the total maximum 
of money paid to parties from the state budget, in 2014 set to €150.8 million. Second, each party is allocated 
their share of subsidies based on a) the number of votes received in the last election with the current rate set 
at €0.85 per vote up to four million votes (€0.50 in Landtag election) and at €0.70 per vote over four millions 
votes received; and b) parties are awarded public contribution in the ratio of €0.38 of subsidy for each €1 
gained through private donations of maximum amount €3,300. Third, state subsidies awarded to a party 
may never exceed their income from other sources. 
Disclosure requirements on party funding are relatively relaxed: anonymous donations may be 
accepted up to €500. Donations over €10,000 must always be listed in Annual Financial Reports with 
donor’s name and address. Donations over €50,000 must be immediately let known to the President of the 
Bundestag, who serves as the main body of oversight. The President controls parties’ compliance with 
disclosure rules and receives submitted Annual Financial Reports. Since 2010, it also publishes complete 
reports on the funding of political parties (both parliamentary and non-parliamentary) in Germany on the 
Bundestag website, with records going back to 1968. While Germany thus performs better today in the 
control over party funding and tries to avoid large financing scandals that plagued its politics in the 1980s 
and 1990s, there are still some holes in its regulatory framework, such as the possibility of making 
anonymous donations, receiving donations from companies partially (up to 25 per cent) belonging to the 
state, or launching an anonymous election campaign, outside of the party budget. 
Slovenia has since its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 led the post-communist sector in 
economic indicators, including its per capita GDP or HDI score. Even though it used to be a part of the 
Habsburg Empire, unlike Austria or the Czech Republic, its current party system does not have many direct 
links to pre-1918 political parties. However, unlike other successor states of Yugoslavia, the party system 
has since the early 1990s been based on two dominant axes, the post-materialist and the socio-economic one, 
and has not featured any major ethnic- or religion-based parties, even though the left-right competition is 
constantly clouded by common mergers and name changes of major Slovenia parties. Between 1992 and 
2004, the centre-left, social-liberal Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) was the leader of coalition 
governments and a junior member of the coalition between 2008 and 2011. The Slovenian People’s Party 
(SLS), the centre-right conservative agrarians, went through a populist, pro-Slovene phase in the early 
1990s, but joined the LDS in the government coalition of 1996 – 2000. The Slovene Christian Democrats 
(SKD), a typical Christian Democrat political party, was a member of ruling coalitions between 1990 and 
1996, but merged with the SLS in 2000. In 2004, the centre-right domination was taken over by the 
previously radically conservative, nationalistic Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), which ruled until 2008, 
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when it lost to the growing Social Democrats (SD). The Social Democrats remained in power until 2011, 
when they were beaten by both the centre-right SDS as well as the newly formed centre-left Positive 
Slovenia (LZJ-PS). In the early election of 2014, another completely new party, the Party of Miro Cerar 
(SMC), won the election, and extended the era of constant replacements of major Slovenian political parties 
that started in the early 2000s.  
The system of party regulation in Slovenia developed substantially less turbulently than the 
country’s party system. First two elections in 1990 and 1992 were regulated by the Law on Political 
Association (SRS 42/89) passed in December 1989, according to which state subsidies were awarded almost 
exclusively to parties represented in the Socio-political Chamber of the Slovenian Parliament (later, the 
National Assembly). In 1994, a new Party Law (RS 62/94) and a new Law on Election Campaigns (RS 62/94) 
were adopted, limiting state subsidies only to parties represented in the National Assembly Allocation of 
subsidies was based on the number of votes received (30 SIT per vote) in national elections, with monthly 
contributions (30 SIT per vote) from local budgets also allowed for parties that participated in local elections 
(Arts 24 and 26). In 1999, the Constitutional Court that limiting subsidies from the state budget only to 
parliamentary parties unconstitutional (Decision U-I-367/96), which led to the 2000 amendment of the Party 
Law. This amendment lowered the threshold for access to public funding from 4 per cent (threshold of 
parliamentary representation) to 1 per cent (1.2 per cent for two-member coalitions and 1.5 per cent for 
larger coalitions). 10 per cent of the total sum allocated to public party funding was now divided equally to 
all parties entitled to state subsidies, the remaining 90 per cent was allocated according to their vote share. 
The total sum of subsidies was limited to 0.017 per cent of the Slovenian GDP made in the year prior to the 
election. The subsidies were still paid out monthly. Subsidies from local budgets, up to 0.6 per cent of all 
assets held by the given community, may now be awarded to all candidates that in local elections received 
at least half of the votes needed for securing a place in local councils.  
Apart from these contributions, Slovenian parties also since 1990 receive contribution towards 
national election expenses (Zakon o volitvah v skupščine 10/90, Zakon o volilni kampanji RS 62/94, 17/97, 119/06), 
previously set at 30 SIT per vote for parties that received at least 2 per cent vote share nationally, or 6 per 
cent within a constituency, today set at €0.17 per vote for non-parliamentary parties over the 2 per cent 
threshold and €0.33 for parties in the National Assembly or the European Parliament. For presidential 
elections, the contribution is set at €0.12 for candidates receiving at least 10 per cent of the total vote. 
Communities may also reimburse candidates in local elections up to €0.12 (Zakon o volilni in referendumski 
kampanji RS 41/07, 11/11, 98/13). 
Disclosure and reporting rules about the financial of political parties have undergone substantial 
changes in the decade. The 2007 amendments to the Party Law (RS 103/07) and the Election Campaign Law 
(RS 41/07) established that all political parties must submit each year their Annual Financial Report for 
control to the National Assembly and the Court of Audit. If a report is incomplete or shows that the 
offending party accepted income from undisclosed or prohibited sources, the party may be fined up to the 
amount of  €20,850. The limit on donations from one donor per year is set to ten times the previous year’s 
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average monthly salary. Anonymous donations may be accepted, provided they do not exceed the limit of 
three times the average monthly salary. Company donors are only banned if they are more than from 25 per 
cent owned by the state. On the expenditure side, there are limits on election spending set at €0.40 per 
eligible voter in all districts where the party puts forward a candidate; in case of presidential elections, 
referenda and mayoral elections, the limit is €0.25. Public access to financial reports of parties is limited to 
parties that receive state subsidies, which, combined with legal rules related to protection of personal data 
and archiving of records, in effect preclude an analysis of the financial development of the Slovenian party 
system that would suit the present work. 
Part 5.6: Regulations of political parties in Central Europe today 
As this Chapter shows, regulations no political parties in the researched countries do not 
substantially differ. They all feature a set of rules that are supposed to keep financial dealings o political 
parties to a certain degree transparent and free of unwanted practices; to these practices usually belongs 
financial support from abroad, financial support from state sources outside of the official channels, i.e., from 
state-owned or state-controlled companies, and financial support from all anonymous donors. In all cases, 
special disclosure requirements are also set for large donors: usually they must be listed with full personal 
data in financial reports; sometimes, they undergo an additional review process on top the regular one for 
other donations. All researched countries allow the public to access the reports of political parties, but not in 
all cases, this access is unhindered. Germany, Poland and Slovakia feature arguable the best and the 
simplest model: they publish all financial reports on the website of the main oversight body. Austria, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia have in theory quite similar rules of public access, in practice, however, data 
on party funding from these countries are much harder to collect. In the Czech Republic, data gathering still 
requires a personal visit to the Czech parliament and scanning hard copies of reports. In Austria and 
Slovenia, the state does not even require data from parties not subsidised from public sources, and the 
collection of data on the entire respective party systems is therefore virtually impossible. 
State subsidies to political parties were introduced in all six countries; public funding to political 
parties is in fact today available in 27 out of 28 Member States of the European Union, with the exception of 
Malta (where only a small contribution for a specific EU-related purpose may be granted to parliamentary 
parties). All six described models of party funding to a higher or a lower degree favour larger parties 
represented in the parliament. In the Czech and Slovenia, Constitutional Courts had to step in to assure that 
smaller parties will not literally or in effect left out of the public funding scheme. The courts established the 
precedent that party funding is an important part of the principle of proportional representation and it state 
subsidisation ought to not unfairly disadvantaged smaller parties. They do not, however, ruled 
unconstitutional the usual linkage of the bulk of state subsidies to elections to the national parliament. 
Parties that are more successful in European, regional, or local elections than in national elections often 
suffer Pyrrhic victories in terms of public contributions towards election expenses; this fully applies to 
parties in Poland and in Slovakia, to a lesser degree also to Czech parties. In Austria, Germany and 
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Slovenia, the difference between subsidies for national and for other elections is substantial, but 
significantly lower than in the previous three cases. 
The juxtaposition of older post-war democracies, Austria and Germany, with younger post-
communist ones, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, shows that even though the first two 
countries enjoyed a longer time of democratic development, they are not today advanced in the 
development of the legal framework regulating political parties. Austria and Germany consistently place 
higher in common rankings of levels of public mismanagement and corruption; in 2013, their respective 
scores in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index were 69 and 78, compared to the scores 
of the latter four countries, 48, 60, 47 and 57 (CPI 2013). However, both Austrian and German politics have 
not been free of financing scandals and questions about the channels of money in party politics are still very 
much alive in both countries. The last regulation reform in Austria was supposed to open the accounts of 
Austrian political parties to public inspection, but in practice, this did not happen and parties still enjoy a 
considerable level of privacy of their financial operations. 
Four of the six countries limit the amount of expenditure used for election campaigns. Only 
Germany and the Czech Republic allow parties to spend whatever they deem necessary on an election 
campaign. The newly introduced direct presidential elections in the Czech Republic already feature 
expenditure limits and major Czech centre-left parties, including the currently governing Social Democrats, 
plan on introducing them at some future point. Whether limits work for transparency and fairness in 
multiparty elections is an open question. The fact is that, as is shown in Chapter X, Czech political parties 
spend aggregately more on election campaigns than even Polish parties, despite the Polish population being 
four times more numerous than the Czech one. One the other hand, the 2013 Czech presidential elections, in 
which some candidates managed to secure 80 per cent and higher discounts on advertising and PR 
products, showed that not even limits have the power to make the playing ground equal for all. 15 out of 28 
EU Member States adopted some form of spending limits, including Greece, Hungary, Italy or Romania, 
where parties are known to regularly side-step any limits by conduction unofficial, hidden campaigns. 
In summary, the researched cases are not in any aspects noticeably different from other European 
countries. Their party systems are relatively stable, even though new, protest parties have recently 
succeeded in crossing parliamentary thresholds in all six countries. This follows a trend seen in most 
European countries in the post-2007 era. None of the six countries adopted unique rules on political parties 
and all of them provide public funding for both parliamentary as well as non-parliamentary parties. As is 
also common in other European countries, major or minor financing scandals have been commonplace in 
Central Europe; in some cases, they led to serious troubles for leading political representatives (e.g., the fall 
of the Czech government in 1998, an opposition leader fall in Slovakia in 2010), mostly, however, they did 
not change the political environment considerably. So far, they have not led to major improvements in party 
regulations, even though efforts for progress towards more transparency are now present in all six 
countries. For the sake of both academic analysis as well as democracy in the region, the progress will 
hopefully continue and resist occasional efforts for its reversion.  
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Chapter 6: Party Budgets 
Part 6.1: The research of party budgets in modern Europe 
Budgets of political parties and their structure reveal many things about political parties, party 
systems and political institutions. They record both long-term trends and one-off events, purely domestic as 
well as trans-national processes. A deep historical analysis of revenues and expenses of political parties 
show the transformation of modern politics from a power struggle between elites to a developed complex 
system how to reach decisions about government policies backed by the mass electorate. While in the early 
and mid-19th century, political parties were only informally organised and candidates running in an election 
often paid out their campaign expenses from their own pockets, the late 19th century and early 20th century 
saw a shift towards parties with rigid formal organisation, paid part-time or full-time staff and centrally 
organised election campaigns. “Contagious organization” (Duverger 1967: 25; Nassmacher 2009: 61) of 
political parties became the standard across Europe and any party that wanted to succeed in elections 
needed to set up a permanent central organ with a fully staffed administrative office. Previously simple 
unofficial records of parties’ financial dealings now transformed into complete accounts of items found in 
budgets of private companies or other organisations, such as wages, energy bills and rents, or office 
equipment costs. Unlike in most organisations, however, these accounts also featured expenses for 
advertisements in the media, printing costs or finances paid out for staging public presentations, all the 
specific tools needed for running a professional, effective election campaign. 
While the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century were characterised by a substantial 
transformation of the expenditure side of party budgets, the second half of the 20th century was marked by 
changes on the income side. The costs of election were rising and political parties found themselves looking 
for new sources of revenue (Bardi and Morlino 1994: 243). For the first time in history, they started receiving 
officially sanctioned monetary contributions from the state. With that came first regulations on party 
funding. If the state was ready to give money to political parties, it demanded in exchange also the power to 
look into their account books and to restrict donations from private sources. The rise of the post-1945 
welfare state brought larger taxes and larger revenues redistributed by the state; since these revenues were 
to be handled by political parties in the government, both the political represenation as well as the public 
felt the need to strip political parties of their still existing privacy. Political parties were now linked to the 
state not only through one of their purpose of existence, the government of a country, but also through their 
budgets. 
For political scientists, this shift towards open party accounts was a blessing; internal financial 
dealings of political parties, until then mostly inaccessible for the public, scholars included, were now 
available for an independent analysis. The already above mentioned works of Paltiel, Nassmacher or Pinto-
Duschinsky included first officially reported data on the amounts of money political parties spend when 
attracting voters and when running their political business. Based on data collected from various authors 
that researched official party reports around the world, Nassmacher (2009: 118), for instance, was able to 
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compare costs of election politics in the 1960s Venezuela, Israel, Philippines and in Western European 
countries. Without the opening of party books that accompanied the introduction of state subsidies in the 
post-war world, such comparisons would not be possible.  
That is not to say that, especially in the beginnings, the execution of these analyses was easy. 
Following budgets of political parties in a single country over the course of a long period of time is 
invariably made harder by changes in the political and economic structures of the country: fundamental 
market processes such as inflation and wage adjustments change the prices of campaign instruments, while 
legal reforms, both related and non-related to party competition, affect in bulk various budgetary items. As 
Penniman (1984: 52; see, also Nassmacher 2009: 89) writes, in the 1980s, a distinguished French political 
scientist gave up researching the subject of party funding in France, because, as he felt, there was “scant 
hope of ascertaining the ascertaining the truth” and the task “was beyond the capacity of a single 
researcher”. Comparisons of more countries, even those restricted to single time points of short periods, 
needed to compute in the differences between national fiscal systems, economies, laws and political 
cultures. Juxtaposing the costs incurred by political parties in all elections (presidential, congressional, state, 
local) in the USA between the years 1995 and 1999 with elections that happened in Germany in the same 
period leads to the conclusion that German parties cost their population per capita more than twice the 
amount that parties in the US cost ($50 and $22, respectively, in the 1995 USD rate) (calculated from 
Nassmacher 2009: 90, 95). However, such a comparison does not take into account the vast differences that 
exist between American and German politics, the make-up of their systems of government, the different 
roles that political parties in the two countries play and the historical events that were at that time 
happening there. A real assessment how much American and German political parties weigh on their 
respective societies and countries’ institutions, or how much are beneficial for the countries’ politics, would 
have to be based on a complex multi-variable formula, too difficult for a single researcher using only his 
head and hands. 
In overcoming the complexity problem, immensely helpful were the technological innovations of the 
1990s and the 2000s, especially the computerisation of academic work and the spread of the Internet. The 
opening of books of political parties to the public was not the only prerequisite of the current high-quality 
analytical work.  Without the ability to base explanatory models on large datasets, made possible by 
computers, research into party finances could not develop further. Computers, networking and the rising 
numbers of students of political parties led to the current level of research on party budgets. For many 
European countries, there already exist dense case studies focusing on the development of party budgets in 
individual countries (see, .e.g, Adams 2005; Ewing 2007; Sickinger 2009); there are also carefully crafted 
comparisons that restrict the number of variables analysed and focus on specific causal chains that involve 
items of party budgets (seem e.g., Austin and Tjernström 2003; Mendilow 2012; Cross and Katz 2013). And 
as Nassmacher (2009) confidently shows, large-N comparisons of distinct cases across space and time are 
indeed possible, even if these comparisons still need to control for the continuing messiness of available 
data and the pitfalls of the diversity found between individual cases. 
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Last but not least, today’s research into party funding in Europe benefits from one more major 
factor: the continuing Europeanisation and unification of political, economic and social institutions. Its 
impact on both methodological as well as practical issues related to political science research may not be 
overrated in any sub-field, including the analysis of political finances. First, political parties, national and 
European-wide, stand in the centre of European integration: they are represented in the European 
Parliament, for which they run in European-wide direct universal elections. Whether they are upholding the 
idea of federalisation of the European Union, they are conservatively ‘realist’, or staunchly anti-Europe, 
more than 90 per cent of all Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) participate in the system of 
political groups of the European Parliament, through which they receive public funding. In addition to 
political groups in the Parliaments, most MEPs participate through their national parties also in the 
activities of one of the (currently) 13 European political parties, or Europarties, and their affiliated political 
foundations. Both European political parties and foundations are granted financial contributions from the 
EU budget, which they spend on day-to-day operational activities and campaigning for European elections 
(see, e.g., Bardi 2004; Johansson 2005; Külahci 2012). 
Second, even without the direct involvement of the European Union, standards of party regulations 
and political financing are being harmonised. The informal pressure coming from the EU, Council of 
Europe or GRECO pushes politicians to adopt legislation in its wording and effects at least resembling 
examples from abroad that are by the international community considered to be the best. Domestic pressure 
groups or national branches of international anti-corruption organisations use success stories from other 
European countries to push politicians into strengthening national rules that would curb illicit practices in 
politics. In the post-communist Central Europe, by far most analyses of party financing are produced by 
NGOs such as Transparency International (see, e.g., Klimešová et al 2012; Integriteta 2014; Mesežnikov 
2014), whose experts are often consulted in the process of drafting new regulations. Gradually, this process 
of adopting rules that have proved effective in other European countries makes national regulations in 
individual countries more and more similar, even without the existence of a uniform model issued by some 
central authority. The spontaneous harmonisation of institutions is a well-known and well-researched 
phenomenon in European law (see, .e.g, Talarico 2005; Loos 2007; Pîrvu 2012) and regulation of political 
parties is one of the areas, where this phenomenon may be observed. 
More transparency, computers and the Internet, and harmonisation of legal regulations are three 
factors that significantly facilitate research of party funding, including the research done for the present 
work. In this Chapter, I am showing in detail items found in party budgets and their totals. I focus on the 
three researched countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia and on what the numbers say about 
four specific areas of inquiry that are covered by the arguments listed in Chapters 2 and 3.  
First, party budgets reveal information about the shape of individual parties, the form of party 
systems and intra-system activities. Changes in the number of political parties, parties’ positions in the 
system and inter-party relations most probably correlate with changes in parties’ budgets and the entire 
financial bulk operated by the units of a party system. It is tenable to assume that the causal link between 
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these two sets of variables, party system transformations and party budgets, are bi-directional. There are 
many ways with a variety of in-between links how transformations of party system may affect party 
budgets: starting from the common event of establishing a pre-election coalition that will invalidate 
participating parties’ claim for state subsidies, through the formation of a coalition of previously competing 
parties that will lead to the electoral defeat of a third party, to a party factionalisation that will rupture the 
party’s previously consolidated budget into several independent financially unsustainable units. From the 
opposite causal direction, inflating a party budget may lead to the party’s success in the next election, or its 
bankruptcy and dissolution in case of an electoral failure. Spending more on campaigns may lead to a 
sudden rise in the number of votes received, but spending more on day-to-day activities may build a stable 
party base support among the electorate that will sustain the party over a long period of time. On the side of 
the revenues, state subsidies are often considered to be a tool of party system petrification; however, there is 
a variety of models of distribution and extent of subsidies, which undoubtedly plays a significant role and 
conditions the subsidies’ actual impact. In comparison, large donations are regularly seen as a sign of 
plutocratic tendencies; again, the specific form, sources and amounts of donations ought to be taken into 
account. To look closer at the relationship in the specific research are, I propose a budget-based 
classification of political parties and add to party budgets data on election results, party lifespans and pre- 
and post-election coalitions. 
Second, numbers in party budgets change due to legal regulations. That is the rule drive area, based 
on the central assumptions that movements in budgets of political parties are partially caused by reform of 
the rules they affect them, that these movements are recognisable and that there exists a theoretically viable 
causal link between them and the legal reforms. While state subsidies are today the standard for all the 
researched countries, it was not always so. Moreover, budgets do not reflect only the presence or absence of 
subsidies; they are transformed by reforms in the actual model of distribution of public funding. Legal rules 
affect also private sources of income, the amount and form of donations, revenues from business and other 
activities. On the expenditure side, regulations most often cover campaign spending, its financial and other 
limits. The data needed for the exploration of this area are party budgets as the dependent variable and data 
on legal regulations, described in detail in Chapter 5. 
Third, there is the wide area covering a quantity of socio-politico-economic variables not directly 
linked to party politics. Some of them, but not all, are covered in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. For instance, 
there are economic factors, such as rising and declining industrial output and the gross domestic product, 
moving currency rates and inflation; all these most probably have some impact on party budgets. From the 
opposite causal direction, the structure of party budgets, such as high shares of state subsidies or large 
donations, may affect the public trust in politics. State subsidies may also discourage parties from building 
grass-root foundations among the civil society and their membership bases. In turn, voter turnout may be 
indirectly affected by the public distrust in political parties, in addition to the direct effect of the amount of 
finances spent during campaigning. The data used for this particular area of inquiry are public opinion 
polls, voter turnout data, corruption indexes and economic data. 
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Last but not least, the fourth research agenda focuses on the relationship between party budgets and 
party campaigns. This sub-field, narrow in its scope but rich in its informational depth, is already to some 
extent discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 and to its further analysis is devoted the entire Chapter 7. In the 
following Parts of this Chapter, election campaigns are sometimes touched upon, since to exclude them 
completely from the text would be detrimental to theoretical explanations. Variables related to campaigning 
are found in the central hub of the many connections interlinking the set of research on party budgets, 
which need to be addressed properly in a separate Chapter. The rest is explored in the Parts below.   
Part 6.2: Budget size-based classification of political parties in the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovakia 
In total, 514 political parties in three countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia) are discussed in 
this Chapter. These parties comprise 2343 individual observations included in the dataset on party budgets, 
each observation representing one submitted annual financial report. 514 parties submitted at least once 
their AFR to their respective national body of oversight, i.e., parliaments in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
and the National Electoral Committee in Poland. 207 parties are Czech, 155 Polish and 153 Slovak. Not all 
parties submitted reports for all of the 11 years included in the dataset – some of them did not exist for the 
entire period, they were created after 2003, or were dissolved before 2013. Others missed the submission of 
reports for one or more years, but were not sanctioned to the degree of court-ordered dissolution. The 
average number of years for which one party features in the dataset is 4.6 for Czech political parties, 5.2 for 
Polish political parties and 3.8 for Slovak political parties; for all the countries together, the average number 
of submitted reports per one party is 4.5 and the median is 3.  
Out of the 2343 financial reports, 562 are blank – they were submitted but do not contain any 
information on the income and expenditure of submitting parties. The parties officially neither received nor 
spent any money; 123 of these reports belong to Czech political parties, out of 950 Czech reports in total, 237 
to Polish parties out of 805 Polish reports in total, and 202 to Slovak parties out of 588 submitted Slovak 
reports. In other words, 13 per cents of all reports submitted to the Czech Parliament did not contain any 
numbers, as did 29.5 per cent of reports submitted to the Polish National Electoral Committee and 34.3 per 
cent of reports submitted to the Slovak National Council. Almost a quarter of all reports in the dataset does 
not provide any other information than that the political parties in question did not have any financial 
activities in the given year. 
Looking at aggregate financial characteristics of the three respective party systems in the period 2003 
– 2013 (Table 6.1), three interesting features should be noted: first, the share of state subsidies is high in all 
three countries and comprises between three to nine tenths of all the funding officially fuelling the three 
party systems. Particularly the higher numbers point in the direction of party system cartelisation taking 
place in Central Europe. On the other hand, the numbers differ in the three countries: in the recent years, the 
Czech system subsidises three to four times the number of parties that is being subsidised in Poland and 
Slovakia. This is because the Czech system awards financial grants also for seats won in regional and Senate 
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elections as well for votes received in elections to the European Parliament and recently, the set of parties 
successful at one level of elections was to a large degree different from the set successful in others. The 
Czech system is at the same time fuelled from a larger part by non-state resources than it is in Poland and 
Slovakia: between 2003 and 2013, the share of subsidies in the total income there did not exceed 62 per cent, 
while the Polish and Slovak parties are quite commonly funded by the state from 70 to 89 per cent. 
Second, the aggregate share of private donations oscillates between 9 and 38 per cent; however, 
there are again differences between individual countries. The Poles officially record highest numbers of 
share of donations in parties’ budgets, between 5 to 50 per cent, 18 per cent on average, followed by the 
Czechs (12 to 25, average 15) and the Slovaks (5 to 12, average 7). The amount of (official) donations to 
Czech parties varied in the research years between 2 to 18 million, less than in the Polish and Slovak cases 
(1.2 to 45 and 0.1 to 2.2, respectively). In Poland, significantly above average is the years 2005, the year of 
both presidential as well as parliamentary elections; after that, the total amount of private donations in 
Poland gradually falls. 
Third, the total income of parties in all three countries significantly increases in the year of national 
parliamentary election. Even though an eleven year period is too short for research any firm conclusions, 
years of parliamentary elections stand out in all three cases. In the 2010 elections to the Chamber of 
Deputies in the Czech Republic, parties managed to accumulate almost €85 million, including €18 million of 
private donations. Similarly, Polish parties in the 2011 election to the Sejm acquired almost €60 million, 
including €14 million of donations. Moreover, while the number of political parties in the Czech Republic 
significantly increased between 2009 and 2010, which biases the data, the number of Polish parties remained 
virtually the same. The Polish case is, however, different from the Czech and Slovak cases, because incomes 
peaked also in 2005 and 2010, when the Poles voted for their president. The effect of presidential elections 
on party budgets seems to be smaller in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. It is, however, too early to say for 
the first case, since the Czechs so far voted for the president only once in 2013, when the early parliamentary 
election also took place. 
Table 6.1: Selected Features of Financing of Political Parties in Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia 
  Total Income Total Donations Total Subsidy 
Nr of Subsidised 
Parties 
Share of 
Donations 
Share of 
Subsidies 
2003 40,387,512.91 10,270,541.73 14,663,291.97 14.0 25.4 36.3 
2004 24,522,681.81 2,531,810.94 13,289,971.88 18.0 10.3 54.2 
2005 26,828,189.42 2,236,805.09 15,803,000.00 16.0 8.3 58.9 
2006 58,697,467.46 7,647,149.98 35,997,989.47 16.0 13.0 61.3 
2007 30,266,782.63 2,376,697.61 17,662,588.63 15.0 7.9 58.4 
2008 41,602,438.01 6,673,560.20 20,468,065.96 19.0 16.0 49.2 
2009 53,830,801.79 7,380,501.98 20,534,953.70 23.0 13.7 38.1 
2010 85,657,527.96 18,535,834.20 40,356,501.22 23.0 21.6 47.1 
2011 50,590,419.15 8,533,848.92 20,785,270.83 21.0 16.9 41.1 
2012 67,616,740.02 13,754,590.58 19,632,544.86 29.0 20.3 29.0 
2013 66,750,365.23 8,503,283.94 36,079,488.85 30.0 12.7 54.1 
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CZE 49,704,629.67 8,040,420.47 23,206,697.03 20.4 15.1 48.0 
2003 22,260,564.64 2,538,276.38 13,284,417.15 10.0 11.4 59.7 
2004 22,426,499.14 4,197,400.43 14,758,286.12 7.0 18.7 65.8 
2005 90,742,230.99 45,125,800.05 21,946,243.55 9.0 49.7 24.2 
2006 79,755,103.21 17,821,771.01 52,815,756.45 9.0 22.3 66.2 
2007 77,874,945.55 19,406,685.62 26,055,913.47 7.0 24.9 33.5 
2008 60,663,089.17 2,858,026.42 51,317,948.39 9.0 4.7 84.6 
2009 34,655,068.94 4,068,893.35 25,359,656.64 7.0 11.7 73.2 
2010 57,454,451.17 11,517,652.11 40,830,160.36 7.0 20.0 71.1 
2011 59,251,101.40 14,502,257.33 27,469,566.62 7.0 24.5 46.4 
2012 36,981,918.84 1,905,717.03 30,007,111.60 7.0 5.2 81.1 
2013 17,816,010.74 1,209,477.85 12,967,557.35 5.0 6.8 72.8 
POL 50,898,271.25 11,377,450.69 28,801,147.06 7.6 18.2 61.7 
2003 4,777,465.00 126,788.10 2,731,149.88 10.0 2.7 57.2 
2004 3,618,149.63 321,566.13 2,017,725.00 7.0 8.9 55.8 
2005 7,676,663.64 505,345.45 2,915,384.29 8.0 6.6 38.0 
2006 16,163,639.46 1,077,777.37 12,429,727.08 9.0 6.7 76.9 
2007 6,946,302.02 403,063.53 4,875,411.76 8.0 5.8 70.2 
2008 7,505,829.92 469,062.50 5,180,125.00 8.0 6.2 69.0 
2009 7,560,842.87 980,089.00 5,500,954.00 8.0 13.0 72.8 
2010 25,139,466.86 2,251,002.70 18,982,174.29 9.0 9.0 75.5 
2011 10,919,448.62 363,250.00 7,333,172.00 8.0 3.3 67.2 
2012 24,467,875.71 1,411,345.72 20,710,039.27 8.0 5.8 84.6 
2013 8,554,607.26 450,080.00 7,534,160.86 8.0 5.3 88.1 
SVK 11,211,844.64 759,942.77 8,200,911.22 8.3 6.6 68.6 
2003 67,425,542.55 12,935,606.21 30,678,859.00 34.0 19.2 45.5 
2004 50,567,330.58 7,050,777.50 30,065,983.00 32.0 13.9 59.5 
2005 125,247,084.05 47,867,950.59 40,664,627.84 33.0 38.2 32.5 
2006 154,616,210.13 26,546,698.36 101,243,473.00 34.0 17.2 65.5 
2007 115,088,030.20 22,186,446.76 48,593,913.86 30.0 19.3 42.2 
2008 109,771,357.10 10,000,649.12 76,966,139.35 36.0 9.1 70.1 
2009 96,046,713.60 12,429,484.33 51,395,564.34 38.0 12.9 53.5 
2010 168,251,445.99 32,304,489.01 100,168,835.87 39.0 19.2 59.5 
2011 120,760,969.17 23,399,356.25 55,588,009.45 36.0 19.4 46.0 
2012 129,066,534.57 17,071,653.33 70,349,695.73 44.0 13.2 54.5 
2013 93,120,983.23 10,162,841.79 56,581,207.06 43.0 10.9 60.8 
AGG 111,814,745.56 20,177,813.93 60,208,755.32 36.3 17.5 53.6 
 
The aggregate numbers of incomes to party budgets in the three countries provide ambiguous 
evidence about the presence or absence of cartelisation in the area of funding of political parties. While the 
share of subsidies in parties’ budgets is comparatively high and in the Polish and Slovak cases the set of 
subsidised parties is small, particularly in the years of election to national parliaments, parties manage to 
acquire large sums of money from private sponsors. 
More information about the shape of party financing in Central Europe may be learned when the 
dataset is divided not by countries, but by party types. The classification presented here is based on five 
characteristics of political parties’ annual budgets. 
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First, the parties are divided by the size of their budgets. There are today in total four super 
heavyweight parties in the researched countries with incomes regularly exceeding €10 million. These are the 
Civic Democrats (ODS) and the Social Democrats (ČSSD) in the Czech Republic and the Civic Platform (PO) 
and the Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland. In 2010, the Czech Social Democrats and the Civic Democrats 
managed to amass and spend more than €20 million each. Between 2003 and 2011, the super-heavy class 
was intermittently reached also by the Polish Democratic Left Alliance (SLD, between 2003 and 2007, and in 
2011), in 2012, also the Slovak Direction party (Smer) broke in. 
Then there are the heavyweight parties, with average budgets between €1 and €10 million. In this 
category, 16 parties may be found in the region. In the Czech Republic, there are the two traditional parties, 
the Christian Democratic Union (KDU – ČSL) and the Communist Party (KSČM), and the newcomers with 
uncertain future, ANO 2011, the Party of Citizens’ Rights (SPO), the Public Affairs (VV) and TOP 09. In 
Poland, there is the already mentioned Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish People’s Party (PSL), 
accompanied by the newcomer Palikot’s Movement (RP). In Slovakia, Smer dominates and is already 
overgrowing this class, followed by the Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH), Freedom and Solidarity 
(SAS), Ordinary People (OĽaNO), Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU – DS) and the Slovak 
National Party (SNS). The inter-ethnic Slovak – Hungarian party Bridge (MH) entered this class in 2010. 
The 19 member-large middleweight category has budgets between €100 thousand and €1 million 
and includes, in the Czech Republic, the two traditional parties, the Green Party (SZ) and the Association of 
Independent Candidates – European Democrats (SNK – ED), and the emerging or constantly re-forming 
parties such as the Citizens.cz (O.CZ), Mayors and Independents (STAN), North Bohemians (S.CZ) and the 
Sovereignty (SUV). In Poland, this class is comprised of the Anti-Clerical Party of Progress (PPAP), 
Democratic Party (SD), Democratic Party – demokraci.pl, Social Democracy of Poland (SP) and the Union of 
Labour (UP). In Slovakia, there are two the two traditional parties, the Party of Magyar Coalition (SMK – 
MKP) and the People’s Party – Movement for Democratic Slovakia (LS – HZDS), and the uncertain 
newcomers such as the 99% Citizen Vote (99), Change from Bellow – Democratic Union of Slovakia (ZZ – 
DUS), Citizen Candidates (OK), Citizen Party Today (OSDNES), Movement for Democracy (HZD) and the 
New Democracy (ND). 
Between €10 and €100 thousand, there are 24 parties of the lightweight category. In the Czech 
Republic, there are the traditional parties, the Independents (NEZ), Non-Partisans (NEST), Party of Private 
Businessmen (SSČR) and the Right Bloc (PB), and the recently established, often regional parties, the 
Alternative, Change (Z), East Bohemians, Mayors for Liberec Region (SLK), Moral Catharsis of the Region 
(MOR), National Socialists – Lev 21 (LEV), Party for Open Society (SOS), Party of Free Citizens (Svobodní), 
Pirate Party (Piráti), South Bohemians 2012 (J2012), United Democrats – Association of Independents (SD – 
SN) and the Zlín Movement of Independents (ZHN). In Poland, this class includes the Congress of New 
Right (KNP), National Party of Retirees and Pensioners (KPEIR) and the Right of the Republic (PR). In 
Slovakia, there is the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), the emerging European Democratic Party (EDS), 
Law and Justice (PAS), New Parliament (NP) and the Party of Tradesmen of Slovakia (SŽS). 
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The bantamweight class, with budgets up to €10 thousand per year, is comprised of the remaining 
256 parties in the dataset. This class also includes several Czech parties of certain regional importance, for 
instance, the Moravians (M) or the Mayors for Citizens (STO), and locally influential parties, such as the 
Jirkov of the 21st Century (J21), Tábor 2020 (T2020), Town for People (ML), Vote for Kladno (VPK), or the 
Vote for Town (VPM). In the Polish subset of this class, there is the Kobiet Party (PK), League of Polish 
Families (LPR), Patriotic Poland (PPAT), Pirate Party (PP) or the Polish Association of Monarchists (PRM). 
In Slovakia, very small budgets are recently reported by the Civic Democratic Party (OKS), Greens (Z), 
Liberal Party, Our Region (NK), Party of Modern Slovakia (SMS) or the Slovak People’s Party (SLS). 
Classification of parties based on the size of their budgets shows that there exists a hierarchy of 
parties that has a strong connection to parties’ past election results and, most probably, their future chances. 
The four super-heavyweight cases of parties in the dataset are the Czech two largest parties that alternated 
in the government as right-wing and left wing coalition leaders since 1992; between 1998 and 2002, the Civic 
Democrats even agreed with the Social Democrats on tolerating the latter’s minority government in 
exchange for influence over important government departments. If there indeed might be argued that a 
party cartel has emerged in the Czech Republic, these two parties are the backbone of the argument’s 
empirical evidence. In Poland, the party system was much more volatile and the two major government 
contenders of the recent period, the Civil Platform and the Law and Justice, do not alternate and cooperate 
in a manner comparable to the Czech case. 
From the point of view of the cartelisation thesis, most interesting are the heavyweight and the 
middleweight classes. If a party wants to enter parliaments in the Czech Republic, it ought to aim for 
budgets exceeding €1 million. The two Czech parliamentary newcomers of 2010, the Public Affairs and TOP 
09, operated in 2010 with incomes of €1 and €3.3 million, respectively, excluding all state subsidies that were 
acquired after the election. In 2009, they already reported respective incomes from private sources of €430 
and €1.6 million. In Poland, the 2011 parliamentary, the Palikot movement, needed only €425 hundred to 
secure 10 per cent of the vote and 40 seats in the Sejm. Compared to the 27 seats of the Union of Democratic 
Left, who amassed €12 million from private sources, Palikot’s party proved to lead a much more cost-
effective campaign. The Ordinary People (OĽaNO), the 2012 Slovak successful parliamentary newcomer, 
acquired only €31 thousand in 2011 and €311 thousand in the entire year 2012, with the election taking place 
already in March; still, he secured 8.6 per cent of the national vote and 16 seats in the National Council. 
A six, “no-weight” class, is formed by parties that regularly do not report any income and provide 
only blank reports in consecutive years. These parties do not appear to conduct any activity apart from the 
continuing dutiful submission of reports to its national body of oversight. It is usually a sign of slow death 
of a party. That was the case, for instance, with the Czech Right (Česká pravice), Democratic Party of Social 
Justice (Demokratická strana sociální spravedlnosti), Polish Party of Land Rebirth (Polska Partia Odnowy Kraju), 
or the Slovak National Union of Handicapped (Národná únia zdravotne postihnutých Slovenska). However, 
many parties function without any financial activities for several years as a kind of “sleeping agents” that 
will suddenly attract private donations or acquire income from business activities and enter an election. 
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Czech radical right-wing activities seem to adopt this strategy of “shelved”, back-up parties, under which 
they rally once their original party is dissolved by a court order because of their pro-nazi or nazi-like 
manifestos and party programmes. These shelf parties bear neutral names, e.g., Party for Europe (Strana pro 
Evropu) and are usually registered to the relatives or close friends of leaders of the Czech right-wing 
movement. Other parties are set up with the expectation of a later entry of a large private donor, usually a 
businessman that will use the party brand as a vehicle to press his or her interests in politics.  
Part 6.3: Budget structure-based classification of political parties in the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovakia 
Apart from total numbers of budget size, the parties are also classified based on budget structure 
characteristics: first, on the share of election expenses in the total annual expenditure. A party is presumably 
more invested in an election if it spends a larger amount of financial investment in campaigning than if it 
spends smaller. The more a party spends on non-election activities, the more probably cares about its long-
term organisational structure and day-to-day operations. Two caveats need to be added here. The first 
caveat is theoretical: in the entire population of parties, an inverse relationship between total expenditure 
paid by a party per year and the ratio of election expenses to total expenditure is expected. The largest 
(parliamentary) parties have large operational costs and even if they spend several fold more on 
campaigning than small parties, their ratio will still be significantly lower than the ratio small parties with 
low operational costs may feature. The ratio is more comparable with parties of the same or similar amount 
of total expenditure, and less so with parties of significantly different amounts of total expenditure. The 
second caveat concerns the practical aspect of research of party funding in the three selected cases. As is 
discussed at length above, particularly in Chapter 5, the existing Czech, Polish and Slovak models of party 
funding oversight is very liberal in terms of control and auditing. This liberal approach betrays itself also in 
the manner how parties report their revenues and incomes on forms prescribed by their respective 
supervisory bodies: to put it mildly, the manner is imperfect. Items from their annual balances are carried to 
prescribed forms differently by different parties. In theory matching columns and rows spread over 
different forms do not match in practice and, in many cases, numbers simply do not add up. This problem 
concerns also the items related election expenses, cumulative sum that are calculated by the parties 
themselves and often through different calculations. For instance, some parties in the 2012 Czech regional 
elections put forward hundreds of candidates and still reported zero election expenses (Šimral 2013). The 
models of audit and supervision of party funding that have been in place in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Slovakia do not guarantee a high level of quality of the data found in annual financial reports, which is 
unfortunate for the democratic process in general and for academic analysis of the data in particular. 
Unfortunately, the annual financial reports are the only publicly accessible data source available and at the 
moment irreplaceable for political finance research. 
The same caveat applies to the other three budget structure-characteristics on which parties are 
classified in the present work: they are the share of state subsidies in revenues, the share of donations in 
revenues, and the ratio of donations, loans and credits to membership fees. A classification based on the size 
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of budgets divides parties into useful categories, but does not by far exhaust the descriptive and 
explanatory potential of parties’ financial characteristics. High total incomes are not by themselves a 
commonly accepted indicator of party cartels, even though the difference between super-heavyweight and 
heavyweight parties points to inequality between parties and suspicious domination. For Katz and Mair, 
cartelised parties are primarily “characterized by the interpenetration of party and state and by a tendency 
towards inter-party collusion.” (Katz and Mair 2009: 755). Some of the transformation processes behind 
party cartelisation has been in the existing literature in part expressed in quantitative indicators: in 
aggregates of party membership (Mair and Biezen 2001) and sums of public funding (Szczerbiak 2001; 
Biezen 2008). Both measures ought to indicate the loss of parties’ roots in the civil society and their 
detachment (or withdrawal) from the general population towards the state that funds them and keeps them, 
at least financially, afloat.  
Between 2003 and 2013, the average shares of state subsidies in the budgets of the super 
heavyweight parties were: 43 per cent for the Czech Social Democrats, 49 per cent for the Civic Democrats, 
57 per cent for the Civil Platform, and 70 per cent for the Law and Justice. However high these number may 
be, they are not, in relative terms, the largest one. In fact, 33 out of the 514 parties in the dataset average 
more than 50 per cent of their (official) income coming from the state: 18 Czech, 9 Slovak and 7 Polish 
parties. Ten Czech parties belong to the lightweight class, 5 to the middleweight and 3 to heavyweights. 
Three Polish parties are middleweights, three are heavyweights and one is super heavyweight, in Slovakia, 
there is one lightweight, five middleweights and three heavyweights. In terms of relative numbers, the 
middleweight and the heavyweight classes are the one most benefited by state subsidies in Poland and 
Slovakia; in the Czech Republic, the heavyweights are accompanied in this respect by lightweight parties, 
most typically regional challenger parties. 
However, the share of state subsidies in parties’ income is not a reliable indicator, if detachment of 
parties from the civil society is to be measured. Substantial income may flow into parties’ budgets also from 
loans and their business activities such as the letting and sale of property, cultural and social events, 
publishing or consulting. More logical is to measure the share of membership fees and private donations, 
respectively. While the first may tell something about engagement with the “ordinary” civil society and the 
party on the ground, the latter tells something about engagement with non-partisan supporters and also the 
private business sphere. In the dataset, no party of middleweight and above category acquired more than 20 
per cent of their income from membership fees. The vast majority of parties have membership fees share 
below 10 per cent of total income. If only this measure is taken into account, parties in Central Europe are 
indeed very detached from the civil society. 
The measure of share of donations provides a more colorful picture. Many parties with higher 
incomes acquired large sums from private donors, usually from large private donors. For instance, the 
Czech party ANO 2011 derived the whole of their 2.5 million Euro income in 2012 from large donations, 
mainly from the founder and main character of the party, the businessman billionaire Andrej Babiš. In the 
present paper, I argue and, hopefully, provide some evidence for the notion that ANO is a prime example of 
77 
 
the party model that currently mostly challenge the real or imaginary party cartel in Central Europe; and 
this model will in the near future play a crucial role in the working and development of Central European 
party systems. ANO is not the only representative of this new coming party: in the Czech Republic, there 
are also the Public Affairs or TOP 09, in Poland, there is the Palikot Movement (today under a different 
name), in Slovakia, there are the various Citizens’ movements, such as 99% Citizen Vote (99), Change from 
Bellow – Democratic Union of Slovakia (ZZ – DUS), Citizen Candidates (OK) or Citizen Party Today 
(OSDNES). 
The most important characteristics to identify these parties certainly do not need to be budgetary: 
the listed parties indeed seem to fall in their majority into a set of parties with clustered around an anti-
system, anti-corruption, essentially anti-cartel message; often in their election manifestos overly focused on 
this issue, with other policies based on simple, schematic populism. These parties are then close not only in 
the outward political appearance, but also in their financial structure, which reflects the parties’ intensive 
election campaign model, the background of the parties’ creators, and the intra-party hierarchy in decision-
making. 
The intensive campaigning model is another significant feature of the party model. In financial 
terms, it may be indicated by the share of election expenses out of all expenses a party incurs in one year. 
This measure ought to indicate how stable an organisation a party runs and what activities it conducts in 
the time between elections. In 2009 and 2010, in the year and of parliamentary election and the preceding 
year, TOP 09, the successful new comer of Czech politics, spend, respectively, 85 and 75 per cent of its 
expenses on campaigning. After it joined the government, the party spent 51 per cent of income on 
campaign in 2012, the year of regional and Senate elections, but only 3 per cent in 2011. The Public Affairs 
(VV), the second Czech parliamentary challenger in 2010, spent in the same two years 97 and 95 per cent of 
their expenses on campaigning. In the Slovak parliamentary election of 2010, the new comer Freedom and 
Solidarity (SAS) spent 84 per cent on their campaign, while the second challenger, Bridge (MH) 70 per cent. 
Comparably, for the 2011 Sejm election, Palikot’s movement spent on their campaign officially a hundred 
per cent share of their total expenses. 
The ratio of donations, loans and credits to membership fees is another indirect indicator of a party’s 
internal structure related to the classic distinction between cadre and mass parties (Duverger 1951; 
Panebianco 1988). Large share of membership fees in a party’s revenues may indicate a large, organized and 
disciplined large membership. On the other hand, if the vast majority of revenues come from donations and 
loans, the party presumably focuses more on its campaign activities and on elections and does not concerns 
itself much with building a stable party organization from registered party members. Again, the ratio 
should be compared in individual cases only between budgetary large and, separately, between budgetary 
small parties. Especially the latter, the small parties, possess oftentimes so small a budget that its structure is 
fundamentally transformed with a single modest donation of several hundred Euro; the same sum may, 
however, be also written down in the books as a membership fee, depending on the tax reasons known to 
the donator, depending on her attitude towards being a registered partisan, or, in many cases, depending 
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solely on her whim. There is a second variable that has an impact on the relationship between total 
expenditure and the ratio of election expenses to total expenditure: the existence of non-official expenses 
towards election campaigning from private or semi-private sources. This matter is, however, dealt with in 
the paragraphs above and it would be redundant to repeat the theoretical arguments here. 
Based on the financial characteristics discussed, a more detailed classification of political parties may 
be created, which takes into account both the budget size as well as the budget structure. In Figures 6.1 – 
6.5, parties are divided on axis X by their ratio of election expenses to total expenditure, and on axis Y by the 
ratio of donations, loans and credits to their membership fees. Party budget size classes from super heavy- 
to bantamweight are represented by the size of parties’ labels. Data used in Figures 6.1 – 6.5 are shown in 
two year periods from 2004 to 2013. The nature of the two selected scales favours shorter data periods as 
longer are affected by significant changes in party budgets – no party keeps its budget size and budget 
structure stable for a period longer than two or three years. Budgets fluctuate due to electoral cycles and the 
development of parties itself, from the early stages, when election expenses comprise the bulk of a party’ 
budget to the mature stage of large organisational expenses. 
Even though it would be possible to show in Figures 6.1 – 6.5 all parties dataset, the visualisation is 
limited to the largest parties and those representing specific party types. Like in the previous budget size-
based classification, also these two continuous axes may serve as the basis for a nominal classification. 
Suitable cutting points need to be again artificially selected: here, the natural points were chosen based on 
the underlying logic of the two axes that is further described bellow. The values of the cutting points are: 
• 45 per cent for the share of election expenses in total expenditure and 
• 8 for the ratio of donations, loans and credits to membership fees. 
Figures 6.1 – 6.5 are titled in chronological succession, but it is better to read them from the opposite 
direction. The reason is already in detailed discussed above: the most recent data are also the most reliable 
data; going back in time means getting closer to the pre-GRECO, pre-recession era when the reports of 
political parties in Central European parties were not the subject of much scrutiny. The oversight and 
control today is far from perfect, but it is still better than it was several years ago. That and the fact that the 
recent composition of party systems in the researched countries is also more actual for the reader is why I 
use Figure 6.5 to explain the logic behind the proposed budget size-based classification of political parties. 
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Figures 6.5: Political parties by (X) share of election expenditure in total expenditure per (Y) ratio of 
donations and loans to membership fees (period 2012 – 2013) (Czech, Polish, Slovak) 
 
Figures 6.4: Political parties by (X) share of election expenditure in total expenditure per (Y) ratio of 
donations and loans to membership fees (period 2010 – 2011) (Czech, Polish, Slovak) 
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Figures 6.3: Political parties by (X) share of election expenditure in total expenditure per (Y) ratio of 
donations and loans to membership fees (period 2008 – 2009) (Czech, Polish, Slovak) 
 
Figures 6.2: Political parties by (X) share of election expenditure in total expenditure per (Y) ratio of 
donations and loans to membership fees (period 2006 – 2007) (Czech, Polish, Slovak) 
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Figures 6.1: Political parties by (X) share of election expenditure in total expenditure per (Y) ratio of 
donations and loans to membership fees (period 2004 – 2005) (Czech, Polish, Slovak) 
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(ZHN), United Democrats – Association of Independents (SD-SN), Northbohemians.cz (S.CZ), Vote for 
Town (VPM), Movement “What’s their Deal” (HOJJ), and the Dawn of Direct Democracy (ÚPD), from 
Poland, Libertas, Poland Comes First (PJN), Patriotic Poland (PolPat), United Poland Zbigniewa Ziobro 
(SPZZ), Polish People’s Party (PSL), Slavic Union (ZS), National Party of Retirees and Pensioners (KPEiR), 
Polish National Union (PWN), Polish Labour Party – August 1980 (PPP-S80), from Slovakia, Magnificat 
Slovakia (MagSlo), 99% Citizen Vote (99), and the Independents (NEZ). This is the set of parties that put the 
bulk of their financial assets towards elections campaigning and the vast majority of their income comes 
from private sources. I label this group as ‘polipreneurs’ and assume them to be primarily new, office-
seeking actors, with smaller membership base.  
In the other two corners of Figure 6.5, there are two more categories of political parties. In the lower-
left part, there is, from the Czech Republic, the Green party (SZ), Mayors for the Liberec Region (SLK), Club 
of Engagé Non-Partisants (KAN), Free Citizens (S), Movement of Independents for Harmonic Development 
of Communes and Towans (HNHRM), from Poland, Congress of the New Rights (KNP), Greens 2004 (Z 
2004), and the Democratic Party (SD), from Slovakia, Change from Below – Democratic Union of Slovakia 
(ZZDUS), Bridge (M-H), Our Region (NK), Freedom and Solidarity (SAS), and the Magnificient Seven (7S). 
These parties spend more than 45 per cent on their income on elections and their ration of DLs to MFs is not 
higher than eight. I label this group as ‘vote-seekers’ that possess to a certain degree significant membership 
base and put the bulk of their assets towards winning more votes. The remaining, upper-left category 
includes, from the Czech Republic, the National Socialists – Lion 21 (NS-LEV21), from Poland, the Polish 
Left (PLew) and Your Movement / Palikot’s Movement (RP/TR), from Slovakia, NOVA and the Party of 
Magyar Coalition (SMK – KMP). This small group is here labeled as ‘hedgers’ and I assume their behaviour 
to be closest to policy-seeking. It is the least populous group, since the years 2012 and 2013 in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia were years of parliamentary and regional elections. In Poland, no elections took place 
in the two years, except for supplementary elections in several senatorial districts. The Polish data are, 
however, affected by the specific format of Polish annual financial reports, which subsumes all expenses not 
used for the actual running of a political organisation and its offices, such as expert publications and 
between-election campaigning, into election expenditure. Even though the expectation ought to therefore be 
for all Polish parties to be on the left side of the Figure, in the all-rounders and hedgers categories, many 
Polish parties may be found on the right. 
The classification into all-rounders, polipreneurs, vote-seekers and hedgers is a rough one, where the 
assignment of individual cases close to cutting points may be arguable, but it serves the purpose of dividing 
the party system into a detailed of meaningful categories. Put together with the previous classification 
based on budget size, political parties may be divided into 5 x 4, i.e.,  20 combinations, starting from 
‘bantamweight all-rounders, through, ‘featherweight polipreneurs’, ‘mediumweight vote-seekers’, 
‘heavyweight all-rounders’ to ‘super heavyweight hedgers’ or ‘super heavyweight polipreneurs’. 
The selection of cutting points in the classification is not completely arbitrarily: since Figures 6.1 to 
6.5 represent two year periods, 45 per cent of election expenses represent a party that spends either its 
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almost entire budget in one year on an election (the second year is election-free), or spends in both years 
almost half of its budget on two major elections; the cutting point is not set to 50 per cent since there is 
always at least a minimal expenditure dedicated to non-election activities. For axis Y, eight was selected as 
the cutting point for the ratio of DLs to MFs due to the visible trend in all Figures 6.1 to 6.5, showing parties 
often being divided along the number eight line. 
In Figures 6.1 to 6.4, I put primarily a) the largest parties that played important roles in the party 
systems of the three countries, b) those parties that used to be smaller, but are today of significance in the 
current politics of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Several general observations about these 
parties and their positioning in the Figures may already be stated based on simple data visualisation: 
First, super heavyweight parties are predominantly positioned in the lower left category of all-
rounders. The Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD) and the Czech Communists (KSČM) together with the Slovak 
Direction (SMER) are always found there. The Czech Civic Democrats (ODS) oscilate on the edges of this 
category and twice overstep into the hedging (2010-11) and vote-seeking (2008-09) category, respectively. 
The Polish Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS) may be found either in the all-rounders’ category 
(2008-09, 2012-13) or among polipreneurs (2004-05, 2006-07, 2010-11); their strategy is much more capital-
intensive in times of preparation for important presidential or parliamentary elections (2005, 2007, 2010 and 
2011) and less intensive between important elections (2012-13, 2008-09). That might indicate that in purely 
financial terms, the Czech Social Democrats and the Communists as well as the Slovak Direction are the 
parties most anchored in a strong membership base and with largest organisational structures to run. The 
Czech Civic Democrats and the two Polish largest parties rely already more on private donations and loans 
and on capital-intenstive election campaigning. Even though the difference in the legal framework between 
Poland and the other two countries (i.e., the rule drive) is significant, it may be tentatively concluded that 
the three latter parties are, if compared to the first three, more strongly linked to large business donors and 
use more expensive campaigning tools. 
Second, traditional heavyweight and middleweight parties are also among the all-rounders. In the 
Czech Republic, there are the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) and the now defunct Freedom Union – 
Democratic Union (US-DEU), in Slovakia, Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH), People’s Party – 
Movement for Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS) and the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – 
Democratic Party (SDKU), and in Poland, since 2008, the Social Democracy of Poland (SP). However, the 
smaller budgets of smaller parties tend to fluctuate more and these parties are not therefore set so firmly in 
their categories. Strongest seems to be anchored in this category the Christian democratic family in the 
Czech Republic and in Slovakia; this family is accompanied by a group of medium-sized centre-left parties 
of both rural (LS-HZDS) and urban (US-DEU) electorate. 
Third, the polipreneurial category and its close border regions are the place of concentration of 
parties challenging the established format of the party system. All the recent challengers of the ‘cartels’ in 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia may be found there: in the Czech Republic, it was ANO, Dawn of 
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Direct Democracy (ÚPD), TOP 09 and the Public Affairs (VV) that amanaged to enter the parliament in the 
parliamentary elections of 2010 and 2013. In the latter case, the two parties already feature in the Czech 
parliamentary arena for a longer time, which leads to their diagonal shift from the upper-right corner to the 
lower-left, as they strengthen their links with the civic society and build their organisational structure.2 In 
Poland, a movement of the same general direction may be seen at the positions of the Palikot’s Movement 
(RP/TR) that succeeded in the parliamentary election of 2011; in Slovakia, the same may be said about the 
Ordinary People and Independent Figures (OLANO).  
Fourth, parties of smaller budgets generally more fluctuate from one Figure to another (from one 
two year period to another). This is logical: several donations may completely change the budget structure 
of a small party and, at the same time, a small party does not run a stable organisation on the ground or a 
chain of offices as large parties do. Heavyweight, middleweight and smaller parties may also be more 
focused on regional, local, or even European elections. Some of the medium weight classes are thus built 
along an electoral cycle different from the large, nationwide parties; they focus their campaigning on the 
years between parliamentary elections, when the other elections usually happen. That is the case with, for 
instance, the Czech party of Mayors for the Liberec Region (SLK) that primary concentrated their assets for 
campaigning in the 2008 and 2012 regional elections. In Poland, successful election campaigns have also 
been staged by the Silesian Autonomy Movement (RAS) in the 2006 and 2010 local elections. The regional 
and local level are also crucial for the Slovak party Bridge (M-H), representing predominantly the ethnic 
Magyar population along the border with Hungary to the south. In the case of the Czech Republic, the 
middleweight parties, such as the Green Party (SZ) or the Free Citizens (S), also wager more of their 
resources on elections to the European Parliament than heavyweight and super heavyweight parties do; the 
reason is their increased chance of success at this level of elections, which uses in the Czech case a more 
proportional system than elections to the Czech parliament. 
Five, the structure of budgets of large political parties from the three countries differs: Slovak Parties 
are mostly concentrated in the lower left region, Czech Parties are scattered towards the middle and the 
centre of gravity of large Polish parties is even further towards the upper right corner. While it might also 
indicate the a lower level of anchoring of Polish political parties among the electorate via formal structures, 
a more probably explanation lies in the difference between the rule drives of the three countries: the budgets 
of large Slovak parties is from a larger part comprised of state subsidies, in the case of SMER and SDKU 
from 80 to 95 per cent, and the parties do not feel the need to materially strengthen their already dominant 
financial position among smaller parties. Plus, there is the anecdotic evidence of the large parties’ tendency 
to boost their campaigns via non-official financial channels (see, e.g., Mesežnikov 2014). A large number of 
Czech parties, on the other hand, is subsidised by the state. The Czech system allows for subsidies to be 
awarded to also to parties that succeeded in regional and European elections, which has led to the 
                                                     
2 The Public Affairs were between 2010 and 2013 the subject of several corruption scandals and fractionalized, which 
led to their effective marginalisation after the parliamentary elections of 2013. Their future fate remains very much 
uncertain. 
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emergence of a relatively large group of medium-sized parties operating outside of the top-level national 
parliamentary arena, in regions (SLK, S.CZ) or continually on the uncertain threshold of the parlimanet (SZ, 
S). These parties either oscilate in the mid-section of the two axes in times of low pre-electoral mobilisation 
or move towards upper right borders in times of heightened election campaign. Finally, the numbers of 
Polish group are affected by the parallel existence of parties and election committees in the Polish system, 
which are in Figures 6.1-6.5 simply calculated together as a single party actor. The large amounts of money 
handled by election committees then create the strong to and fro jumping effect of Polish parties, which are 
strongly geared towards intensive election campaigin spending. 
Part 6.4: Budget structure and size of political parties in Austria, Germany and Slovenia 
Austria, Germany and Slovenia were not included in the previous analysis as the scope, detail and 
contents of data collected on the three countries do not for allow it. Austrian political parties that receive 
federal grants publish their annual financial reports and audit reports by 30 September of the following year 
in Wiener Zeitung, the official gazette of the Austrian government. However, the format of this publication 
is relatively limited and lists only 14 budgetary items on the side parties’ income and 13 on the side of 
expenses. These items do not precisely correspond with the items selected for analysis in the previous Part 
and cannot be therefore directly compared with the Czech, Polish and Slovak cases. Moreover, since not all 
parties are required to publish their financial statements, only a partial dataset on seven large parties that 
formed the parliamentary level of the Austrain party system in the years 2006 to 2012 was collected for the 
present work, but may be used only for illustrative purposes and for an indirect comparison. 
A similar problem arises with a comparison with German political parties. While German parties’ 
financial statetements are fully accessible at the website of the Bundestag, the listing of their budgetary 
items differs and is actually closer to the Austrian case; here, the spread of a different accounting and 
reporting model in German-speaking Central Europe as opposed to the Western Slavic model is quite 
apparent. The financial reports of German political parties include nine items on the side of revenues and 
seven on the side of expenditure and the system of couting of individual entries found in the accounting 
books that later constitute the items of financial reports is different from the system common for Czech, 
Polish and Slovak reporting. As in the Austrian case, also the German data, which include financidal 
stateements of six largest parliamentary parties between the years 2007 and 2012, serve only complementary 
purposes in the analysis. 
Data on the finances of Slovenia political parties are currently the most difficult to obtain. On the 
Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services (AJPES) are accessible 
only short forms for the years 2012 and 2013 listing nine items of parties’ income and thirteen items of 
parties’ expenses. Older data are in theory open for public at a request at the Slovenian Court of Auditors, 
but in practice, privacy laws, as today enforced, prevent research into the parties’ reports on the same scale 
and with the same depth is in the case of the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Before this controversy 
is resolved, financial dealings of Slovenian political parties cannot be included in a detailed analysis. The 
present work uses the accessible data for the years 2012 and 2013 and covers 20 Slovenian political parties 
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that existed for the duration of those two years, contested the 2011 Slovenian parliamentary election and the 
early elections of 2014. 
Figure 6.6: Political parties by (X) share of election expenditure in total expenditure per (Y) ratio of 
donations and loans to membership fees in Austria (period 2006 – 12) 
 
Figure 6.6 shows that, despite the difficulties in comparison of Austrian parties’ budgets with the 
budgets of Czech, Polish and Slovak political parties, the Austrian party system behaves most probably 
similarly to its Western Slavic, post-communist counterparts. Even though only a small piece of the party 
system is displayed in the Figure, which precludes making generalised observations and reaching firm 
conclusion, data visualization shows a trend: large, established parliamentary parties, the Austrian People’s 
Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) have the smalles ratio of donations and loans 
to membership fees and their private income comes almost exclusively from their fee-paying members. 
Different is the funding model of the younger Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which draws private 
revenue mostly from donations, credits, loans and business activities. The same can be said about the other 
four parties included in the dataset (Die Grünen, Alliance for the Future of Austria – BZÖ, Liste Dr. Hans-
Peter Martin, and Bürgerforum Österreich – FRITZ). Unlike in the cases of ÖVP and SPÖ, these parties’ annual 
budgets are more volatile, which is a reflection of the low membership base as well as of the intensive 
election campaigning funded by one-time large donations and loans. 
Figure 6.7: Political parties by (X) share of election expenditure in total expenditure per (Y) ratio of 
donations and loans to membership fees in Germany (period 2007 – 12) 
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German political parties are shown in Figure 6.7, which, however, is not construed in the same 
fashion as the previous six figures. The reason is simple: the six large German parliamentary parties, which 
are included in the dataset, receive only a small portion of their private funding from (official) donations 
and loans and are largely funded by membership fees and state subsidies. The Figure indicates the existence 
of a trend that is common also to Austria, Czech Republic, and Slovakia: traditional left-oriented parties, 
social democrats and communists, have the ratio of donations to membership fees smaller than right-wing 
oriented parties. These numbers thus support the classic image of a large, structured, well-organised social-
democratic party with strong presence on the ground and the more business world-oriented conservative 
party that is not to the same degree anchored among the general working population. The deviating case of 
Poland, which does not support the classic theory, may be explained by the traditional tendency of Polish 
parties to factionalise and continually reform their inter-party coalitions. The high volatility of the system 
then translates in parties’ budgets to relatively high level of reliance on private donations and lines of credit, 
intensive election campaigning and low level of stable organisational structures on the ground.   
The new system of reporting incomes and expenses of Slovenian political parties at the AJPES 
website precludes any juxtaposition of private donations, loans and membership fees as separate parts of 
parties’ budgets. Also impossible is the calculation of the share of election expenses from the total annual 
expenditure of Slovenian parties – items included in Slovenian reports do not differentiate between costs for 
services and products related to election campaigns and non-election expenses. It might be possible to learn 
the amount of election expenses separately from post-election campaign report all Slovenian political parties 
are required to submit – howerer, only campaigns for national referenda and for presidential elections, both 
in the year 2012, took place during the research period of 2012-13 and these campaigns in their planning, 
conduct and financing differ from classic party-led campaigns before local, regional, parliamentary or 
European elections. To ascertain the involvement of parties in the financing of campaigns of individual 
presidential candidates, who were in their majority supported by coalitions of parties, would require a 
detailed in-depth analysis. In the case of the 2012 referendum, campaign reports indicate a very limited 
financial involvement of all major parties, not exceeding several hundred euros. 
Austrian, German and Slovenian political parties do not differ only in terms of budget structure, but, 
like Czech, Polish and Slovak parties, also in terms of budget size. Since only the large parliamentary parties 
of Austria and Germany are included in the dataset, only the largest classes are represented. The Social 
Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) are representatives of the super 
heavyweight class with with incomes regularly exceeding €10 million per year. Both SPÖ and ÖVP recorded 
their largest incomes in 2006, €21 and €24 million respectively. 2006 was a year of parliamentary elections 
and a second spike in incomes for both parties meant also 2008, a year of next, early parliamentary elections 
(€21 and €14 million, respectively); ÖVP managed to acquire almost €15 million in the following year for the 
2009 European elections, still, however, trailing behind SPÖ’s €17 million revenues. Between 2010 and 2012, 
incomes of both parties slightly decreased and oscilated around the €10 threshold. The Freedom Party of 
Austria (FPÖ), Die Grünen, and the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) are typical heavyweight parties, 
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with average incomes in the observed period of €5.8, €3.3, and €2.8 million, respectively. Liste Dr. Hans-Peter 
Martin operated between the years 2006 and 2010 with annual incomes between €0.6 million to €2.4 million, 
which puts the party on the border between the heavyweight and the middleweight class. The Tyrolean 
Bürgerforum Österreich – FRITZ, the last party in the Austrian small dataset, represents middleweight parties 
with income recorded in its 2008 annual financial report of €0.6 million. 
All German political parties discussed in this Part belong to the super heavyweight class. Moreover, 
the two largest parties, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU), form a class of their own with revenues between 2007 and 2012 ranging from €147 to €173 million 
and €138 to €162 million, respectively. To put things into perspective, each of this ‘hyperweight’ parties had 
in the observed period annual incomes larger than all Czech, Polish and Slovak political parties together (!). 
The remaining four German parties in the dataset would still belong to the richest level of parties in the 
Western Slavic countries: the Christan Social Union in Bavaria’s (CSU) average annual income reached €41 
million, Free Democratic Party’s (FDP) €35 million, Alliance '90/The Greens’ (B 90/ Die Grünen) €31 million, 
and the Left’s (Die Linke) €27 million. All German parliamentary parties had in the observed period 
revenues higher than any of the Czech, Polish or Slovak political parties in the dataset. 
Slovenian political parties, in comparison, operate with much smaller financial assets. Only two 
Slovenian political parties, the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Social Democrats (SD), reached 
the heavyweight class with average annual incomes in the period 2012-13 of €1.8 and €1.1 million, 
respectively. The remaining 18 political parties included in the small Slovenian dataset belong either to the 
middleweight (8 parties), lightweight (2 parties) or bantamweight class (8 parties). The average annual 
incomes of the middleweight and lightweight parties were: Positive Slovenia (PS) €844 thousand, Slovenian 
People's Party (SLS) €713 thousand, Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) €589 thousand, 
New Slovenia – Christian Democrats (NS-KD) €527 thousand, Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) €420 
thousand, Civic List (DL) €254 thousand, Zares – Social Liberals €155 thousand, Slovenian National Party 
(SNS) €132 thousand, Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia (TRS) €60 thousand,  and the Youth 
Party – European Greens (SMS-Zeleni) €54 thousand. 
Data on Austrian, German and Slovenian political parties do not allow for a comparison similar to 
that carried out for Czech, Polish and Slovak parties. However, the data are more valuable in the next Part 
of the Chapter, which discusses the effects of the rule drive on budgets of political parties. 
Part 6.5: The effect of the rule drive on budgets of political parties 
I discuss legal regulations that have an impact on party funding already to some length in Part 2.2., 
where I deal with the content of the concept ‘rule drive’ and in Chapter 5, where I summarise the 
developments of party regulatory framework in six selected Central European countries (Austria, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). In the present Part, I focus on the relationship between the 
size and structure of parties’ budgets and legal regulations in existence in the researched countries. The data 
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on party budgets used in the following paragraphs come from the same dataset used in Parts 6.1 to 6.3, data 
on legal regulations are reiterated from Part 5.1 to 5.4. 
The path towards the current form of party regulations in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia 
was full of turns and changes of direction and pace in all three countries. In the Czech Republic, the original 
1995 legislation was significantly refurbished in 2000 for two major reasons: first, parties borrowed 
substantial sums for previous parliamentary election campaigns (1996 and 1998) and were falling behind in 
installments. Second, Czch media were in 2000 once again filled with a series of scandals related to illicit 
party funding. Parties therefore agreed on a reform to fill up their party treausries with money from the 
state budget by legal, transparent means, increasing state subsidies to large parliamentary parties. This 
move, however, met with criticism from the Constitutional Court, and the legislating parties were forced to 
grudgingly allow the widening of the scope of subisidies also to smaller parties. This compromise was 
accepted by all major stakeholders, including the large parliamentary parties, medium-sized parties on the 
threshold of the parliament, parties strong in the regions, and the public. The 2000s model of party 
regulations in the Czech Republic was thus a result of a trade-off between the need for more financial 
support from the state by large parties and the pressure of the smaller players to level the playing field – in 
the Czech case, smaller parties managed to get hold of a substantial, even if not equal part of public funding 
and this development shows in the numbers of Czech medium-sized parties budgets. The 2011 decrease of 5 
per cent in mandate contribution contributed to the overall decrease of the total amount of state subsidies 
granted to Czech parties in 2011, 2012 and 2013, but its net effect is hidden by decreases caused by a 
movement of the electoral cycle (2012 regional elections, 2013 parliamentary elections) and the subsequent 
redistribution of funds towards a different set of political parties than before 2011. 
Similarly to the Czech Republic, neither the Polish smodel of party regulations was substantially 
modified between 2003 and 2013; the major reform happened already in 2000 and 2001, when the 
framework currently in place was agreed upon. In the Polish case, parliamentary parties are clearly the 
winners of the new model: first, dotacje podmiotowa, mandate contribution, is granted only to groups 
represented in the parliament. These groups may be both non-partisan and partisan, but in reality, the Sejm 
have been for long fully dominated by regular political parties. Second, non-partisan election committees 
are not eligible for dotacle celowa, contribution for votes, which was distrbuted exclusively to political 
parties. Third, state contributions have been in Poland calculated solely on the basis of results of 
parliamentary elections, even though that other levels of elections (local, European, presidential) have been 
progressivelly more and more regulated. Since 2011, for instance, all election campaign expenses have been 
limited by spending caps, which carries with it a ‘rule drive’ effect affecting parties’ budgets. However, 
since the years 2012 and 2013 have been election-free in Poland, the real effect of the caps will hate wait for 
an analysis until at least parties’ campaign expenses for the 2014 European elections and the 2015 
parliamentary elections are known. 
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Table 6.2: Subsidies and their share in the aggregate incomes of party system in the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovakia 
Year Total Subsidy 
Share of 
Subsidies 
Year Total Subsidy 
Share of 
Subsidies 
Year Total Subsidy 
Share of 
Subsidies 
2003 14,663,291.97 36.3 2003 13,284,417.15 59.7 2003 2,731,149.88 57.2 
2004 13,289,971.88 54.2 2004 14,758,286.12 65.8 2004 2,017,725.00 55.8 
2005 15,803,000.00 58.9 2005 21,946,243.55 24.2 2005 2,915,384.29 38.0 
2006 35,997,989.47 61.3 2006 52,815,756.45 66.2 2006 12,429,727.08 76.9 
2007 17,662,588.63 58.4 2007 26,055,913.47 33.5 2007 4,875,411.76 70.2 
2008 20,468,065.96 49.2 2008 51,317,948.39 84.6 2008 5,180,125.00 69.0 
2009 20,534,953.70 38.1 2009 25,359,656.64 73.2 2009 5,500,954.00 72.8 
2010 40,356,501.22 47.1 2010 40,830,160.36 71.1 2010 18,982,174.29 75.5 
2011 20,785,270.83 41.1 2011 27,469,566.62 46.4 2011 7,333,172.00 67.2 
2012 19,632,544.86 29.0 2012 30,007,111.60 81.1 2012 20,710,039.27 84.6 
2013 36,079,488.85 54.1 2013 12,967,557.35 72.8 2013 7,534,160.86 88.1 
CZE 23,206,697.03 48.0 POL 28,801,147.06 61.7 SVK 8,200,911.22 68.6 
 
In Slovakia, the model of party funding regulations underwent a significant reform in 2004 and 2005, 
when a new Election Law and a new Party Law were adopted. First elections to the Slovak National Council 
took place in 2006 and the regulations reform resulted in an immediate increase of state subsidies in the 
budgets of political parties, particularly large and medium-sized parties. Aggregately, the share of subsidies 
in the income of the entire Slovak party system rose from 38 to 77 per cent (see Table 6.2) and since 2006, 
this share oscilated between 67 to 89 per cent. As in the Polish case, also in Slovakia the model of 
subsidisation has always been strongle parliament-centred and did not undergo a process of scope-
expansion comparable to the Czech model. Consequently, only 8 to 9 parties in the Slovak party system has 
been since 2004 subsidised, a number quite similar to the Polish party system. The number was moreover 
kept lower by the higher eligibility threshold of 3 per cent for both the contribution for seats as well as the 
contribution for votes, which is, for the latter, 2 per cent higher than in the Czech Republic. As Table 6.3 
shows, middleweight and lightweight Slovak political parties distributed in the observed period among 
themselves a sum aggregately lower (€33 million) than their Polish counterparts (€54 million), comparable 
rather with Czech parties (€26 million), but among fewer units (11) of the set than it is in the Czech party 
system (32). 
The amount of state subsidies and its share in the budgets of political parties is one the most 
apparent, most direct and easiest to calculate effects of the rule drive on the parties’ budgets. State subsidies 
also stand in the centre of the discussion about cartelisation of Central European party systems and their 
large amounts are often considered to be an indicator of the existence of the cartel. The precise distribution 
of state subsidies among the different weight classes of political parties needs to be, however, taken into 
account; it may turn out that the parties most profiting from public funding are not those large 
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parliamentary players usually seen as the members of a cartel, but another group, not directly involved in 
the process of legislating party regulations. 
Table 6.3: Distribution of state subsidies among political parties by weight classes 
Weight 
Class 
Total Subsidies 
Share of 
Subsidies 
Nr of 
Subsidised 
Parties 
Average 
Subsidy 
SW 143,495,920.00 57.61 2 71,747,960.00 
HW 79,353,496.00 31.86 5 15,870,699.20 
MW 19,953,665.00 8.01 11 1,813,969.55 
LW 5,895,066.00 2.37 21 280,717.43 
BW 378,844.00 0.15 6 63,140.67 
CZE 249,076,991.00 100.00 45 5,535,044.24 
SW 177,391,216.00 53.00 2 88,695,608.00 
HW 102,648,070.00 30.67 5 20,529,614.00 
MW 53,646,010.00 16.03 5 10,729,202.00 
LW 1,016,482.00 0.30 1 1,016,482.00 
BW 
   
  
POL 334,701,778.00 100.00 13 25,746,290.62 
SW 
   
  
HW 57,260,273.00 63.47 3 19,086,757.67 
MW 31,316,045.00 34.71 7 4,473,720.71 
LW 1,633,705.00 1.81 4 408,426.25 
BW 
   
  
SVK 90,210,023.00 100.00 14 6,443,573.07 
 
In Table 6.3, political parties in the three researched countries are divided by weight classes used for 
the previous classification based on budgets sizes. The Table indicates the presence of two trends present in 
the researched countries, which are of significance for the discussion about cartelisation of party systems 
East Central Europe. 
First, the largest parties do indeed receive the majority of state subsidies in all three countries. In the 
Czech Republic, the two major parties that dominated Czech politics in the observed period, the Civic 
Democratic Party (ODS), leading government coalitions between 2006 and 2013, and the Social Democratic 
Party (ČSSD), leading a coalition between 2002 and 2006, were awarded between 2003 and 2013 more than 
€143 million in public funding. This sum includes both contributions for votes and contributions for all their 
mandates in the parliament, in regional councils and in the Prague municipal council, and represents a 58 
per cent share of all subsidies awarded to Czech parties in that period. In the heavyweight category, the 
always parliamentary Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) received in the same period from 
public funding almost €39 million. The fourth largest party, the Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak 
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People's Party (KDU-ČSL), which did not hold seats in the Chamber of Deputies between 2010 and 2013, 
acquired despite the important electoral loss almost €22 million. The new challenger of the 2010 
parliamentary elections and a junior coalition party in the Nečas’s government (2010-13), TOP 09, received 
in the span of three years more than €13 million. 
A situation similar to the Czech case was in the observed period in Poland, where the two major 
alternating government parties, the Civic Platform (PO) ruling between 2007 and 2013, and the Law and 
Justice (PiS), ruling between 2005 and 2007, divided between themselves over €177 million. The government 
leading party of the 2003 to 2005 period, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), a party on the border of the 
super heavyweight class, managed reveiced alone almost €55 million. The common junior coalition partner, 
the Polish People’s Party (PSL), reached to the sum of €29 million. The fifth largest party, despite its collapse 
in the 2007 parliamentary elections, the Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland, acquired more than €19 
million. The difference between the Czech distribution and the Polish distribution of subsidies to super 
heavyweight and heavyweight parties is substantially influenced by the borderline classification of the third 
and fourth largest Polish political parties. As Table 6.4 shows, the differences between super heavy Czech 
and Polish parties in their respective average shares of seats in the lower houses of their national 
parliaments were in the observed period minimal: PO and PiS average seat shares in the 2003-13 period 36.6 
and 30.3 per cent, respectively, ČSSD and ODS 33 and 31 per cent, respectively). 
Table 6.4: Seats held in lower chamber of national parliaments (CZE, POL, SVK) 
 
CZE 2002 2006 2010 2013
ČSSD 70 35 74 37 56 28 50 25 724 32.91
ODS 58 29 81 40.5 53 26.5 16 8 673 30.59
KSČM 41 20.5 26 13 26 13 33 16.5 338 15.36
TOP 09 41 20.5 26 13 149 6.77
KDU-ČSL 31 15.5 13 6.5 0 0 14 7 159 7.23
ANO 2011 47 23.5 47 2.14
VV 24 12 0 0 72 3.27
ÚSVIT 14 7 14 0.64
SZ 0 0 6 3 0 0 0 0 24 1.09
200 100.00 200 100.00 200 100.00 200 100.00 2200 100.00
POL 2001 2005 2007 2011
PO 65 14.13 133 28.91 209 45.43 207 45.00 1853 36.62
PiS 44 9.57 155 33.70 166 36.09 157 34.13 1533 30.30
SLD 216 46.96 55 11.96 53 11.52 27 5.87 835 16.50
PSL 42 9.13 25 5.43 31 6.74 28 6.09 342 6.76
S 53 11.52 56 12.17 0 0.00 0 0.00 218 4.31
LPR 38 8.26 34 7.39 0 0.00 0 0.00 144 2.85
GER Min 2 0.43 2 0.43 1 0.22 1 0.22 15 0.30
RP 40 8.70 120 2.37
460 100.00 460 100.00 460 100.00 460 100.00 5060 100.00
SVK 2002 2006 2010 2012
SMER 25 17 50 33 62 41 83 55 565 34.24
SDKU 28 19 31 21 28 19 11 7 286 17.33
LS-HZDS 36 24 15 10 0 0 0 0 168 10.18
KDH 15 10 14 9 15 10 16 11 163 9.88
SMK 20 13 20 13 0 0 0 0 140 8.48
SNS 20 13 9 6 0 0 98 5.94
SaS 0 22 15 11 7 66 4
M-H 0 14 9 13 9 54 3.27
ANO 15 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 2.73
KSS 11 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 2
OLANO 0 16 11 32 1.94
150 100.00 150 100.00 150 100.00 150 100.00 1650 100.00
Total 
Seats
Average 
Share
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In Slovakia, during the observed period, a super heavyweight party did not exist – only the ruling 
Direction (Smer) received over €10 million in revenues in 2012, almost nine tenths of it from public funding. 
The heavyweight class therefore represents the summit of the Slovak party systems in terms of party budget 
sizes and this calss also receives the bulk, 63.5 per cent of all state subsidies. The average subsidy for one 
party in the class is higher than in the Czech and Polish cases, but that is influenced by the presence of the 
borderline case of Smer. While Smer received in 2003-13 the toal amount of €34 million in state subsidies, the 
second largest party, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKU-DS), which led 
the government coalition between 2006 and 2010, was in the same period awarded only €14 million, not 
even a half of the sum belonging to the Direction. The third largest party in terms of public funding received 
was the Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH) with €9 million in state subsidies, followed by two no 
longer parliamentary parties, the Party of Magyar Coalition (SMK-MKP) and the Slovak National Party 
(SNS), both reaching to €7 million and by the dominating party of the second half of the 1990s, People’s 
Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS) with €6 million.  
The second trend noticeable in all three countries is the unfavourable position of the smallest parties. 
Bantamweight parties, i.e., those with annual budgets below €10 thousand, did not receive any subsidies in 
Poland and in Slovakia; only in the Czech Republic, they were awarded some kind of public funding. In 
three cases, it was contribution for a seat in the Senate (B10, Movement of Independents, National 
Prosperity), in two cases contribution for mandates in regional councils (Independents and Mayors, Vote for 
Town), in one case caontribution for votes received in European elections (Right Bloc). The Czech model of 
subsidisation that covers not only the major (parliamentary and presidential) elections, but also other 
elections to regional councils, to the Senate and the European parliament, gives a better chance to parties 
strong on the regional level and/or on European issues. On the other hand, a comparison of sums divided 
between parties of smaller budget size classes shows that the average sum awarded to small parties is much 
lower in the Czech case than it is in Poland or Slovakia. While lightweight Slovak parties received in 2003-13 
on average €755 thousand and the Polish lightweight party (Union of Labour) no less than €1 million, Czech 
parties of the same class ended up with the sum of €280 thousand, bantamweight parties with only €63 
thousand. It is safe to say that the Czech model with a widened scope of state subsidies benefits a larger 
number of smaller parties, compared with Poland and Slovakia, but with the drawback of a larger 
dissipation of funds. Czech middleweight parties are as a consequence comparatively disadvantaged, if 
juxtaposed with their Polish and Slovak counterparts. 
While these two trends, the relative advantage of the largest parties and the relative disadvantage of 
the smallest, are common across the three researched countries, there are also differences between the 
countries. The unfavourable position of middleweight parties in terms of public funding is already noted in 
the paragraph above: the 11 Czech parties that belong to that category distributed between themselves in 
the 2003-13 period a bit less than €20 million, which is substantially less than their five Polish counterparts 
with the aggregate sum of €53.6 million. Each Czech middleweight party received on average €1.8 million in 
public funding, while Polish and Slovak middleweight parties received €10.8 million and €4.5 million, 
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respectively. Czech super heavyweight parties are, on the other hand, privileged in tems of awarded state 
subsidies: between 2003 and 2013, they received four-and-a-halftimes more than Czech heavyweights and 
almost fourtytimes more than middleweights. In Poland, the ratio between super heavyweights and 
heavyweights is the same as in the Czech case, but the ratio between super heavyweights and 
middleweights is only seven-and-a-half. The Slovak party system did not feature any super heavyweights 
in the observed period, if the emerging borderline case of Smer is not taken into account, and the ratio 
between heayweights and middleweights was only 4.2. Because of the classification of Smer as a 
heavyweight party, this class in Slovakia also received the major share of state subsidies, a much higher 
proportion than the Czech and Polish cases of approximately one third-share. In Poland and in the Czech 
Republic, the lion’s share of all public funding received the sets of the two largest parties in the system, 49 
and 58 per cent, respectively.   
In addition to the Czech, Polish and Slovak full datasets, also the Slovenian partial dataset allows the 
analysis of distribution of state subsidies among political parties in the country, albeit for a shorter period of 
2012 to 2013). Similarly to Slovakia, neither the Slovenian party system features any super heavyweight 
parties; moreover, there is no Slovenian party resembling the Slovak Smer that would be nearing the 
borderzone between super heavy- and heavyweight categories. The two in terms of budget sizes largest 
parties, the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Social Democrats (SD), operated with average annual 
budgets in the two year period of €1.8 and €1.1 million, respectively.  
Table 6.5: Distribution of state subsidies among political parties in Slovenia by weight classes (2012-13) 
  
Total Income 
Total 
Subsidies 
Share in 
Total 
Subsidies 
Share of 
Subsidies 
in 
Income 
Nr of 
Subsidised 
Parties 
Average 
Subsidy   
  
HW 5,894,497.00 4,460,989.00 45.76 75.68 2 2,230,494.50 
MW 7,270,882.00 5,063,611.00 51.94 69.64 7 723,373.00 
LW 226,543.00 217,874.00 2.24 96.17 2 108,937.00 
BW 27,862.00 5,598.00 0.06 20.09 1 5,598.00 
Total 13,419,784.00 9,748,072.00 100.00 72.64 12 812,339.33 
 
Even though the dataset of Slovenian parties is not complete and features only the 20 largest parties 
with largest budgets in the years 2012 and 2013, Table 6.5 shows that also in the post-Yugoslav country, a 
major share of state subsidies is awarded to the two-member heavyweight class. In that period, the share of 
subsidies in heavyweight parties’ budgets amounted to three quarters of their annual income; and the share 
of public funding granted to these parties comprised more than 45 per cent of all public funding channeled 
to the national party system, a number similar to the Polish case. Almost all remaining funds were awarded 
to seven middleweight parties that formed the middle stratum of the Slovenian party system, namely the 
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Slovenian People's Party (SLS), Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS), New Slovenia – 
Christian Democrats (NS-KD), Slovenian National Party (SNS), Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) and 
ZARES – Social Liberals. For the class of middleweight parties, public funding officially amounted to 
approximately 70 per cent of their annual incomes; that number is, however, significantly influenced by the 
presence of the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), which did not receive any state subsidies in the two year 
period and was the only middleweight party without public financial aid; excluding SLS, the average share 
of subsidies rises in the middleweight category to 88 per cent, with individual cases varying from 73 per 
cent (New Slovenia – Christian Democrats) to 99 per cent (Slovenian National Party). In comparison, the 
difference of shares between SDS and SD is only 10 per cent, with the former relying on public funding in its 
budget from 80 per cent, while the latter relied on subsidies from 70 per cent. Both lightweight parties in the 
set, the Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia (TRS) and the Youth Party – European Greens (SMS-
Zeleni), based almost their entire income, more than 96 per cent, on state subsidies; despite this financial 
support, both parties in 2012-13 remained at the periphery of Slovenian party politics and did not achieve 
any significant electoral successes. From the six bantamweight Slovenian parties in the dataset, only one, the 
Greens of Slovenia (ZS), were awarded a public grant, which represented in 2012 and 2013 their entire 
annual incomes. As a share from the total amount of public funding given to Slovenian political parties in 
that period, this grant did not amount to even one percentile of the total sum. The Slovenian case therefore 
confirms the general trends found in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, with the electorally largest 
parties receiving the bulk of all public funding and the smallest parties, if they receive anything, then only a 
very limited financial sum. 
Table 6.6: Average Share of Subsidies in the Budgets of Austrian and German parties 2006/7-12 
Austria   Germany   
Grune 73 B90/Grunen 59 
BZO 64 Linke 51 
FPO 61 FDP 44 
OVP 51 CDU 43 
SPO 42 SPD 41 
Fritz 40 CSU 34 
Martin 32     
 
In the present work, I do not use data on non-parliamentary parties in Austria and Germany and a 
comparison of classes is here ruled out. However, the dataset, specifically its time range, allows for an 
analysis of subsidies’ shares that takes into votes received in parliamentary elections, similar to the analysis 
of Czech, Polish and Slovak parties found in Table 6.4. First, in Table 6.6 are shown Austrian and German 
parties in the dataset and the average share of state subsidies in the periods 2006-12 for Austria and 2007-12 
for Germany. The Austrian dataset is influenced by the variance between the number of financial reports of 
each party included in the dataset: Citizens' Forum Austria (Fritz) is included only in 2008, Hans-Peter 
Martin’s List (Martin) only in 2006-10, the remaining five parties for the entire period 2006-12. The low 
96 
 
shares of subsidies in the budgets of the two parties indicate their relatively recent creation (Citizens' Forum 
was established in 2008, Martin’s List in 2004) and their position outside of the National Council; the parties 
enjoyed some success only in regional, respectively European elections. The remaining political parties in 
the Austrian dataset enjoyed relatively high shares of public funding, starting from 42 per cent of the Social 
Democratic Party of Austria (SPO) to 73 per cent of the Greens (Grune). This falls into the scope of subsidies 
share of large established parliamentary parties as it was in the same period in the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Comparable shares were recorded by German parliamentary parties, ranging from 
34 at CSU to 59 at B90/Grunen, with the arithmetic mean slightly below the Austrian case (45 per cent as 
opposed to 58 per cent, when Fritz and Martin are excluded). There is no apparent ranking along the left-
right dimension of political competition, but the parties are rather arranged from the largest (OVP, SPO and 
CDU/CSU, SPD), that receive the smallest share of subsidies, to the second-level, medium-sized parties 
(FPO, BZO, Grune and FDP, Linke, B90/Grunen). This might indicate a stable anchoring of the largest 
parties of Austria and Germany ‘on the groung’, i.e., among the civil society, and a larger dependence of the 
other parties on their present electoral success. This thesis is supported by the strong long-term position of 
the largest parties. 
Table 6.7: Seats held in lower chamber of national parliaments (AUT, GER, SLO) 
 
Seats Seats Seats
AUT 2006 2008 2013
SPO 68 37.16 57 31.15 52 28.42 177 32.24
OVP 66 36.07 51 27.87 47 25.68 164 29.87
Grune 21 11.48 20 10.93 24 13.11 65 11.84
FPO 21 11.48 34 18.58 40 21.86 95 17.30
BZO 7 3.83 21 11.48 28 5.10
Stronach 11 6.01 11 2.00
NEOS 9 4.92 9 1.64
Martin 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Fritz 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
183 100.00 183 100.00 183 100.00 549 100.00
GER 2005 2009 2013
SPD 222 36.16 194 31.19 193 30.59 609 32.62
CDU 180 29.32 146 23.47 255 40.41 581 31.12
FDP 61 9.93 93 14.95 0 154 8.25
Linke 54 8.79 76 12.22 64 10.14 194 10.39
B90/G 51 8.31 68 10.93 63 9.98 182 9.75
CSU 46 7.49 45 7.23 56 8.87 147 7.87
614 100.00 622 100.00 631 100.00 1867 100.00
SLO 2008 2011 2014
SD 29 32.95 10 11.36 6 6.82 45 17.05
SDS 28 31.82 26 29.55 21 23.86 75 28.41
Zares 9 10.23 0 0 9 3.41
DeSUS 7 7.95 6 6.82 10 11.36 23 8.71
SNS 5 5.68 0 0 5 1.89
LDS 5 5.68 0 0 5 1.89
SLS 5 5.68 6 6.82 0 11 4.17
NS-KD 4 4.55 5 5.68 9 3.41
TRS 0 6 6.82 6 2.27
SMS-Z 0 0 0 0.00
PS 28 31.82 0 28 10.61
DL 8 9.09 0 8 3.03
SMC 36 40.91 36 13.64
ZaAB 4 4.55 4 1.52
88 100.00 88 100.00 88 100.00 264 100.00
Total 
Seats
Seat 
Share
Seat 
Share
Seat 
Share
Average 
Share
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Table 6.7 shows the seat shares of Austrian, German and Slovenian parties in the periods captured in 
their respective datasets used in the present work. The Austrian, German and Slovenian national party 
systems show a format of competition very much alike the format of the Czech and Polish party systems in 
the same period, i.e., in the 2000s: two large parties of a centre-right and a centre-left policy position form 
the two largest camps, atttracting together around two thirds of the total popular vote, while other 
parliamentary parties divide the rest of the electorate and serve as junior coalition government or 
opposition parties. The distribution of state subsidies reflects in Austria, Germany and Slovenia reflects this 
distribution of electoral power, including the weakening of the two previously leading Slovenian parties 
(SD and SDS)  in 2011 for the benefit of the newly established and victorious Positive Slovenia (PS). The rise 
of PS was also the cause of the relatively lower share of state subsidies (45 per cent) to SD and SDS. Also in 
Austria, the seat share of the two largest parties (SPO and OVP) was weakened in the parliamentary 
elections of 2013 to the total of 54 per cent. The opposite direction took the German party system, where the 
SPD and CDU, thanks to the significant electoral success of the latter, increased their common share to 71 
per cent. 
Juxtaposing Table 6.7 with Table 6.4 and Figures 5.1-3 indicates that the Central European region 
experiences in the recent years an erosion of the traditional bi-polar competition of two traditional, or at 
least established centre-right and centre-left parties. New challenger parties have begun to protrude into 
national parliaments in the last two electoral cycles in Austria (Team Stronach, NEOS), Czech Republic 
(Public Affairs, TOP 09, ANO, Dawn of Direct Democracy), Poland (Palikot’s Movement), Slovenia (Positive 
Slovenia, Civic List, Party of Miro Cerar, Alliance of Alenka Bratušek) and in Slovakia (OLANO); in the only 
exception case, where the share of the two largest parties actually rose, in Germany, the rise was due to the 
overwhelming victory of the ruling CDU. However, also here, a new challenger party, the Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) came in 2013 close to the 5 per cent threshold of parliamentary representation. All these 
challenger parties have in common a largely unclear, populist economic and social policies and political 
agendas reacting to the global developments of the previous decade: the prolonged recession, war on 
terrorism and the restructuring of the post-1989 international order. Specifically for Europe, these new 
parties commonly put forward the issues of further European integration, rising unemployment and the 
unsustainable model of social welfare state, heightened religious and ethnic tensions. The analysis of these 
parties’ budgets, carried out in the previous text, indicates that these parties use their often significant 
financial assets, mostly acquired from private donations, to mount intensive election campaigns with 
noticeable electoral succeses. The issue, how these campaigns generally look like and how are they reflected 
in party budgets, is tackled in the following Chapter 7. Before turning to the issue of campaigning, the 
Chapter discusses the general relationships between budgets and electoral performances of political parties 
and their relationships to other, economic and social independent variables. 
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Chapter 7: Strategies 
Part 7.1: Budgets of political parties and electoral performance 
Any statistical analysis of budgets of political parties in the region is difficult due to the nature of the 
data: they are sketchy, with a large variance between individual units and between datasets covering 
individual countries. As the work of Nassmacher’s (2009) and others show, it is indeed almost impossible to 
compare budgets of political parties across more countries by the means of statistics, since a) different 
countries record different data, b) these data are very much influenced by variables unique to each country.  
In the following Part, I turn to the electoral performance of political parties in the three researched 
countries. Specifically, I am interested in answering the three following hypotheses that ought to cover 
different aspects of the question how the budgets of political parties influence the parties’ performance in 
elections: 
H1: The more finances a political party spends in a given year, the more candidates it runs in elections. 
H2: The more finances a political party spends in a given year, the more votes it attracts. 
H3: The more finances a political party spends in a given year, the more seats it wins. 
While the sketchiness of data on party budgets is one problem related to the financial side of the 
hypothetical formula and, in the above hypotheses, related to the independent variable, there exists also a 
significant statistical problem related to the dependent variable, i.e., electoral performance: the occurrence 
of several types of elections in a given country in one year. In the research period between 2003 and 2013, in 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, elections of only one type took place in 10 cases. In all other cases, 
elections of two and more of these types plus local elections happened in one year, which precludes a robust 
statistical analysis in these years for two jointly influential reasons: first, turnouts for different types of 
elections vary significantly, as do the numbers of seats contested in the elections. In the short period that the 
Slovenian dataset covers, 2012 and 2013, no elections took place.  
Second, from the six countries discussed in the present work, only Polish and Slovenian parties 
report their election expenses for each election campaigns separately and that only to a limited degree, often 
with aggregate expense including also items otherwise reported as day-to-day activities. The dataset used 
here is based on annual financial reports, where election expenses from various campaigns staged over one 
year are summed up together – which might even be a better reflection of relality, where election campaigns 
for different types of elections that happen in a common time slot, such as the same weekend, are often 
mutually indistinguishable. 
OLS regression models ran to test the three hypothesised relationships between quantitative 
indicators are therefore based on smaller datasets depicting certain years in individual countries when only 
one type of election happened. The datasets are: 
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 2009 European elections in the Czech Republic with 28 competing parties; 
 2013 parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic with 24 competing parties; 
 2008 and 2012 regional elections in the Czech Republic with 30 and 44 competing parties, 
respectively (Czech data source: Czech Statistical Office 2014); 
 2004 and 2009 European elections in Poland with 13 and 10 competing parties, respectively; 
 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections in Poland with 6 and 7 competing parties, respectively (Polish 
data source: National Electoral Commission of Poland 2014); 
 2012 parliamentary elections in Slovakia with 23 competing parties; 
 2013 regional elections in Slovakia with 17 competing parties, respectively (Slovak data source: 
Statistical Office of Slovakia 2014); 
 2006 and 2008 parliamentary elections in Austria, both including the 6 most successful parties 
(Austrian data source: Nohlen and Stöver 2010: 217); 
 2009 parliamentary elections in Germany, including the 6 most successful parties (German data 
source: Bundeswahlleiter 2014). 
In the Czech Republic, 2009 and 2012 were also the years of elections to one third of the Senate, but 
these elections and their campaigns happen together with the regional elections, which, together with the 
small number of contested seats in the Senate as opposed the contested seats in regional councils (27 vs 675), 
allows their exclusion from consideration; they should not influence results dramatically. 
OLS regression models tested first the relationship between two independent variables, (I1) total 
annual expenditure and (I2) election expenses and three independent varaibles, (D1) total votes, (D2) total 
candidates, and (D3) total seats.They are run in the statistical programme R, the integrated development 
environment RStudio 0.98.932, and the command is:  
olsX<-lm(Dx ~ Ix, data=X) 
The following is a summary of results for the three dependent variables: 
First, the majority of D1 (total votes) models are statistically significant with a positive correlation 
between the amount of both total annual expenditure and election expenses on the one side and the number 
of votes accumulated. The only exception are first, the model of 2013 Slovak regional elections, which 
includes election expenses as the independent variable (out of the 17 competing parties, only 3 reported any 
election expenses), and second, the model of 2004 and 2009 Polish European elections, also including 
election expenses.  Otherwise, P-values are always below 0.01.  The R-squared ranges from 0.40 for Polish 
European elections (total expenses), through 0.52 for Czech regional elections 2008 and 2012 (election 
expenses), 0.62 for 2013 Czech parliamentary elections (total expenditure), 0.69 for 2012 Slovak 
parliamentary elections (election expenses), to values over 90 (Slovak regional elections – total expenditure, 
Czech European elections – total expenditure, Austrian and German elections – total expenditure). 
Generally speaking, total expenditure is always a better predictor of the number of votes than election 
expenditure, which confirms the unreliability of this item in annual reports. In terms of ranking of 
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individual countries, better are being predicted Austrian and German elections, where only successful (i.e., 
parliamentary) parties are included in the dataset, over Czech elections over Slovak, and finally, over Polish 
elections.  
Second, D2 (total candidates) models are run only on Czech datasets, since full data on candidates in 
other elections were not available. Also they all result in statistitically significant positive correlations 
between total annual expenditure and election expenses on the one side and the number of candidates 
competing. The R-squared of these models is, however, low, especially for European elections in 2004 and 
2009 (0.01); for parliamentary and regional elections, the value is around 0.3 for both election expenses and 
total expenditure. 
Last, the same positive correlation also applies to D3, total seats won as the dependent variable of 
total annual expendire and election expenses. However, since the amount of units on winning actually any 
seats is very low, the explanatory power of the models is low and p-values are on average higher than in the 
previous cases. Lowest p-values and largest adjusted R-squared (over 0.9) have quite predictably Czech and 
Slovak regional election, since the number of seats distributed in these elections is largest. However, also the 
models Austrian and German parliamentary elections, where only the successful parties are included in the 
dataset, feature p-values of <0.0001 and 0.01 and adjusted R-squared of 0.93 and 0.79, respectively. Austrian 
and German datasets have in this statistical analysis the best predictive power. 
The datasets thus shows that the amount of money spent on election has a significant positive effect 
on the number of votes. However, this conclusion should not be generalised on other datasets, which might 
be construed as time-series or focus on other sets of parties. This particular piece of data includes a 
relatively large set of all small, medium and large parties competing in one election, where both the 
variance in total votes and the variance in budget sizes are huge. If another analysis focused, for instance, on 
parliamentary parties competing in a series of parliamentary elections, the results, including the general 
direction of the relationship might be different. To acquire data usable in such an analysis is, unfortunately, 
for the above described problems, impossible. 
While only a very specific conclusion may be drawn from the result, it is interesting to note that 
some of the datasets also included the challenger parties discussed in the previous Chapter: ANO in the 
2013 Czech parliamentary elections, TOP 09 in the 2012 Czech regional elections, the Palikot’s Movement 
(RP) in the 2011 Polish parliamentary elections, OLANO in the 2012 Slovak parliamentary elections, and 
NOVA in the 2013 Slovak regional parties. All these parties, despite minimal or nonexisting previous 
electoral experience, managed to succeed in the researched elections, pouring into campaigning large sums 
of money, quite comparable to those of established, parliamentary parties; without this money, any electoral 
success would be, most probably, ruled out. Further empirical evidence for this argument may be found 
when the regression formula is used on data with parliamentary parties are exlcluded, to control for the bias 
resulting from a party’s previous presence in the parliament and state subsidies. If such a model is run on 
the above described datasets of the 2013 Czech parliamentary elections and the 2012 Slovak parliamentary 
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elections, they both show statistically significant results with improved R-squared (0.87 an 0.90, 
respectively). 
Part 7.2: Budgets of political parties and dependent variables 
The electoral perfomance of political parties is not the only variable, or a set of variables, testable by 
the present dataset. As is stated in the thirty arguments in Chapter 2, party budgets are supposed to 
influence a wide variety of variables related to political (party membership, average life of parties, 
factionalisation, party ideological profile) and social (public trust, level of corruption, ethnic issues) 
phenomena. Those of these variables that have readily available indicators based on arguments in the 
existing literature are put in this Part under analysis. 
First, there is the hypothesis that public funding prolongs the average lifetime of parties. As the 
dependent variable put against the independent variable of the aggregate sum of state subsidies awarded 
during the research period to one party, I put the number of annual reports the party during that time 
submitted. Regression analysis of the entire dataset, in which all Czech, Polish and Slovak political parties 
are included, shows a statististically significant result confirming this hypothesis, but with a very low 
predictive power and the adjusted R-squared of 0.1 It is true that if the whole dataset is considered, many 
parties actually survive the entire eleven-year period without receiving any subsidies. However, many of 
these parties do not effectively contest the parliamentary level of the political competition, being of any 
significance only at the local or regional level. On the other hand, some of the parties that had been 
previously successful in the elections and in securing large sums of state subsidies did not prevent their fall 
out of off the voters’ favour at one point of time and their gradual or rapid retreat from the positions of 
power: in the Czech Republic, the Union of Freedom – Democratic Union, in Poland, the Self-Defence of the 
Republic of Poland, in Slovakia, the People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. State subsidies 
thus help in prolonging the party life, but do not make a party resistant to failure. 
Second, it is argued that wider availability of public funding discourages parties from establishing 
grass-root links to the society via large party membership. Data on party membership in political parties in 
Europe are even today hard to gather, but some have been used in previous studies, on which I draw 
(Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012). The dataset includes 40 units: five parties from Austria from the year 
2008, five parties from the Czech Republic from the year 2008, six parties from Germany from 2007, nine 
parties from Poland from 2003 and nine from 2009 and six from Slovakia from 2007. Only data for Poland 
therefore allow the comparison of two time points, which confirms the common observation that party 
membership in European countries is declining. However, there does not seem to be any significant 
statistical relationship between the share of subsidies in these parties incomes and the number of their party 
members – in fact, several regression models even suggest that the large a share of public funding in the 
budget, the more members the attracts. Regression analysis does not, in the end, result in neither tentative 
nor firm conclusion about the dataset or the relationship of the variables in general. The present work and 
the data is uses cannot provide any hard evidence for or against the argument that the introduction of 
public funding to political parties closes prevents the parties from establishing links to civil society. 
102 
 
Third, it also is argued that the structure and amount of assets in party budgets varies according to 
ideological party families. In the dataset are included all parties that were in the researched period present 
for at least year in the Czech, Polish or Slovak national parliament – in total, 30 political parties. These 
parties are divided into three categories to either rightwing, centre, or leftwing, based on data from the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 2014) and the Parties & 
Elections in Europe database (Nordsieck 2014). This three-point scale is in the formula used as the 
independent variable, while the dependent variable is the ratio of donations and loans to membership fees 
(RDM). Regression analysis does not show a statistically significant result of the formula, but it should be 
noted that the average RDM of rightwing parties (ANO 2011, US-DEU, ODA, ODS, LIDEM, STAN, VV, 
TOP 09, PiS PO, SRP, SDKU, SNS, LPR, OLANO) is 73.4, while the RDM of centre parties (KDU-ČSL, SZ, 
KDH, PSL, RP/TR, ANO, MOST, SAS, SMK) is 13.5 and the RDM of leftwing parties (ČSSD, KSČM, NS-
LEV21, SLD, LS-HZDS, SMER) is  5.15. These numbers suggest that different party families, at least if 
classified on the rightleft unidimensional scale, acquire private assets via different means – the more 
leftwing families from large fee-paying membership, the more rightwing families from private donations 
and loans. 
Fourth, another argument states that spending limits lower voter turnout. Since there were no 
spending limits effectively enforced in none of the countries researched, it is impossible to focus on this 
variable. Instead, I look at the amount of total expenditure and election expenses in the researched countries 
as the independent variable, while total voter turnout is the dependent variable. Austrian and German 
datasets are too small to make any conclusions from them, but regression models run on Czech, Polish and 
Slovak datasets show that there is a positive correlation between parties’ expenditure and the per cents of 
voters turning up for elections. The statistical significance of these models ranges from the p-value of 0.11 
(Czech dataset), through 0.015 (Polish dataset) to 0.007 (Slovak dataset) and the adjusted R-squared from 0.3 
(Czech), through 0.67 (Polish) to 0.76 (Slovak). The entire dataset together has the p-value of 0.004 and 
adjusted R-squared of 0.32. These models are biased due to the differences between voter turnouts for 
European, regional and parliamentary elections and the parallel differences between the amounts of 
expenditure parties spend on campaigning for these three different types of elections. However, even when 
this difference is controlled by the inclusion of a variable distinguishing the three types of elections, the 
direction of the slope remains the same, most so for parliamentary elections over regional and European 
elections. The results suggest that if spending limits had been applied in the three researched countries, 
voter turnout might have indeed been lower; that conclusion is, nevertheless, only tentative as this problem 
obviously stands on a more complex formula that the three variables included in the regression models. 
Fifth, the structure of parties’ budgets is supposed to influence two features of intra-party structure: 
the level of its factionalisation and its organisational hierarchy and decision-making processes. Specifically, 
state subsidies ought to strengthen the unity of political parties and reduce the threat of party disintegration 
as well as strengthen the subsidies’ direct beneficiaries inside the party and change the party internal power 
structure. Party factionalisation has been measured in the scholarly literature via several methods, each one 
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related to one the three most commonly used concepts of this research sub-field: party discipline, party 
unity, and party cohesion (Ozbundun 1970). For the three countries primarily researched in the present 
work, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, the Rice’s Index of Cohesion is the most used commonly 
used indicator of factionalisation (despite its shortcomings, see, e.g., Depauw and Martin 2009: 104) and its 
data may be taken from previous works (Rakusanova and Linek 2005; Borz 2009; Tavits 2013). However, its 
application as the dependent variable with the independent variable of the amount of state subsidies does 
not yield statististically significant results in a regression analysis model. Moreover, from the 30 political 
parties which were in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia at some point of the researched period 
present in their respective national parliaments, 13 splintered and in 6 cases their members established new 
independent parliamentary parties (TOP 09, NS-LEV 21, LIDEM, Ruch Palikota, Most – Híd , OLANO). In 
almost half of the researche d cases then, state subsidies did not prevent the emergence of strong factions 
inside parliamentary. 
The party internal power structure is another problematic variable for study in Central Europe. In 
none of the six countries researched, political parties report financial activities of their regional or local 
branches. The research of internal dealings of parties in Europe might be considered an area even less 
developed than the research of party funding – political parties are primarily private organisations and they 
are not compelled by any legal instrument to disclose the reality inside their group. As civic organisations, 
they are obliged to follow their statutes, which are registered with authorities and open to public inspection, 
but these represent only a small part of the set of both formal and informal rules party members must 
follow in their action. Informal rules are often more. Based on these statutes and on expert opinions, the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014) ranks political parties in OECD countries according to the inclusivity of their 
internal decision-making processes. Germany and Poland score the highest from the group, 7, Czech 
Republic 6, Austria 5, Slovenia 3 and Slovakia 4. There is no apparent correlation between this ranking and 
the amount or the structure of state subsidies. The fact is that there is also no difference between the six 
countries indistribution of subsidies included in the present dataset – they are all send directly to the party 
central office. Some new findings might be potentially found if these sums of subsidies were compared first, 
with the MPs’ salaries and the subsidies awarded to parliamentary clubs and clubs in regional or local 
councils, and second, with subsidies that are in some countries awarded by sub-national authorities (mostly 
Austria and Slovenia, less common in the other four countries). However, such data were not gathered for 
the present work and no firm answer about the potential influence of public funding on the structure of 
internal hierarchy in political parties can therefore be given. 
The sixth argument states that public funding limitations, in particular the threshold of eligibility, 
closes and petrifies the party system. The rankings of closure here is taken from Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 
(2014); since for Austria and Germany, this ranking was computed from the entire 1949 to 2013 period, 
which does not correspond to the ranking period of the other four countries (1990 to 2013),  the two 
countries are excluded from the analysis. The remaining four countries have their scores of closure very 
similar, ranging from 81.7 for Poland to 88 for Slovenia. Figure 7.1 shows that in these four cases, there is no 
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apparent correlation either between the closure score and the threshold for public, or for the closure score 
and the distribution of subsidies among weightclasses. Indeed, the most closed party system, Slovenia, 
features today the lowest eligibility threshold of public funding for the permanent contribution and the 
second lowest for contribution for votes. The most open party system, Poland, has the highest threshold for 
both the permanent contribution as well as for the contribution for votes from the four countries. If there 
exists a causal link between these variables, they are not reflected in this data.  
Figure 7.1: Party system closure, corruption levels and trust in political parties 
 
Figure 7.1 also shows the Corruption Perception Index from 2013 for the four countries. Poland and 
Slovenia score significantly higher than the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Yet, the first two countries feature 
both quite different closure score (81.7 and 88) as well as thresholds of public funding for political parties 
and the distribution of subsidies among weight classes. Similarly to the closure ranking, neither the 
corruption ranking seems at the first sight to be influenced by the model of party funding. 
The last three collumns in Figure 7.1 show per cents of public trust in political parties in three time 
points: Autumns 2004, 2007 and 2013, which captures the start, the middle and the end of the researched 
dataset. Data were taken from Eurobarometer (2014). The European average at the same time points was 14, 
18 and 17, as political parties in the majority of European countries are among the least trusted institutions 
of the public life. This data indicates that in the post-communist East Central Europe, the trust is even lower; 
lowest in today’s Slovenia, where the recent turmoils and a series of corruption scandals at the highest 
levels of party politics resulted in virtually no trust (6 per cent) in political parties among the population. At 
the same time, Slovenia ranks higher on the CPI than other countries in the analysis, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, where the trust in parties is relatively higher. Again, there seems to be no correlation between this 
data and the eligibility thresholds for public funding for political parties. In fact, the lowest trust is today in 
the two countries with the lowest thresholds, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. However, a firm conclusion 
about the relationship of these two variables cannot be reached from such a small number of cases. 
The last arguments from previous literature discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 is that public funding 
may help to get involved in party politics groups who are in traditional societies materially disadvantaged, 
such as women, workers or non- ethnic and religious minorities. This is another complex problem that 
cannot be satisfactorily dissected only with the data available in the existing literature and with those 
gathered for the present work. No gender-based parties appeared in none of the researched countries’ 
parliaments during the observed period. Ethnic minorities have by law representatives in the parliaments of 
CPI
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Poland (German minority) and Slovenia (Hungarian and Italian minority). The only two ethnic parties that 
crossed the standard threshold of parliamentary representation were the Party of the Hungarian 
Community (SMK-MKP) and the younger Bridge (MOST) in Slovakia, both parties focusing on the 
cooperation of the Hungarian minority the Slovak majority. The first party received only 4.33 per cent of the 
vote share in the 2010 Slovak parliamentary election, followed by 4.28 in the 2012, which allowed it to 
receive both contributions for votes as well as permanent contribution. Even today, the party’s budget is 
from more than 90 per cent based on state subsidies and public funding keeps the party further in play for 
seat in representative bodies; in the 2014 European election, it won one seat in the European Parliament. As 
regards the last disadvantaged group, the workers, social democratic parties were successfully integrated 
into the party systems in all six researched countries. Since the research period covers only the era of large 
catch-all, cartelized political parties, the budget size and budget structure of social democratic parties does 
not substantially differ from the budget size and budget structure of largest rightwing parties. Whether 
public funding played to some degree a significant role in brinding social democrats to the parliamentary 
area is a question that must be answered in a research project focusing on the earlier, 20th century European 
politics. The present work at this point turns away from an analysis of dependent variables found in the 
existing literature and focuses on the variables related to the strategy drive. 
Part 7.3: Budgeting for elections campaigns 
In the last part of this work, a second original dataset is brought in. It is the product of an email 
questionnaire sent to 470 political parties from Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia in December 2013. The full wording of all four language versions sent out may be found in the 
Appendix. The questions included in the questionnaire asked about the surveyed parties’ opinion on the 
current state of party regulation in their respective countries (4 questions), party policy towards potential 
reform of party regulations (4 questions), and parties’ conduct of election campaigns (6 questions). Answers 
to these questions were transformed into 47 variables.  
The questionnaire was followed by two email reminders in February and April 2014 with the goal to 
increase as much as possible the response rate. In the end, the questionnaire was fully or partially 
completed by 117 parties: 11 from Austria, 45 from the Czech Republic, 21 from Germany, 11 from Poland, 
11 from Slovenia and 18 from Slovakia. The response rate from individual countries was 23.5 per cent cent 
of contacted parties from Austria responded, 31 per the Czech Republic, 30 per cent from Germany, 14 per 
cent from Poland, 25 per cent from Slovakia, and 19 per cent from Slovenia. The aggregate response rate 
was slightly under 25 per cent. If the dataset is divided into weight classes, 7 super-heavyweight parties 
responded, 15 heavyweight parties, 23 middleweight parties, 33 lightweight parties and 39 bantamweight 
parties.  
As can be viewed in Appendix A, the questionnaire includes questions about first, parties’ opinions 
on national regulations of political parties and the national system of party funding, and second, parties’ 
campaigning strategies, tools of their election campaigns, campaign personnel statistical data and about 
their campaign budgets’ structure. Respondents could choose to answer or not to answer any question in 
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the set and many chose to focus more on the first part of the questionnaire than on the second. Nevertheless, 
valuable information was gathered from both parts. 
The first question allowed the respondents of the questionnaire to choose the level of anonymity of 
the answers: they could either allow the publication of the recorded answers namely, as referring directly to 
their party, or the publication of the data in an anonymised form, only as a statistical variable referring to 
one of the party weight classes used in the present work. Out of the 117 political parties, only 16 of them 
chose the first option (13 per cent of the dataset): 4 parties from Austria, 7 from the Czech Republic, 2 from 
Poland, 3 from Slovenia. From these numbers, it might appear that political parties in the researched group 
of countries do not yet fully believe in the need for transparency of internal financial dealings of political 
parties beyond the scope of the law; however, if the parties that responded toe the questionnaire are 
summed up based on the share of votes cast at at the latest parliamentary election in each country, the 
response rate should actually represent a relatively high share of the electorate: the parties that responded 
from Austria represent 51 per cent of the vote share, from the Czech Republic 53 per cent, from Germany 63 
per cent, from Poland 87 per cent, from Slovenia 45 per cent and from Slovakia 75 per cent of the vote share. 
Moreover, the information taken from the dataset suggests that the majority of parties would 
welcome a more regulated framework for the financing of political parties in their countries. In total, 60 
parties, i.e., a 52 per cent share of the dataset responded that party funding in their country is too liberal and 
should be more regulated. Table 7.1 shows the distribution by individual countries: the least in favour of a 
potential reform of the party funding system towards more regulation seem to be German political parties, 
followed by Czech parties. This is an interesting piece of information, since the current Czech regulatory 
framework is the target of many a criticism from both national NGOs and the civil society as well as from 
international organisations. The data are influenced by the self-selection of willing respondents to the 
questionnaire and the actual share of Czech parties optioning for the preservation of status quo in party 
funding regulations (49 per cent) is much closer to the Austrian (56 per cent, i.e., 5 parties) and Slovenian (55 
per cent, i.e., 6 parties) number than to the German number (33 per cent). Most pro-reform are in the dataset 
Slovak (67 per cent) and Polish (73 per cent) political parties.  
Table 7.1: Opinion of parties on the current national regulation of political parties (Question 2) 
  1 3 4 5 6 8 9 Total 1 3 4 5 6 8 9 
AT 
 
5 
 
2 1 
 
1 9 0.0 55.6 0.0 22.2 11.1 0.0 11.1 
CZE 5 22 1 5 10 2 
 
45 11.1 48.9 2.2 11.1 22.2 4.4 0.0 
GER 4 7 
 
6 3 
 
1 21 19.0 33.3 0.0 28.6 14.3 0.0 4.8 
POL 
 
8 1 1 1 
  
11 0.0 72.7 9.1 9.1 9.1 0.0 0.0 
SLO 
 
6 1 
 
4 
  
11 0.0 54.5 9.1 0.0 36.4 0.0 0.0 
SVK 
 
12 
 
2 3 
 
1 18 0.0 66.7 0.0 11.1 16.7 0.0 5.6 
  9 60 3 16 22 2 3 115 7.8 52.2 2.6 13.9 19.1 1.7 2.6 
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A fifth of all parties included in the analysis believe that their national system of funding is 
regulated enough and should remain so, most so Slovenian parties (36 per cent, i.e., 4 parties) and Czech 
parties (22 per cent). This is understandable in the Slovenian case, where the recent legal reform brought to 
existence a very detailed regulatory system, but less understandable again in the Czech case. The Czech 
parties in the dataset appear to be the national group most favouring liberal approach towards party 
funding regulations, which is also supported by the number of parties that believe the regulations are 
liberal and should remain so (5 parties, i.e., 11 per cent). The majority of parties in the dataset has an official 
or unofficial policy on the issue of party funding and party regulations in their country (90 parties, i.e., 77 
per cent), a slightly smaller majority also discusses the issue of a potential reform (80 parties, i.e., 68 per 
cent). 
Parties were also asked to write down up to five most useful legal tools that might make a system of 
party regulations more transparent and/or enhancing democracy. The most often mentioned tools were 
transparent bank accounts (58 cases), identifiable party donors (52), limits on election expenses (46), 
independent supervisory organ (38), guaranteed space for campaigning on national TV, in the press and on 
space allocated to outdoor poster campaign (30), identifiable purchasers of political advertisements (21), 
regularly updated financial operations of political parties directly on their website (10), ban on company 
donors (6), ban on political advertisments on TV (6), ban on political advertisments from non-political 
subjects as recognized by the law (4), regulation of political foundation (3), tax assignment for political 
parties (3), and limits on donations by single individuals (3). Among single recommendations in the dataset 
was a fairer electoral formula, a ban on discounts for political advertisments, reimbursement for the real 
amount of expenses for election campaign, or the publication of all contracts concluded by political parties. 
Table 7.2 shows parties’ opinion on the eligibility and amount of state subsidies distributed to 
parties in their respective countries (Question 6). In most countries, political parties believe that the 
eligibility criteria for state subsidies should remain the same, most so in Germany (57 per cent) and in 
Slovenia (54 per cent), least so in Poland (36 per cent) and in the Czech Republic (39 per cent). The second 
largest share is of the parties that would like to see the scope of eligibility for state subsidies wider, most so 
in Poland (46 per cent), the Czech Republic (39 per cent) and in Slovenia (36 per cent). In Slovakia, more 
parties, five pro to four against, would actually like to see the eligibility criteria narrower, in Austria, the 
two sides draw (two parties against two parties). 
Table 7.2: Opinon of parties on the legitimacy of state subsidies (Question 6) 
  1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 
AT 4 2 2 8 50.0 25.0 25.0 
CZE 17 17 9 43 39.5 39.5 20.9 
GER 12 6 3 21 57.1 28.6 14.3 
POL 4 5 2 11 36.4 45.5 18.2 
SLO 6 4 1 11 54.5 36.4 9.1 
SVK 9 4 5 18 50.0 22.2 27.8 
  52 38 22 112 33.9 19.6 46.4 
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Table 7.3 shows shows parties’ opinion on the eligibility and amount of state subsidies when 
compared with the average share of subsidies found in the budgets of the parties that responded to each of 
the given option in Question 6. The data on share of subsidies in budgets represent the year 2012 for 
Austria, Germany and 2013 for the remaining countries. On average, parties with a higher share of state 
subsidies in their budgets (56 per cent) believe that the eligibility criteria should remain the same. Parties 
with a lower share of subsidies in their annual budgets answered, that either less or more parties should be 
eligible for public funding. The last option, i.e., that fewer parties should be eligible for state subsidies 
should be eligible for state subsidies, was often selected by free market, libertarian parties, which do not a 
substantial support among the voters in the researched countries. 
Table 7.3: Opinon of parties on 1) whether the regulations are strict enough or should be changed 
(Question 2), 2) whether the scope of eligibility for state subsidies should be the same / larger / narrower 
(Question 6), 3) how large a share of subsidies in parties’ revenues is legitimate (Question 7), 4) how 
large a share of small donations in parties’ revenues promotes transparency and democracy (Question 8) 
Question 2 1+6 2+3+4+5 8+9     
Average 
subsidies share 
42 38 22 
 
  
Question 6 1 2 3 
 
  
Average 
subsidies share 
56 23 19 
 
  
Question 7 1 2 3 4 5 
Average 
subsidies share 
61 50 41 40 18 
Question 8 1 2 3 4 5 
Average 
subsidies share 
15 36 36 57 59 
 
Table 7.3 also shows the average share of subsidies in the budgets of parties that responded to the 
five choices offered in Questions 7 (democratically legitimate share of subsidies in parties’ budgets) and 8 
(democratically legitimate share of small donations in parties’ budgets). In both questions, the aggregate 
responses confirm the expectation that parties that rely on subsidies the most consider them more legitimate 
than parties that do not rely on subsidies to such a degree. Heavily subsidised parties also do not emphasise 
the role of small donations in parties’ budgets for the promotion of democratic legitimacy. The hypothesis 
that the structure of incomes in a party’s budget varies according to the party’s policy position on the 
existing regulations on political parties therefore seems to be empirically supported; even though the 
question on the causal direction of this relationship is left to be answered. 
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Table 7.4: Questions 6 to 8 divided by weightclasses 
Question 6 1 2 3     
Average Class 3.17 4.15 4.08 
 
  
Question 7 1 2 3 4 5 
Average Class 1 3.42 3.44 3.85 4.27 
Question 8 1 2 3 4 5 
Average Class 4.29 3.77 3.61 3.5 3 
 
In Table 7.4, classification of parties according to their weightclass is brought in to show that parties 
are divided on the question of legitimacy of public funding also when they are divided by the budget size 
scale. Weightclasses are coded on the range from 1 (super heavyweight) to 5 (bantamweight). Parties that 
believe that the current scope of eligibility for public funding ought to remain the same are on average 
middleweight (3.17), while those that belive that more parties should be eligible for subsidies are 
lightweight (4.15), same as parties that believe fewer parties should be awarded subsidies (4.08). The largest 
share of subsdies in parties’ budgets is seen as most legitimate by the budgetary largest (or heaviest) parties 
and the smaller the party is, the smaller share of subsidies is seen as legitimate (Table 7.4). The opposite is 
true about the legitimate share of small donations in parties’ budgets – the smaller a party is, the larger 
share of small donations in parties’ budgets it considers legitimate. 
No clear answer gives the statistics of Question 9, asking whether caps on campaign expenditures 
are beneficial for the transparency and/or democratic legitimacy of elections. Parties in the dataset are split 
on the issue 36 against-caps and 72 pro-caps and the 1:2 ratio is approximately the same in all the six 
researched countries (Table 7.5). Parties in countries with limits on election expenditures, i.e., Poland and 
Slovenia, seem to favour caps more than parties in countries with no limits, but the number of countries in 
the set is too small to make a firm conclusion. In Slovakia, the country where caps were introduced in the 
summer of 2014, the against/pro ratio is actually a little below average. There is no significant difference in 
the against/pro camps in terms of average share of state subsidies (37.23 versus 37.29) or in the average 
weight class (3.5 versus 3.78) either. The distinction between these two groups might lie in their ideological 
differences, with the leftwing parties more favouring the pro-caps camp. However, given the unclear 
ideological position of the many small parties in the dataset, I do not carry out this correlational analysis as 
it would be more a guesswork than a scientific inquiry. 
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Table 7.4: Question 9 divided by parties (against / pro) and share of parties 
AT 5 6 45.5 54.5 
CZE 14 26 35.0 65.0 
GER 5 14 26.3 73.7 
POL 3 8 27.3 72.7 
SLO 3 8 27.3 72.7 
SVK 6 10 37.5 62.5 
  36 72 33.3 66.7 
 
The remaining paragraphs of this Part are devoted to the analysis of data found in Questions 10 to 
16 of the Questionnaire, which concern the strategies and tools political parties use in their election 
campaigns. The number of parties that were willing to answer to the set of questions on campaign tools and 
strategies was lower than for the set of questions on policies towards and opinions about party funding and 
party regulations, but the questionnaire even here yielded some interesting results.  
First, Question 10 asks after the length of parties’ elections campaigns for different types of elections 
(European Parliament, Upper Chamber, Lower Chamber, Regional Councils, Local Councils) and the 
statistical results may be seen in Table 7.6. The longest campaigns are on average staged for lower chambers 
of national parliaments (78 days), followed by regional elections (66 days), European elections (56 days), 
elections for the Czech Senate (55 days), as it is the only country with this type of separate elections, and 
local elections (51 days). It is interesting to note that none of the 10 Slovenian parties reported campaigning 
for a period longer than the officially permitted 30 days and some chose to report periods even shorter; on 
the other hand, parties from countries where some campaigns also have official time limits, such as the 
European elections in the Czech Republic (16 days) or Slovakia (21 days), chose to include also unofficial 
campaign days and effectively disregard the limits set by the law. It is probably for that reason, why in 
Table 7.6, the Slovenian case strongly deviates from the rest. With this exception, the average length of an 
election campaign in the researched countries is slightly above two months. Respondents in different 
countries may also differently understand the meaning of the term ‘campaign day’, which might have led to 
confusion and a bias in the answers.  
Table 7.6: Average days of campaigning by types of elections, countries and weightclasses 
EP 56 AT 62 SW 71 
Senate 55 CZ 60 HW 75 
Parl 78 GER 72 MW 60 
Regs 66 POL 61 LW 64 
Locs 51 SLO 28 BW 54 
    SVK 73     
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Correlational analysis in RStudio between the data from Question 10 and the weightclasses does not 
yield strong statistically significant results due to a relatively large number of missings (from 20 to 73 from 
117); however, even if the two-tailed tests are negative with values ranging from 0.056 (regional councils) to 
0.126 (local councils), the Pearson correlation itself is always negative and ranges from -0.156 (local councils) 
to -0.279 (Czech Senate). There is some empirical support for the statement that the smaller a party is, the 
shorter an election campaign it stages. Table 7.6 shows that in the dataset, such a statement cannot be taken 
absolutely as the there are dips in the number of campaign days in the superheavy weight class and the 
middleweight class. These results, due to the lower number of parties choosing to answer this question, 
should be taken with much caution. 
Table 7.7: Average number of campaign managers by types of elections, countries and weightclasses 
EP  2.7 AT 19 SW 8 9.8   
Regs 8.2 CZ 1.5 HW 6 9.1   
Parl 3.8 GER 2.5 MW 2.3 3.8   
  
 
POL 4.4 LW 3.5 4.6   
  
 
SLO 4 BW 1.5 3.7   
    SVK 1.6 only national with regionals 
 
Second, Question 11 asks after the number of election campaign managers in European, national, 
regional and local elections. The data need to be again considered cautiously, as the question might have 
been understood differently by different respondents. When the numbers are divided by countries, the 
numbers of election campaign managers in national elections strongly vary from 19 in Austria to 1.5 in the 
Czech Republic and in Slovakia (Table 7.7). This might suggest two things: either the question was 
understood differently by respondents in different countries, or there indeed exists a difference of 
approaches towards campaign management in the researched countries. While in Austria and and also in 
Poland and in Slovenia may be campaign management more of a team effort, with entire committees 
steering election campaigns in Austria (or a highly decentralised model), in the Czech, German and Slovak 
case, campaigning is ultimately the responsibility of one or two persons. Larger parties in the dataset also 
tend to have more national (and regional) managers than smaller parties, but there is again a dip on the 
level of middleweight parties. During regional elections, parties divide the campaigning workload among 
more regional campaign managers and streamline the management process in European and national 
elections, when a small team of 3 to 4 managers is usually commonly established. The question also 
included the variable ‘local managers’, but it proved to be of no value for the analysis as some of the parties 
reported having local managers for basically every larger commune in the country (up to hundreds), which 
inflated the variable’s variance to an inoperable level. 
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Table 7.8: Is the person participating in the campaign planning team? (share of the group in the dataset) 
  Chairman ExComm 
Gen 
Sec 
NonExComm 
PR 
profs 
Local 
mems 
Volunteers Candidates 
SW 71.4 100.0 85.7 42.9 57.1 28.6 28.6 28.6 
HW 66.7 100.0 73.3 60.0 33.3 46.7 46.7 66.7 
MW 69.6 91.3 52.2 47.8 47.8 65.2 73.9 65.2 
LW 78.8 93.9 51.5 39.4 24.2 72.7 75.8 69.7 
BW 87.2 89.7 33.3 23.1 15.4 61.5 71.8 66.7 
AT 81.8 90.9 63.6 45.5 36.4 45.5 72.7 63.6 
CZ 82.2 91.1 53.3 35.6 26.7 57.8 75.6 57.8 
GER 76.2 90.5 52.4 33.3 28.6 57.1 57.1 71.4 
POL 81.8 100.0 45.5 36.4 18.2 45.5 45.5 54.5 
SLO 63.6 100.0 36.4 45.5 36.4 72.7 63.6 72.7 
SVK 72.2 100.0 44.4 44.4 33.3 61.1 77.8 66.7 
 
Third, in Question 12, parties were selecting from a closed list of options the people who regularly 
contribute to the planning of their election campaigns (Table 7.8). Some findings are not surprising: in 
parties of larger budgets, it is more probable that they will include in the planning paid public-relations 
professionals. On the other hand, the difference between the super heavyweight parties in the dataset, that 
hire such professionals for the planning stage in 57 per cent of the cases and the bantamweight parties, that 
hire these professionals in 15 per cent of the cases, is not as large as might be expected. Moreover, only a 
third of the heavyweight parties include PR professionals in the planning, while almost a half of the 
middleweight parties do so. Clearly, the size of the budget is not the only influential variable when parties 
decide on this issue. The number of volunteers involved in the planning also decreases with the increase of 
the budget size, same as does the number of actual candidates in the planning team and local party 
members. Also here, the difference in the spectrum from the heavyweight to the bantamweight class is 
lower than it might be expected. Lower in smaller parties is the occurrence of a general secretary in the 
planning team, since many small parties most probably do not have this administrative position served by a 
person separate from the chairman or other Executive Committee member. Table 7.8 shows in addition the 
answers from the dataset divided by countries. Similarly to the previous question, given the self-selection of 
respondents and the relatively small number of responses, these numbers are not quite reliable. The 
individual countries do not differ to a large extent, but the Table indicates two interesting deviations: first, 
Polish parties appear to use the services of PR professionals much less than parties in Austria, Slovakia or 
Slovenia. Second, Slovenian parties tend to involve local party members in campaign planning more than 
parties in other countries. It seems that in the smallest country in the dataset, local party cells are more 
important than in other countries. 
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Table 7.9: The share of annual expenditure devoted to a type of election by weight class and country 
  EP Parl Regs Locs 
SW 0.27 0.8 0.33 0.28 
HW 0.47 0.8 0.6 0.38 
MW 0.43 0.81 0.6 0.45 
LW 0.39 0.66 0.64 0.43 
BW 0.47 0.75 0.68 0.48 
AT 0.54 0.83 0.62 0.56 
CZ 0.39 0.66 0.68 0.49 
GER 0.52 0.75 0.69 0.47 
POL 0.39 0.8 0.49 0.36 
SLO 0.56 0.86 X 0.42 
SVK 0.31 0.78 0.55 0.3 
 
Fourth, Question 13 asks about the amount of expenses allocated from parties’ annual budgets to 
campaigns for different levels of elections. In total 89 parties answered the Question at least partially, either 
reporting the share of annual budget allocated to the election expenditure, or in hard numbers. The latter 
were subsequently recalculated by me also to the annual budget share. Similarly to Question 10, 
correlational analysis between the answers and the weightclasses does not lead to many strong statistically 
significant results due to a relatively large number of missings; however, it shows some positive correlation 
(two-tailed test value 0.012) between the party group number and the share of annual budget allocated to 
regional allocation (0.285). With two-tailed test value 0.125, there is possible correlation between the party 
group number and the share allocated to local elections too (0.175). The smaller a party is, the larger a share 
of its annual budget apparently allocates to these two types of elections. Table 7.9 again shows the 
classification into weight classes and countries. Elections to national parliaments seem to be distinct from 
other types as also super heavyweight parties put into campaigning for these elections four fifths of their 
annual budgets. For other types of elections, there is a dip in the share of election expenditure to total 
expenditure in the heavyweight class and this share is largely similar to the smaller classes. This confirms 
the data from annual financial reports analysed in Chapter 6. Classification into national data sub-sets needs 
to be again taken with a caveat, but it does not any significant deviations anyway. Only the share of 
subsidies devoted to European elections seem to be smaller in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia 
than in Austria, Germany and Slovenia, which mirrors the turnout for the last European elections in these 
countries. 
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Table 7.10: The share of election campaign expenditure devoted to a tool by weight class and country 
  Contact Outdoor Print Internet Other 
SW 0.34 0.38 0.12 0.06 0.45 
HW 0.25 0.3 0.21 0.15 0.36 
MW 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.13 0.24 
LW 0.29 0.34 0.24 0.13 0.27 
BW 0.3 0.36 0.32 0.11 0.18 
AT 0.17 0.3 0.28 0.15 0.33 
CZ 0.33 0.35 0.27 0.13 0.1 
GER 0.36 0.33 0.27 0.13 0.19 
POL 0.23 0.3 0.17 0.08 0.37 
SLO 0.19 0.29 0.2 0.1 0.38 
SVK 0.23 0.36 0.31 0.15 0.1 
 
Fifth, Question 14 focuses on the various tools of political parties used for election campaigning. 
Table 7.10 shows the shares of election campaigning budget dedicated to five sets of tools: face-to-face 
campaigning, outdoor campaign (billboards and posters), print media, internet media and social networks, 
and the rest (including TV and radio campaigning). The last category is largest for parties with largest 
budgets, which reflects the relatively high prices of television advertising. The share of campaigning budget 
spent on print media, on the other hand, decreases the larger a party has its budget. The probable cause 
behind this inverse relationship is the relatively large part of budgets regional and local parties spent on 
advertisments in local newspapers. In addition, Table 7.10 shows two small deviations of single categories: 
in the budget size (weight) classification, super heavyweight parties spend less on internet advertising and 
social media than other party classes. In the division according to countries, Polish political parties are those 
that spend significantly less on the Internet than parties in other countries. 
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Table 7.11: Do you use different strategies for different types of election campaigns? (share of the group) 
  Different 
strategy 
Same 
budget 
Same 
strategy   
SW 83.3 0.0 16.7 
HW 80.0 20.0 0.0 
MW 59.1 13.6 27.3 
LW 41.9 35.5 22.6 
BW 32.4 38.2 29.4 
AT 70.0 20.0 10.0 
CZ 47.6 31.0 21.4 
GER 44.4 27.8 27.8 
POL 72.7 18.2 9.1 
SLO 44.4 33.3 22.2 
SVK 38.9 27.8 33.3 
 
Sixth and last, in Question 15, respondents were asked whether their campaigning style or strategy 
differs for different levels of elections, i.e., European, national, local. Out of the 109 parties that answered 
this question, in 54 cases, the strategy for each of the levels of elections differed significantly and this 
difference affected also the structure of the campaigning budget, in 30 differed, but not in budgetary items, 
and in 24 cases, the strategy did not differ. The average weightclass of respondents choosing the first option 
was, when recoded to the three-point scale, 3.24, the second option 4.14, and the last option 4.04. Table 7.11 
follows the suit of the previous Tables showing the shares of the dataset classified according to weight 
classes and countries. Super heavyweight parties in the dataset apparently have in their majority different 
strategies for different elections, same as heavy- and middleweight parties. Light- and bantamweight 
parties, on the other hand, follow the same strategy for different types of elections. In the national 
classification, the most strategy-concerned appear to be Polish and Austrian parties. Again, the cause 
behind these numbers remains a mystery and it may be so that it is only an unbalance in the analysed 
dataset. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The present work’s stated goal is to contribute to the discussion on cartelisation in the party systems 
of East Central Europe. The work’s contribution to the research field is to be found in a thorough analysis of 
the budgets of political parties in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, to a smaller degree also of the 
budgets of political parties in Austria, Germany and Slovenia. 
In total thirty arguments found in the existing scholarly literature are discussed in the present work, 
with a focus on their relation to budgets and election strategies of political parties. These arguments are 
analysed with the help of basic tools of quantivative statistical analysis and the qualitative method of 
comparison of selected features of the analysed cases. 
The work’s analytical part is based on two new original datasets. The first one, where data on 
budgets of political parties are collected, uses publicly available sources found in both the off-line as well as 
the on-line world of today. The second one uses original data collected by the means of an electronic 
questionnaire send to representatives of political parties in the six researched countries. In the near future, I 
plan to allow the public free access to both datasets, as much as it is possible to keep the promise of 
anonymisation of the data in the questionnaires. Personally, I believe that the collection of these data might 
be maybe the most beneficial part of the research project for the political science community. The data 
already in the present work show several interesting phenomena currently happening in East Central 
European party systems and other researchers might discover and explore even more of them. 
The first phenomenon of note is that the size and structure of party budgets are influenced by two 
distinct abstract causal agents, which I conceptualise as the rule drive and the strategy drive. The rule drive 
is the part of a party’s budget that is predominantly formed by legal regulations on political parties, their 
funding and activities. On the income side, the rule drive is mostly visible in the share of party budget 
comprised by state subsidies. On the expenditure side, the rule drive is most apparent in the legal limits of 
expenses parties may allocate to election campaigning. In addition, the rule drive encompasses also the 
various limits on donations permittable to be accepted by political parties, limits on parties‘ business 
activities, or the legal fees that parties are obliged to pay to enter certain types of elections.  
The strategy drive is the causal agent that is predominantly formed by parties‘ free decisions on how 
they wish to conduct their day-to-day activities and their election campaigning. On the income side, the 
strategy drive is represented by the amount of membership fees collected, donations accepted or loans taken 
out. On the expenditure side, the strategy drive is the formula by which political parties allocate their 
financial assets to the various activities each political party carries out: office operations, administrative 
work for their elected representatives and officials, education of party members and promotion towards the 
public in general, election campaigning.  
In the present work, I focus on how these two concepts affect the basic and most visible parts of 
parties‘ budgets: how large a part of parties‘ revenues comes from state subsidies, how large from 
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membership fees and how large from private donations and loans. On the expenditure side, I am primarily 
interested in how large a part of parties‘ expenses is devoted to election campaigning. 
From the data collected stands out the second notable phenomenon dealt with in the present work: 
parties in their lifetime go through an evolution of their budgets, from one relying mostly on private 
donations and spending the majority of assets on elections to one relying on membership fees, state 
subsidies in the case of an electoral sucess, and spending a larger part of assets on activities not related to 
election campaigning. Such a budget evolution is theoretically quite easily conceivable and is now 
confirmed by hard data. 
However, this budget evolution depends largely on the size of their budget – parties with smaller 
budgets feature also a different budget structure than parties with budgets larger. This rule applies across 
the spectrum, from the largest parties in the dataset to the smallest one. The quantitative data on budget 
sizes are in the present work translated into a language of explanation by turning them into meaningful 
categories, into which political parties are divided. These categories are here labeled weight classes, 
mimicking the weight classes found in the boxing world. From the budgetarily smallest bantamweight 
parties, with annual budgets up to €10 thousand, to the budgetarily largest super heavyweight parties, with 
annual budgets over €10 million, all parties in the researched countries (and in general, all parties 
everywhere) may be classified by this simple, but helpful measure. 
Based on these categories, the third important phenomenon is noted: the largest, super heavy parties 
in East Central Europe receive the bulk of all public funding. The model of subsidies distribution differs in 
the researched countries: the two largest, super heavy parties in the Czech Republic received in the 
observed period in total over  €70 million, in Poland over €88 million. Parties of the heavyweight class, in 
both countries five of them, received over €15 and €20 million, respectively. These numbers show that it is 
difficult to assess whether one system is more cartelised than the other on the basis of distributed state 
subsidies; while the largest parties in the Czech Republic may have relatively received a larger share of 
public funding than the largest parties in Poland, in total 45 different Czech parties were between 2003 and 
2013 awarded subsidies, while only 13 of Polish parties. 
It is easier and less arguable to assess the relative transparency of the models of party regulations 
and regulations of party funding found in each of the researched country. Austria, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia and Poland are in the recent time undergoing a turn towards more transparency, with new laws 
already in place or currently being adopted. The Czech Republic is noticeably lagging behind and the pro-
reform mood has not as yet resulted in anything more than a draft law currently being debated in the 
cabinet. The draft should be discussed on the floor of the Czech parliament in spring 2015 and the Open 
Society Fund was kind enough to provide me with a grant, of which goal is to transform my research 
findings into a series of up-to-date briefs and analyses that ought to help push through the parliament a law 
truly improving the transparency of the Czech party funding model. 
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The fourth phenomenon discussed in the present work is that certain features of budgets, including 
its size and structure, correlate with certain party strategies. In Chapter 7, this relationship is mostly 
discussed from the direction of budgets as the causal agents to strategies as the outcomes, but is it most 
definitely a bi-directional relationship. In simple terms, parties of certain budget size and structure have 
different campaigning strategies, different policies and different opinions than parties of different budget 
size and structure. The collected data shows interesting links between several variables, from the logically 
most obvious, such as parties with large subsidies share in their budgets see as legitimate larger subsidies 
share than parties without subsidies, to less obvious, such as heavyweight and middleweight parties spend 
a significantly larger share of their election expenses on the Internet than super heavyweight parties. 
The fifth and maybe most intriguing phenomenon is the behaviour of a specific set of parties that are 
in the researched dataset mostly found in the heavyweight and middleweight class. The above mentioned 
deviation in strategy is only one of several features that these parties seem to uniquely possess. These 
parties also keep their election campaign spending higher than the rest of the group and their budgets do 
not go through the same evolutionary shift as do the budgets of standard parties. They do not increase their 
fee-paying membership and do not sustain significant day-to-day activities not directly related to election 
campaigning. These parties seem to be recently, since 2007 at the latest, most successful in challenging the 
‘cartel’ established by larger parties in national parliaments. The set of these parties appears to overlap in a 
large part with the set of ‘populist’ parties as discussed in other, ideology and party programme-oriented 
literature. Or, in a restated, less firm but more exciting conclusion, the populist parties are in their majority 
distinguished not only by their programmatic profile, but also by the structure of their budgets and related 
party strategy features. 
Ultimately, the present work does not lead to shocking discoveries and does not amount to a 
challenge of already existing concepts. However, it does provide a lot of empirical evidence for the 
discussion of the concept of ‘cartel’ in the region of East Central Europe. It supports with hard data some of 
the folk theorems present today in debates on politics of the region and refines some arguments. In the end, 
the work will hopefully create a firm data and conceptual basis for further research of party funding in East 
Central Europe and provide other scholars with some interesting notions and ideas to ponder. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
Allow me to turn to you with the following request: 
I am a PhD student at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Lucca, Italy (see the school’s current students at this 
website and my academic resume here). My dissertation research focuses on the question of regulations on political 
parties in six Central European countries: Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Apart 
from the current state of law, I am interested in the election campaigning and funding strategies that political parties 
employ.  
For that reason, I would like you ask to if you would kindly agree to help me with my research by filling a short 
questionnaire, which includes in total 14 (semi-)closed questions. The questionnaire should be filled by your campaign 
manager, general secretary, chairman or simply the person(s) who knows the most about your party position on 
existing party regulations, election campaigns, and your campaign budgets. 
The 14 questions ask about your opinion on the current party regulation in your country (4 questions), possible 
changes to the law that you would like to see (4 questions) and also how the current legislation affects your strategies 
when selecting campaigning tools and campaign budgets before elections (6 questions). 
The questionnaire is attached to this email in .doc format; I selected the format as the most widely used and end-user 
friendly format that is easy to fill in. The guidelines (3 sentences) can be found on the first page of the questionnaire.  
In its simplest form, the questionnaire takes 10 minutes to fill: however, if you choose to spend on it more time and 
write down more detailed answers, I would very much appreciate it. If you cannot answer all the questions asked, I 
would feel obliged for any number of answers you provide. 
As you can also read at the start of the questionnaire, I commit myself not to share, without your explicit consent, the 
data you send me with no third person. The data will be used solely for the purpose of my dissertation research and 
will be anonymized so as to make identification of the surveyed person and his or her party impossible (again, subject 
to your explicit consent); the survey is being sent in total to 319 political parties and movements, which makes the 
process of anonymization easier and quite safe. Apart from my PhD scholarship, the survey is not subject to any 
external funding or supervisory body and the data will be neither seen nor stored by anyone but me. 
I would very much appreciate if you could send me back your answers by mid-January 2014 or sooner.  
I realize that my request is not small and that the questionnaire increases your workload. Therefore, for any 
information on the subject you are willing to share, I would be very grateful indeed. Afterwards, I can offer you an 
exclusive first-view of the results of the survey and my entire dissertation research, on which you will be very 
welcome to comment and criticize points you consider problematic. If you have questions related to my person, my 
research, data protection or any other issue, please, feel free to reach me on this email, my second email 
(vit.simral@imtlucca.it), my Skype (vit.simral) or my Czech phone number (+420 606 220 985). 
Thanking you in advance for your kind answer! 
Yours gratefully, Vit Simral 
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Political Campaign Survey 
Date and place: 
Author’s name, home address and phone number: Vit Simral, Prachovska 383, Jicin, 50601, Czech Republic, 
+420 606 220 985 
1. The author of the survey pledges to use the acquired data solely for the use of his own academic 
research, namely his PhD dissertation written at the IMT Institute for Advanced Studies in Lucca and 
related academic outputs, such as contributions to academic journals, academic monographs and 
chapters in monographs. All other uses of the data are prohibited without the explicit consent of the 
persons and parties surveyed. Common rules of publishing ethics apply. 
2. The author pledges not to share the survey results and information included in the survey with a third 
person without the explicit consent of the person and party surveyed. Access of the data will be limited 
to the author of the survey and secured by means of professional-level technical safety precautions. 
3. The author pledges to anonymize all acquired data to the level where it is no longer possible to identify 
the party and the person surveyed without their the explicit consent. 
Distributed by means of electronic mail to all political parties and movements registered by national 
authorities as active on 31 December 2012 in Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
Guidelines: Please, underscore (Ctrl + U), make bold (Ctrl + B) or change the font color of the selected 
option (depending on your own preference). If you do not know the answer to the question and do not care 
for making an informed guess, please, specify so in the space below questions (e.g., write “not known”). 
Also, if you want to change the level of anonymization for a particular question from the survey (i.e., other, 
than selected in the first question), please, also specify that in the space below the question. In that space, 
feel free to share as many details about your campaigning strategies and campaign budgets as you want to.  
I would very much appreciate if you could send me back your answers by mid-January 2014 or sooner. 
Any information you share will be more than welcome and will contribute to the overall data yield of the 
survey! 
Name of your party: 
Your position in the party: 
1) What level of anonymization of the data extracted from your answers do you prefer? 
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a) I allow publishing the data namely, as referring directly to my party. 
b) I allow publishing the data anonymized, only as a statistical variable (i.e., my answers will be hidden 
among the answers received from other parties from Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia and the party’s name will not be deducible). 
Space for your own words: 
2) What is your opinion about the current system of regulation of the working and funding of political 
parties in Slovenia (select more options if you wish so)? 
a) The system is liberal and it should remain so. 
b) The system is liberal too much and it should become more regulated. 
i) Party funding should become more regulated. 
ii) The everyday operations of political parties should become more regulated. 
iii) The campaign activities of political parties should become more regulated. 
c) The system is regulated enough and it should remain so. 
d) The system is regulated too much and it should become less regulated. 
i) Party funding should become less regulated. 
ii) The everyday operations of political parties should become less regulated. 
iii) The campaign activities of political parties should become less regulated. 
Space for your own words: 
3) Does your party have an official policy or an unofficial consensual stance on the law of political parties 
and other regulations on political parties? 
a) Yes. 
b) No. 
Space for your own words: 
4) Is there an internal discussion inside your party on the topic of a new potential law on political parties 
and/or political funding? 
a) Yes. 
b) No. 
Space for your own words: 
5) What are, in your opinion, the most useful tools in making the system of party regulation more 
transparent and/or enhancing democracy in Slovenia (both tools that are already in place as well as 
those that might be wise to include in a new law)? Please, write them down (e.g., an independent 
supervisory organ, caps on spending / incomes, auditors selected by draw, transparent bank accounts, 
state-guaranteed air time on national media, state-guaranteed space for outdoor poster/billboard 
campaign, identifiable party donors, identifiable buyer and owner of political advertisements, etc.) 
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a) … 
b) … 
c) … 
d) … 
e) … 
Space for your own words: 
6) In almost all countries in Europe, state subsidizes some political parties. Do you think that the limits on 
eligibility for subsidies from the state in Slovenia should be changed? 
a) No, the current scope of eligibility should remain as it is. 
b) Yes, more parties should be eligible for state subsidies. 
c) Yes, fewer parties should be eligible for state subsidies. 
Space for your own words: 
7) Is state subsidization in your opinion legitimate? What ideally should be the share of state money in a 
party’s budget to promote political transparency and/or democracy in Slovenia? 
a) More than 90 per cent. 
b) Between 61 and 90 per cent. 
c) Between 31 and 60 per cent. 
d) Between 11 and 30 per cent. 
e) Up to 10 per cent. 
Space for your own words: 
8) What share of revenues of political parties should constitute small donations to promote political 
transparency and/or democracy in Slovenia (please, specify here the amount of money you consider to 
be a small donation: … )? 
a) More than 90 per cent. 
b) Between 61 and 90 per cent. 
c) Between 31 and 60 per cent. 
d) Between 11 and 39 per cent. 
e) Up to 10 per cent. 
Space for your own words: 
9) Do you believe that caps on campaign expenditures are beneficial for the transparency and/or 
democratic legitimacy of elections? If so, does it apply to all elections? 
a) No, caps are not beneficial.  
b) Yes, caps are beneficial in the case of all elections. 
c) Yes, they are beneficial but only in the case of these specific elections (please, write them down): … 
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Space for your own words: 
10) Please, write down in months, weeks or days how long lasted (from the campaign day until the election 
day) your election campaign in the last… 
a) European Election: … 
b) National Election 
c) Local Election: … 
Space for your own words: 
11) Please, write down the exact or approximate number of election campaign managers working in your 
party: 
a) At the European level: … 
b) At the National level: … 
c) At the local level: … 
d) In total: … 
e) From these, the number of paid campaign manager (both full-time and part-time): … 
Space for your own words: 
12) Who regularly contributes to the planning of your party’s election campaign (check one or more 
options)? 
a) Chairman of the party. 
b) Other members of the chairmanship (deputy chairmen, ordinary members of the chairmanship). 
c) Secretary General. 
d) Campaign manager who is not a member of the chairmanship. 
e) Hired PR professionals. 
f) Party members at lower levels (regions, local). 
g) Volunteer non-partisans. 
h) Party candidates. 
Space for your own words: 
13) Expenses spend on campaigns at different levels of elections vary: the folk wisdom says that parties in 
Europe spend most on campaign for National Elections, less on European, regional or local elections. 
Please, write down how much your party spends (in an actual sum of money or as a share of your 
annual budget) on campaigning for: 
a) European Election: … 
b) National Election: 
c) Local Election: … 
Space for your own words: 
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14) Expenses spend on different campaign tools also vary: the folk wisdom again says that parties in Europe 
spend most on TV and radio advertisements and on outdoor campaign such as billboards and posters 
and spend the least on social networks (Facebook, Twitter). Please, write down how much your party 
spends (in an actual sum of money or as a share of your campaign budget) on: 
a) Face-to-face campaign (meetings, workshops, discussion tables, seminars): … 
b) Outdoor campaign (leaflets, billboards, posters, LED panels): … 
c) Air advertising (radio, TV): … 
d) Printed advertising (newspapers, journals): … 
e) Internet advertising (banners, website): 
f) Social networks (Facebook, Twitter): 
g) Other (please, specify): 
Space for your own words: 
15) Finally, the last open question: does your campaigning style or strategy differ for different levels of 
elections, i.e., European, national, local? If so, is this difference also reflected in the structure of your 
campaign budget? Please, especially with this question, use the free space to write any detail about your 
campaigning styles and budget differences you feel like sharing. 
a) Yes, there are fundamental differences in the campaigns for different elections and this is also 
reflected in our campaign budgets. Specifically: … 
b) There are some campaign differences but the differences in respective campaign budgets are 
minimal. Specifically: … 
c) No, our campaigning styles and strategies as well as budget structures are the same for each level of 
election. 
Space for your own words: 
Please, send the filled the questionnaire to the address vit.simral@imtlucca.it or vit.simral@gmail.com. 
 
Thank you very much for your contribution! 
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